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Abstract
This study addresses the question of how international financial 
standardisation is influenced by private actors. It firstly proposes that private 
influence is part of a ‘supply and demand’ relationship where regulators 
demand private power capabilities to enhance their own political or policy 
needs and private actors willingly supply these capabilities to influence 
outcomes. Captured outcomes as a result of this relationship are likely to 
arise when demand for a specific private capability is high; that is, when 
regulators are not able to fulfil their regulatory roles and policy requirements 
without private power capabilities, due to the specialised and technical 
nature of specific regulatory issue areas. However, captured outcomes are not 
likely to arise when demand for private capabilities is low. Demand for 
private power may be low when private power capabilities have fulfilled the 
regulator’s initial policy purpose, or when regulators perceive the capability 
to be a threat to their political and/or policy making authority. Following on 
from this, the study then explores how supply and demand relationships 
produce outcomes that are captured or not. The study’s central thesis is 
relationships that mutually benefit both regulators and private market actors 
are bound by institutions and as a result, private influence may be enhanced 
and/or constrained in institutionalised settings. Regulators will use 
institutional mechanisms to include private actors when the demand for 
private power is high, and exclude private actors when the demand for 
private power is low. This means that whilst institutions can facilitate 
capture, they can also frustrate and constrain private actors from producing 
outcomes which are favourable to their vested interests. As a result, financial 
standards outcomes are likely to encapsulate both public and private 
interests, the extent of either depending on the supply and demand dynamics 
interceding with institutional mechanisms.
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Introduction 
International Financial Standardisation and 
the Question of Influence
The global financial system has experienced one of the most serious financial 
crises since the Great Depression1. As the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) Chief Economist Olivier Blanchard grimly announced in January 
2009, “We now expect the global economy to come to a virtual halt" (IMF 
2009). The current global economic climate is therefore timely as it lends 
serious weight to the urgent need for policymakers around the world to 
establish new ways of governing a ‘new world order’ in globalised financial 
market activity. It also presents an opportunity to understand and evaluate 
how the current architecture for global financial governance was unable to 
stem the systemic breakdown of financial markets.
Private influence over financial policymaking has been a particularly 
pervasive theme in commentary on the causes of the global financial crisis2. 
Politicians and regulators in the advanced economies have acknowledged 
“major failures in the financial sector and in financial regulation and 
supervision” as fundamental causes of the crisis, allowing excessive risk 
taking and leverage to build up in the global financial system (Group of 20 
2008). The former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan 
acknowledges that he “made a mistake” in presuming that banks were
1 The global financial crisis is with reference to the period 2007-2009.
2 Refer Chapter 2 for more examples of policymakers and academics accounts o f the causes of the 
global financial crisis.
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capable of protecting the interests of their own shareholders (Greenspan 
2008). Nobel Prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz (2009) has blamed 
such “capitalist fools” for embracing such a fundamentally flawed economic 
philosophy.
Notwithstanding the global financial crisis, private influence over 
public policymaking has been a core issue that has interested scholars from 
the economic, political and social sciences for some time. The question of 
private influence is a pertinent one in an era of financial globalisation where 
‘influence’ transcends national borders into global policymaking forums. This 
study also looks more fundamentally at the issue of influence and how 
influence is conceptualised in the field of international financial 
standardisation. In particular, it looks at how private actors are involved in 
the formation of international financial standardss and the nature of the 
relationship between private actors and policymakers. It specifically 
addresses the question of how international financial standardisation is 
influenced by private actors and the impact that this influence has on 
standards outcomes.
This study conceptualises private influence in international financial 
standardisation as part of a ‘supply and demand’ relationship where 
regulators demand private power capabilities to enhance their own policy or 
political needs and private actors willingly supply these capabilities to 
influence outcomes. It proposes that captured outcomes as a result of this 
relationship are likely to arise when demand for a specific private capability is 
high; that is, when regulators are unable to fulfil their regulatory roles and
3 The formation of international financial standards is otherwise referred to in this study as 
international financial standardisation.
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policy requirements without private power capabilities, due to the specialised 
and technical nature of specific regulatory issue areas. However, this study 
also proposes that captured outcomes are not likely to arise when demand for 
private capabilities is low. Demand for private power may be low when 
private power capabilities have fulfilled the regulator’s initial purpose, or 
when regulators perceive the capability to be a threat to their political and/or 
policy-making authority.
Following on from this, the study then explores how supply and 
demand relationships produce outcomes which are captured or not. The 
study’s central thesis is that because regulators lack formal legislative 
authority in transnational governance arenas, they utilise institutional 
mechanisms as a primary substitute for this in order to either enhance or 
constrain private power. At the transnational level of governance, 
relationships that mutually benefit both regulators and private market actors 
are bound by institutions and as a result, private influence may be enhanced 
and/or constrained in institutionalised settings. Regulators will therefore use 
these mechanisms, in the form of adopting institutional practices, to include 
private actors when the demand for private power is high, and exclude 
private actors when the demand for private power is low. This means that 
whilst institutional practices can facilitate capture, they can also frustrate and 
constrain private actors from producing outcomes that are favourable to their 
interests. As a result, standards outcomes are likely to encapsulate both 
public and private interests, the extent of either depending on the supply and 
demand dynamics interceding with the use of institutional mechanisms.
3
l . i  Global financial m ark e ts  and  the  d iscree t w orld  of 
in te rn a tio n a l financia l s tan d ard isa tio n
Why international financial standardisation? Globalised financial markets 
and domestic regulation
International financial standardisation or ‘standardisation’ in short refers to 
international efforts to coordinate domestic regulatory approaches to 
produce what is considered ‘best practice’ for financial regulation. They are 
‘soft’ laws or rules and are therefore seen as voluntary codes of practice that 
states officially implement on their own accord. Whilst the concept of 
standard-setting is not necessarily new, one remarkable characteristic of 
standardisation has been its widespread proliferation in the last few decades 
across a diverse range of issue areas. The IMF for instance lists twelve 
different international standard setting agencies for ten different issue areas 
in finance, some of which are even private industry organisations^.
The question that is raised is why standards and why ‘technocratic’ 
standard-setting agencies? Globalised financial activity and its associated 
risks have posed a serious dilemma for financial regulators. This is because 
financial conglomerates are often made up of branch networks, subsidiary 
networks and joint ventures, and the regulatory treatment of these various 
pieces of the conglomerate puzzle will depend and differ across regulatory 
jurisdictions. Branch networks for instance are considered to be part of the 
same legal entity as the parent company, and branches established in foreign 
jurisdictions are therefore considered to be regulated by the parent
4 The issue areas are: Accounting, Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing o f  Terrorism 
(AML/CFT), Auditing, Banking, Corporate Governance, Data, Fiscal Transparency, Insolvency and 
Creditor, Monetary and Financial Transparency and Securities. Refer to the IMF website,
http://www.imf.org/extcmal/standards/agencv.htm
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company’s regulatory authority. Foreign subsidiaries however are legally 
independent from their parent institution. This means that foreign 
subsidiaries come under the regulatory jurisdiction of the country in which it 
is incorporated and therefore the rules that apply to the parent institution 
may differ markedly from those rules applied to its subsidiary. In contrast to 
branches and subsidiaries, joint ventures sit within the ‘grey zone’ of 
regulatory jurisdiction, and depend ultimately on the domestic laws 
applicable to rules governing foreign ownership. Theoretically (and 
practically), one financial conglomerate operating globally could be regulated 
by numerous domestic regulatory authorities. The implications for regulatory 
arbitrage are clear if those authorities apply different rules to the same 
transactions within the same conglomerate.
The dilemma is that whilst financial transactions are taking place 
through complex conglomerate networks across countries, regulation is still 
firmly rooted in domestic legal jurisdictions. This difficulty has been 
described as the fundamental conflict between a globalised market and 
localised state control (Blair 1998: 398). International standards therefore 
are, by their very definition, designed for differences in national supervisory 
systems so that the same rules and standards for supervision can be adopted 
and then adapted to suit local legal structures and supervisory techniques. 
International standards rely on what the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) has described as ‘consolidated supervision’ which means 
that supervisors around the world adopt the same practices (as 
recommended by these international standards) when dealing with globally
5
active financial conglomeratess. International standards are thus a function 
of both sovereignty on the one hand and globalisation on the other.
In principle therefore, the proliferation of standards solves the difficult 
contradiction between the globalisation of financial markets and the 
sovereignty and prerogatives of domestic regulation. Standardisation allows 
for regulation to rest with domestic regulators whilst at the same time 
creating global uniformity so that global capital can be monitored throughout 
a global regulatory ‘web’. Standardisation as ‘soft law’6 therefore has been a 
much more appealing solution to the problems associated with financial 
globalisation and has therefore proliferated at a much faster rate than more 
formal law. However, unlike the well known international financial 
institutions such as the IMF, World Bank or even institutions such as the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the 
United Nations (UN), which have attracted a lot of public attention for their 
mandates in international financial governance, little is known about the 
international standard-setting regimes in the wider public, despite their 
significant mandate. In fact, these technocratic bodies have little to do with 
broader public constituencies, other than the ones that take an active interest 
in their work, which are the financial sector and financial regulators.
Prior to the onset of the global financial crisis, the nature and 
proliferation of efforts by standard-setting regimes to govern financial 
globalisation through international financial standardisation had been
5 Refer BCBS, History o f  the Basel Committee and its Membership,
http://www.bis.ore/bcbs/historv.pd f?noframcs:=:l
6 However, the ‘softness’ o f  standards is increasingly been called into question, not only because o f  
the pressure to follow the lead o f  the dominant markets but also because o f  the role international 
financial institutions have played in promulgating these standards as part o f  their surveillance and 
financial market development mandates. See for instance Simmons (2000) who argues that the 
dominant regulator uses various means to get others to harmonise.
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increasingly scrutinised by scholars. The exclusivity of this new breed of 
technocratic elite was seen to be problematic because these governance 
forums were argued to be disproportionately influenced by the market (Baker 
2006). Despite the attention that this issue has attracted from an increasing 
number of scholars, it still remains a vexed topic, with debate focusing not so 
much on whether policymakers are influenced by private market actors but 
rather, how they are influenced. These debates form part of a wider literature 
that highlights the growing concerns surrounding the role of private actors in 
international financial governance, which are explored further in this study.
The question o f influence: state power, transnational capture and private 
authority in international financial standardisation
Scholarship in the field of international financial standardisation has 
provided a rich cross section of approaches that account for private influence. 
Earlier accounts of international financial standardisation encapsulate the 
way in which powerful states, their domestic institutions and domestic 
political pressures influenced the production of international financial 
standardisation outcomes. Private influence in this literature is embedded 
within the domestic political economy, and standards outcomes at the 
international level of coordination are argued to be the result of state power 
(Kapstein 1994, Oatley and Nabors 2001, Simmons 2001, Drezner 2004, 
Singer 2004).
More recent developments in the literature on private influence in 
international financial standardisation highlight the transnational 
characteristics of private influence, where private market actors not only 
participate directly in international financial policy forums but also exercise
7
their own ‘authority’ in financial governance (Baker 2006, Cutler et al 1999). 
Rather than seeing private influence as embedded within a domestic political 
structure, private actors from the major economic powers are identified as 
agents in their own right, acting on their own behalf in increasingly global 
networks. Private influence in this conceptualisation transcends domestic 
national borders and is seen to operate directly at the global standard-setting 
level.
This literature also characterises standard-setting regimes as a type of 
‘transgovemmentalism’? involving specialists in a particular regulatory area 
who are focused solely on technical problem solving (Baker 2006:17). Private 
sector participation is said to have become increasingly important in this 
transnational setting, where the close nature of interaction between public 
regulators and financial institutions has provided financial sector actors with 
more opportunities to influence and capture policy making in monetary and 
financial governance (Underhill and Zhang 2003, Baker 2006, Mosley 2006). 
The main problem highlighted by scholars is that there is a ‘democratic 
deficit’ in the composition of standards regimes. The composition of 
standard-setting regimes is seen to be unrepresentative, comprising not only 
the elite few from the advanced economies but also private market 
participants (Baker 2006). Furthermore, because deliberation and 
discussions focus on detail and are highly technical, to the wider public these 
discussions and policy deliberations “appear to be impenetrable and opaque” 
(Baker 2006:17).
7 Transgovemmentalism was a term used by Keohane and Nye (1974).
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Policy deliberation is above all characterised as exclusive and narrow, 
where the standardisation process is said to lack any form of accountability as 
it is by its very nature a transnational regime of private interests that extend 
beyond any one particular state (Underhill and Zhang 2003). What is most 
concerning for some scholars is that whilst the operation and practices of 
financial sectors have a direct impact on the broader community and public 
interest generally, it is only “significant players in national financial sectors 
who tend to be listened to by the constituent regulatory authorities involved 
in these types of technical solving networks” (Baker 2006:17). Consequently, 
it has been argued that international financial standards regimes have 
become instruments of private influence and private economic interests as 
opposed to the interests of the public (Underhill and Zhang 2003).
The implication of these claims is that this ‘new world order’ of 
interlinked institutionalised networks of public regulators and private market 
interests poses significant dilemmas for the governance of global finance 
(Slaughter 2004). On the one hand, finance is inherently technical and 
requires an in-depth knowledge of the way in which its complexities operate. 
However on the other hand, critics of this view argue that the governance of 
global finance is not simply a technical issue and more importantly has 
broader political and public welfare implications (Underhill 1995, Porter 
2001, Griffith-Jones 2003). The discreet and specialised nature of the these 
standard-setting regimes is therefore seen to be a problematic area of 
financial governance which many scholars believe is highly susceptible to 
industry influence and capture.
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Prior to the global financial crisis, scholars had warned that this 
setting “provide private interests with the opportunity to capture policy­
making and regulatory processes in the financial domain and to influence the 
nature of monetary and financial governance” (Underhill and Zhang 2003). 
The fact that private market actors are involved in the development of 
international financial standards, which by definition are supposed to govern 
their behaviour has increasingly been scrutinised. Above all, these scholars 
have argued that the involvement of private actors in standardisation is 
argued to produce ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ and the winners in this case are 
private market interests. This means that public regulators not only act on 
behalf of private interests, but they have also normatively ‘bought-in’ to the 
normative discourse which underpins the market. Regulation as a result 
becomes ‘market-based’ and in this environment, “greater levels of autonomy 
are necessarily conferred upon market actors” (Underhill 1995: 257).
This study shares the assumptions made in this transnational body of 
literature that private market actors have become a core feature of new forms 
of authority and governance in the global realm (Graz and Nolke 2007). 
However, where it seeks to further its inquiry is how this feature of private 
influence affects policy outcomes. Research on transnational governance that 
encompasses both public and private elements is a fertile ground for 
exploring private influence in international financial standardisation. 
Nevertheless, an underlying weakness found in the existing literature is that 
it pre-determines both outcome (captured outcomes) and causality of 
outcome (private influence) without addressing the causal mechanisms which 
lead to a situation of private capture.
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Private actors who participate in these global deliberative spaces are 
assumed to affect outcomes because of their close interaction with 
policymakers, but there is limited analysis on how participation and 
closeness in these forums leads to capture. This study argues therefore that 
there is further scope to enrich the literature by examining what participation 
and closeness constitutes and how participation and closeness produces 
outcomes. This may then shed light on how private actors are able to 
influence these global forums.
1.2 Private influence in  international financial standardisation: 
core propositions
Core propositions: participation and closeness as the supply and demand o f 
private power
Before examining how private participation in international financial 
standardisation and the close relationship between private actors and 
regulators can lead to captured outcomes, we begin by firstly looking at what 
‘influence’ is more generally. There are three main approaches to power in 
international relations which provide the basis for an understanding of what 
private influence constitutes. These are firstly the ‘instrumentalist’ 
perspectives, which emphasise the ability of private market actors to act 
cohesively in the political arena to pursue to political goals, using largely their 
material resources or other capabilities; secondly the ‘structural dependency’ 
approaches which emphasise power through the dependency within a market 
system that the state has on private sector activity and profitability; and 
finally the cultural or discursive approaches, which focus on the ideological 
paradigms that private market actors generate based on their private sector
11
activity {Levy and Egan 2000). Private actors possess these three sources of 
instrumental, structural and discursive power in political arenas and can as a 
result of these sources of power influence political activity.
Whilst this study acknowledges the potential importance of all three 
sources of power that private actors can possess, this study looks more closely 
at the instrumental forms of private power in standard-setting forums and 
how interaction between public and private actors in these forums can lead to 
captured outcomes. This requires us to look at the theoretical underpinnings 
of ‘capture’, which this study argues to be derived from the theory of 
economic regulation, pioneered by Stigler (1971). This literature stipulated 
that regulation was supplied to those private industry actors who had the 
most demand for obtaining favourable regulation, who would in turn provide 
political actors with votes and resources. As a result, Stigler argued that 
regulation acquired by the industry with the most demand is designed and 
operated primarily for its benefit (Stigler 1971). This literature therefore 
emphasises the instrumental nature of private power, where the supply of 
capabilities through votes and resources is the primary motivation for public 
actors to produce favourable regulatory ‘goods’. From this perspective, at the 
heart of regulatory capture is an exchange of instrumental capabilities, 
derived from the material, technical and human resources that private actors 
can generate from their market activities.
Consistent with this approach, this study explores the potential of 
conceptualising private influence as private instrumental power that is part of 
a ‘supply and demand’ principle espoused by the theory of economic 
regulation. However, whilst this study adopts the underlying proposition that
12
there is a supply and demand for private power capabilities, it takes a slightly 
different approach to the model advanced by Stigler (1971) and argues that 
captured relationships can result from a demand by public actors for private 
favour and a corresponding supply of this favour from private actors, 
generating a ‘win-win’ situation for both parties. One of the core propositions 
advanced in this study is that private market actors don’t exercise 
instrumental power over public actors but instead supply power to 
policymakers who have a willing and ready demand for it. Importantly, both 
public policymakers and private market actors engage in close relationships 
because they are ultimately rewarded by such a mutually beneficial exchange. 
At the heart of private influence in regulatory governance therefore is an 
incentive for both parties to engage in such mutually beneficial interaction, to 
the exclusion of other interested parties and or stakeholders.
Where this study fundamentally diverges from the theory of economic 
regulation advanced by Stigler (1971) is that capture is not treated as a given 
simply because there is a supply and demand relationship between regulators 
and private industry, but when demand for a specific private capability is 
high; that is, when regulators are unable to fulfil their regulatory roles and 
policy requirements without the input of private power capabilities. High 
demand is accentuated by the fact that financial regulation can be highly 
technical and policy development relies on a limited number of specialists 
with the required knowledge.
This study also challenges the presumption of outcome that is evident 
in the theory of economic regulation, which postulates that regulation 
acquired by the industry is designed and operated primarily for its benefit
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(Stigler 1971). This study proposes instead that demand for private power 
capabilities can fluctuate in accordance with the needs of regulators at a 
particular point in time. As a result, demand for private power capabilities is 
high when regulators are dependent upon the private power source, but this 
demand may also fall when the capability has fulfilled the regulator’s initial 
purpose, and/or when regulators perceive private power to be a threat to 
their authority. Regulators may therefore assess that the cost of acquiring 
private capabilities outweighs the benefit that it could potentially provide in 
the initial transaction costs associated with implementing policy and 
legislation. The self-interest of regulators to preserve their control over 
policy-making (thereby justifying their positions of authority) in this instance 
may be greater than the uncertainty of not being able to produce the required 
regulations.
The causal variables fo r  captured outcomes: institutional mechanisms
Whilst this supply and demand proposition provides the reasons why 
captured relationships may or may not arise between public and private 
actors, this still does not explain how outcomes become captured or not. This 
study proposes that the way in which outcomes become captured is 
contingent upon institutional variables. Specifically, there are three 
institutionalised characteristics of international financial standard-setting 
that act as the causal mechanisms that can either lead to captured outcomes, 
or that prevent outcomes from becoming captured. These characteristics are 
that international standardisation is an exercise in the creation of norms, 
which are dependent on policy-making processes, and which are further 
dependent on collective decision-making structures, consisting of decision
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structures internal to the institution, as well as decision-structures that sit in 
other vertical and horizontal governance networks.
It proposes that whilst institutional boundaries structure and bind 
agents, regulatory agents will attempt to strategically use institutional 
mechanisms to promote their interests by adopting specific practices around 
norm creation, policy processes and decision structures. For instance, when 
their demand for private capabilities is high, regulators will attempt to use 
institutionally generated norms, processes and decision structures to enhance 
private industry preferences if these preferences promote the authority of 
regulators. Alternatively, when their demand is low, regulators will try to use 
institutionally generated norms, processes and decision structures to 
constrain private preferences in order to generate outcomes that promote the 
vested interests of regulators to thereby enhance their authority.
This is because these institutional mechanisms are used as the primary 
‘substitute’ for the legislative authority that regulators lack in the 
transnational governance arenas. As a result, regulatory control over 
institutionally generated norms, processes and decision making allows 
regulators to exercise some degree of authority over the outcomes that supply 
and demand relationships produce. This means that regulators can facilitate 
private preferences over norms, process and decision structure where each of 
these elements is crucially linked in their causality: that is, private power 
must ‘get through’ these stages in order for an outcome to be captured. 
Alternatively, when demand for private capabilities falls, regulators will use 
these mechanisms so that private preferences are not reflected in standards.
15
These propositions can be illustrated in Figure 1.1 and Table 1.2 where 
varying regulatory demand will give rise to different institutional strategies 
which act to either facilitate or constrain private preferential norms.
Figure 1.1 Matrix of Influence
High Demand
High demand/low threat 
Capture
High demand/high threat 
Institutional Constraints
Low demand/low threat 
Status quo
Low demand/high threat 
Institutional control
Low Demand
As seen in Figure 1.1, there are four main scenarios of influence based 
on the varying level of demand and level of perceived threat to regulatory 
authority. Specifically, where there is a high demand and where the use of 
private capabilities is perceived by regulators to enhance their authority (or a 
‘low threat’ from private actors), institutional practices will be used to 
facilitate captured outcomes. The second scenario proposes that a low 
demand and a low threat would simply maintain the status quo. The third 
scenario on the other hand contemplates a high demand but correspondingly 
high threat from private actors. A high threat means that regulators will
16
High 
T
hreat
perceive private capabilities to undermine their political and or policy making 
authority. When this occurs, it is proposed that regulators will impose 
institutional constraints in order to prevent private normative preferences 
from influencing standards outcomes. The last scenario is one where there is 
a low demand but a high threat from private actors, leading to regulatory 
control, where the objective is not only to constrain private normative 
preferences from influencing standards outcomes but also to control private 
market behaviour. This leads us to the question of what exactly these 
corresponding institutional practices are which regulators may resort to in 
order to produce these varying outcomes.
The following table 1.2 provides an illustration of the institutional 
practices that are adopted by regulators in order to facilitate capture, or to 
constrain capture, or more fundamentally control the extent of capture over 
outcomes. These practices are based on the three institutional characteristics 
of international standard-setting forums, namely institutionally generated 
norms, processes and decision structures. It is proposed that these practices 
are used instrumentally by regulators in order to enhance their interests and 
importantly, their political and or policy making authority.
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Table 1.2 Institutional practices to facilitate or constrain private capture
Strategy
y
High demand/low 
th rea t
i
Capture
I
High dem and/high 
th rea t
1
Institutional
Constraints
j
Low dem and/high 
th rea t
i
Institutional
Control
1
Norms Norms sourced from 
private actors, 
drafted by private 
actors
Norms sourced from 
private actors, drafted 
by regulators
Norms sourced from 
and drafted by 
regulators
Private norms 
introduced and 
adopted
Private norms 
reconstructed to 
include vested 
regulatory interests
Private norms 
rejected or existing 
private norms deleted
Norms developed to 
allow private self­
regulation
Norms developed to 
give regulators 
supervisory power
Norms developed to 
give regulators 
legislative power
Process Deliberation with 
private actors 
undertaken 
throughout policy 
development
Limited deliberation 
with private actors 
undertaken in later 
stages of policy 
development
Deliberation with 
private actors not 
undertaken
Frequency of 
meetings with 
regulators increased
Frequency of 
meetings with 
regulators reduced
Access to meetings 
with regulators denied 
or other stakeholders 
included
Comments from 
private industry 
adopted and 
standards changed
Comments from 
private industry 
partially adopted and 
standards partially 
amended
Comments from 
private industry not 
adopted, no changes 
to standards
Decision
Structure
Private decision 
making authority
Private decision 
making authority 
changed to regulatory 
decision making 
authority
No private decision 
making authority
Decision making 
authority at Board, 
sub-committee and 
sub-group levels
Decision making 
authority at Board 
and sub-committee 
decision levels
Decision making 
authority at Board 
level only
Private participation 
in committee 
structure
Private participation 
in committee 
structure limited or 
structured
No private 
participation in 
committee structure
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B&ed on these propositions, captured outcomes in international 
financial standardisation are likely to arise when private actors are able to 
shape the underlying normative framework of standards, these standards 
reflecting market norms are maintained throughout the policy process of 
deliberation and regulatory decision-makers form consensus agreement 
based on these market norms. On the other hand, captured outcomes are not 
likely to arise if private influence over norms, processes and decision 
structures can not be established. This means that regulators have 
constrained the influence of private actors by adopting these institutional 
practices. For instance, when private power capabilities are seen to be 
detrimental, regulators can resort to using the ‘policy machine’ to reconstruct 
or fundamentally pare back the market-based discourse. They can do this by 
introducing new norms that counter market-based ones, or make various 
amendments through the policy process, thereby changing the intended 
utility of market norms designed to enhance private industry activities. 
Regulators in decision-making capacities may also choose to delay, change or 
even eliminate certain market-based norms at the various stages and levels of 
decision-making. Regulators may also resort to changing the nature of 
interaction or even frequency of deliberation with private actors. This means 
that the participation of and interaction with industry could also be closed off 
or opened only at the very last stages of deliberation and undertaken simply 
as a formality.
By establishing whether the institutional practices support or 
constrain capture, we may be better positioned to understand how the nature 
of private capture may differ in accordance with the varying regulatory
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demand, how the power capabilities are supplied, and how these institutional 
practices are used to either enhance or curb private power. Above all, the 
propositions highlight that the relationship between public and private actors 
is a constitutive one; that is, neither public nor private actors can undertake 
governance without the other and their actions are reinforced and constituted 
by the actions of the other. Private capture may simply be a case of private 
power prevailing over outcomes. However, the more interesting possibility is 
that ‘capture’ is a much more embedded and integrative governance 
relationship between public and private actors. Important for this analysis is 
the way in which the institutional boundaries of interaction may determine 
the interaction between public and private actors, which can then yield 
important insights into how institutions can frame a balance between the 
exercise of both public and private power.
1.3 Research D esign and M ethodology
Research design, case selection and limitations
The core question that this study seeks to address is how private influence 
leads to captured outcomes in the field of international financial standard- 
setting. The corollary question is whether private capture is evident in a 
number of different international financial standard-setting arenas. In order 
to examine these questions, this study conducts a comparative empirical 
study of private influence in international financial standardisation. This 
requires us to firstly address the issue of case selection and to outline how the 
study intends to carry out a comparative empirical analysis.
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One research design issue evident in a comparative study of 
international financial standardisation is that standard-setting does not occur 
within defined institutional parameters and the composition of standards 
organisations vary (from wholly ‘public’ to wholly ‘private’ or even 
combined). Standard-setting organisations are therefore not institutionally 
comparable given the differences in member composition, membership size 
and private industry participation. In fact, the literature surveyed earlier in 
this chapter conceptualises capture occurring between regulators and private 
actors, despite variations in the way in which private actors participate in 
these forums. The varying participation of private actors and the resulting 
closeness is treated as a constant.
For this reason, this study applies the ‘most different systems design’ 
approach to this study’s comparative analysis. By adopting this design 
method, this study seeks to examine and explain the phenomenon of ‘capture’ 
below the system level by treating institutional variations as a constant 
(Anckar 2007, Meckstroth 1975). Specifically, the study intends to use cases 
with different systems of public-private interaction as a means to test the 
robustness of the study’s dependent variables, which are firstly whether the 
supply and demand dynamic between regulators and private actors is evident 
across different empirical cases and secondly, whether the same institutional 
practices are used by regulators, despite the differences that exist across 
standard-setting arenas.
Based on this design method, this study has selected three case 
studies, which are characterised by their varying membership composition, 
their different financial industry focus and as a result, the different systems of
21
public-private interaction in place between regulators and private industry. 
The first case study looks at the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS). The BCBS is the standard-setting organisation for international 
banking and is wholly ‘public’ in composition. This means that all decision­
makers that make up the BCBS are public regulators either from a prudential 
supervisory authority or from a central bank. The interaction between the 
BCBS and private industry is characterised as ‘external’, where private 
industry participation is largely through formal consultative mechanisms.
The second case examined is the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). Still considered a publicly mandated standard- 
setter for the international insurance industries, the IAIS is more of a ‘hybrid’ 
institution whose members consist of both public regulators and private 
actors from the world’s insurance firms and industry associations. Unlike the 
BCBS, interaction between the IAIS and private industry is characterised as 
‘internal’ where both public and private actors are present at the policy­
making level.
The third case study looks at the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB). The IASB is the international accounting standards setting 
body and unlike the BCBS and IAIS is a wholly ‘private’ organisation, made 
up of actors from the private sector -  most notably from the accounting 
profession but also further a field from general manufacturing to finance. 
This case study therefore requires a broader examination of the interaction 
between the IASB as the ‘private’ actor and public agencies as ‘regulators’ 
across governance constellations.
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At the same time however, we also need to draw some parameters 
around the selection of these case studies so that we are testing the study’s 
dependent variables within some comparable controls. As such, this study 
has also designed its research around some control variables. These are firstly 
their similar functionality, which is to set international standards for best 
practice. Secondly, they are all undertaken at the same ‘level of governance’, 
which is the international or ‘transnational’ level of governance. Thirdly, this 
study also focuses on international standards that affect prudential 
regulation. This allows the study to isolate the actors involved in each case, 
namely prudential regulators and private industry affected by the standards. 
Finally, it then isolates a similar prudential issue area in each case study, 
which are the issues involving the regulatory capital (in the case of banks), 
the requirement for regulatory provisions (in the case of insurers) and the 
meaning of equity (in the case of accounting standards), which will in general 
be referred to as issues relating to ‘capital’. The similarity of issue area 
enables relative uniformity in terms of private ‘interests’ and hence a better 
comparative assessment across the three cases.
In the case of the BCBS, the two main actors identified were regulatory 
authorities and the large international banks (and their banking 
associations), predominantly from the European Union (EU) and the United 
States (US). In the case of the IAIS, the organisation itself makes this 
distinction between Members who are insurance regulators and private 
Observers, who are insurance firms from predominantly the EU, US and 
Asia, and or industry associations. For the IASB, the Board and its internal 
working groups were identified as ‘private actors’ with its public constituency
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identified as government agencies, central banks or prudential regulatory 
authorities.
A study addressing the question of influence is not without its 
analytical or methodological challenges. The framework proposed in this 
study goes some way in providing a method for uncovering how influence 
operates, but there are still significant challenges that a study of this size is 
unable to overcome. These challenges include generating enough research 
and data to establish comprehensive conclusions about when outcomes are 
captured or constrained. It therefore seeks to limit the comparative analysis 
to one comparable standards outcome issue area, which is used to illustrate 
and support rather than prove the dependent variables in this study.
Method o f research and analysis
With the broader research design in mind, this study conducted qualitative 
research in order to uncover a supply and demand of private capabilities and 
to assess whether and how institutional practices were used to support or 
constrain capture. The study undertook primarily field research, conducting 
interviews with officials from each of the three standard-setting cases. In 
total, the study interviewed 24 officials, 3 of which were conducted on an 
‘informal’ basis where the officials did not wish for the author to record the 
interview proceedings. Specifically, six officials were interviewed for the 
BCBS, one of which was ‘informal’. Three of these officials were from the 
BCBS, and the other three were external to the BCBS. For the IAIS, 16 
officials were interviewed, two of which were ‘informal’. All of these officials 
were involved with the IAIS as either Members or Observers. Four officials 
were interviewed for the IASB. Only one of these officials was from the IASB,
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whilst the other three were from entities external to the IASB but which had 
direct dealings with the IASB.
Obtaining interviews with the BCBS and the IASB was clearly much 
more difficult than the IAIS. As a result, the author relied more on primary 
documents in the cases of the BCBS and IASB and used information from 
interviews to verify the information and analysis of these documents. On the 
other hand, the author was able to obtain a cross-section of information from 
interviewees in the case of the IAIS. As a result, the author used the 
information from interviews as the basis from which to examine primary 
materials to support and substantiate what was said during the interviews.
Interviews that were conducted on formal basis were undertaken in 
the offices of those participants interviewed. Each participant was offered a 
confidentiality agreement; the interviews were recorded and then transcribed 
by the author after the interview had taken place. Furthermore, for 
comparability, all interviewed officials were all asked the same set of 
questions, tailored only to when specific examples of standards given during 
conversation (refer Appendix l  for the list of interview questions).
In addition to the rich first-hand accounts from officials interviewed, 
the study also used primary documents published by the standard-setting 
organisations in each case in order to verify these accounts as well as 
ascertain the historical timelines for the empirical examples given during the 
interviews. The author was also able to obtain confidential primary 
documents that were not available for public viewing. This allowed the author 
to uncover some of the dynamics which were evident ‘behind closed doors’ 
that helped the policy analysis undertaken in this study (discussed below).
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There are evident limitations with the primary materials used in this 
study. Firstly, interviews with officials and analyses of documentation were 
undertaken prior to the onset of the global financial crisis, which was namely 
between 2005 and the beginning of 2007. As a result, the views of officials 
would be markedly different in the current financial climate. Secondly, access 
to primary confidential documents and interviews with key officials within 
each standards regime was made possible because the author is an employee 
of a regulatory authority that is a member of both the BCBS8 and IAIS. There 
are advantages and disadvantages with this privilege.
Beginning with the advantages, the author was able to access 
confidential documents, ‘closed’ meetings to which regulators only had 
access, and one-on-on interviews with regulators who were more open with 
information about the standards issues due to a professional affiliation than 
may otherwise be the case if the author was from the private and or other 
professional sectors. The disadvantages however were that national 
affiliations and confidentiality issues may still have been a consideration for 
regulators disclosing information in interviews, and hence subjective national 
biases are evident in the material obtained. For this reason, the author has 
attempted to obtain interviews from a cross-section of regulators from 
different jurisdictions in order to balance as well as cross-reference these 
different accounts.
Consideration is also given to the possibility that the author may also 
be constrained by professional bias. Factors that help to ensure the author’s
8 However, it should be noted that the authority was not a member o f  the BCBS during the period in 
which research o f  the BCBS was undertaken, which was namely from the period 2006-2008. The 
authority only subsequently became a member o f  the BCBS in 2009 as a result o f  the global financial 
crisis. Refer to the BCBS press release found at http://www.bis.org/press/p090313 .htm
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objectivity are that the author was on leave from the regulatory authority 
whilst conducting research and all of the interviewees understood that the 
author was conducting research for the sole purpose of undertaking a 
doctorate. The regulatory authority has also had no part in the sponsorship of 
the study9, or had any input into the research and findings10. Furthermore, 
prior to the research conducted on the study, the author had no previous 
participation or role in the international standard-setting activities of the 
regulatory authority. The author therefore had limited knowledge about the 
activities of the standard-setting forums, which enabled the author to 
approach the empirical task without the bias of experience.
Based on these sources of research, there are two main tasks of this 
study, which are to establish the supply and demand premise for the 
relationships between public and private actors in each case, and then to 
examine how regulators have attempted to either enhance and/or constrain 
this relationship from producing captured outcomes. It does this by firstly 
establishing whether there is evidence of a power capability that is both 
sought by regulators and then provided by their private constituents. The way 
in which this is undertaken is firstly a historical analysis of the way in which 
each of the standard-setting organisations have developed and to establish 
any reasons for why there may be a historical or functionally driven demand 
for private sector input and a consequent ‘reward’ for the supply. Following
9 The author was given unpaid study leave to undertake the Doctorate for the period 2005-2009. The 
author returned to the regulatory authority from 2007-2008, and again from April 2009 to the current 
period.
10 The author has only used material from interviews with officials who are employed at the regulatory 
authority and who have played an active role in the standard-setting activities of the case studies in 
this study.
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on from this is the need to then uncover the specific empirical circumstances 
surrounding why such a demand was evident in the case studies.
The second task is to then establish whether and how institutional 
practices have been used to enhance and or constrain outcomes. This 
involves a policy analysis of a standards outcome, which is an analysis of 
whether and how the content of standards differs from the start to the end of 
standard-setting process. Institutional practices using norms, processes and 
decision structures will be assessed by looking at the decision hierarchy and 
decision rules that allow certain actors institutional positions or access to 
decision making processes, and how decisions are then made through such 
forms as ‘consensus’. The study also undertakes a close examination of the 
policy-making processes within each of these standards organisations, which 
is to assess how a standard has developed in to its ‘finalised form’ by looking 
at the actors who are responsible for drafting the standards, from where the 
content has been sourced, whose ideas have been incorporated during 
deliberation, and why particular standards come into existence over others.
This requires an analysis of a standard-setting and consultation 
processes for a particular issue area in each industry. As already outlined, the 
study will pay close attention to a similar issue area in each case study, which 
are the issues involving the provision of regulatory capital (in the case of 
banks), the requirement for regulatory provisions (in the case of insurers) 
and the meaning of equity (in the case of accounting standards), which will in 
general be referred to as issues relating to ‘capital’. This task requires 
analysing changes to primary documents, but also requires information 
sourced from interviews with key officials, focusing on why particular issues
28
were selected in the first place, how the drafting and consultation phases 
impacted the content and the actors who were responsible for making or 
amending changes to the standards that were then reflected in their finalised 
form. Substantive changes in the content of standards will then be traced 
back to the factors that have affected those changes.
Methodological qualifications aside, the scope of this study is evidently 
limited to the assessment of one specific standard-setting outcome within 
each standards arena. Having said this, it is not the intention of the study to 
make broad generalisations based on the data found but rather this study 
intends to use the findings in each case as part of a comparative assessment 
as to how influence can operate across different standards-setting regimes. 
These findings may then help to generate further questions and scholarship 
on private influence in global financial governance more generally, with the 
intention in particular of enriching the existing literature on transnational 
governance, institutional accountability and institutional design.
1.4 Findings o f the Study
One of the core propositions advanced in this study is that the underlying 
condition that fosters private influence in policymaking arenas rests on the 
economic principle of ‘supply and demand’. Supply and demand is based 
upon the premise that there is a demand for a specific power capability that 
public regulators are in need of and correspondingly, private actors are in the 
position of strategically targeting and providing. Furthermore, when demand 
for these capabilities is high, or when regulators are unable to fulfil their 
standard-setting roles without specific private power capabilities and the 
perceived threat to their authority is low, this condition is argued to give rise
to captured outcomes. When this occurs, institutional mechanisms are likely 
to be used to enhance the influence that private actors are able to assert over 
outcomes. Evidence to support the high demand and corresponding low 
threat proposition was found in all three cases analysed in this study, namely 
each standard-setting regime had a high demand for different capabilities 
from their private constituents and private industry has been at the forefront 
of providing this power. Furthermore, evidence of regulators accommodating 
these sources of private power through institutional means, in order to 
generate outcomes that were favourable to both regulatory and private 
interests was also established.
The core power capability demanded by regulators in the case of the 
BCBS was the need for information and technical resources. The BCBS was 
for various reasons restricted in its ability to not only source information 
from the private sectors globally but also ‘assemble’ this information for the 
purpose of constructing a revised capital standard, otherwise referred to as 
Basel II. It was therefore highly dependent on information provided by 
private sources, which accentuated the closeness it had with the private 
sector during the consultation and deliberation mechanisms. The largely EU 
and US international banks were also at the forefront of providing this 
information. Information was in fact the primary means for the major 
international banks to influence the Committee in the shaping of the capital 
standard, particularly information that promoted the internal risk models of 
the banks. Given the closed nature of the BCBS and hence limited direct 
access to decision makers, the provision of information was a powerful way of 
influencing the BCBS policymakers.
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This supply and demand also paved the way for the US and EU 
international banks to use their power capability to influence standards 
outcomes. In the case of the BCBS, private influence over Basel II was 
evident, seen primarily in the BCBS’s adoption of the internal models 
approaches advocated by the large international banks. The need for the 
BCBS regulators to establish an alternative to the capital approach under the 
original Basel Accord was the primary motivation for the BCBS regulators to 
fast-track the adoption and inclusion of the ‘advanced’ methodologies for 
calculating capital requirements. This was not only the result of the large 
banks advocating the use of the internal models but also the result of the 
BCBS using institutional practices to adopt these private models. They did 
this through sourcing these approaches directly from the industry as part of 
their ‘fact finding’ missions, by undertaking data exercises referred to as the 
Quantitative Impact Studies (QIS) to verify the establishment of capital 
incentive structures for the advanced approaches and finally amending key 
components of the advanced methodologies in order to recalibrate the 
requirements so that they would produce capital incentives for the large 
international banks. The result has been that the internal models approaches 
included within Basel II provide net capital reductions.
For the second case study undertaken of the IAIS, material resources 
as well as technical expertise were the main source of private influence 
established in this case study. Due to the circumstances surrounding the 
establishment of the IAIS, this organisation found that it had limited public 
resources to support its ongoing viability as an international organisation. 
Hence public regulators were essentially in need of resources, which they
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partially derived through the introduction of ‘Observer’ membership fees 
entitling insurance companies and lobby groups to participate directly in the 
IAIS’s standard-setting activity. Private Observers were given the very 
privileged concession of direct access to decision and policymakers in 
standard-setting forums as well as access to information being drafted by 
policymakers in return for an annual monetary fee. The IAIS is therefore the 
clearest case where adopting institutional practices, such as direct 
participation and access to information portals were granted in return for 
contributions.
Observers were given important access to standard-setting meetings; 
however what is interesting in the case of the IAIS is that even though there 
were a vast number of private actors who could supply the resources needed, 
IAIS policymakers showed particular favouritism towards a select few private 
actors. This was most evident in the case of the development of the IAIS’ 
solvency framework. In this particular issue area, the IAIS relied heavily on 
the strategic input of one Observer -  the International Actuarial Association 
(LAA), who, unlike other Observers, would be singularly invited to present on 
topics and to provide their technical input into the IAIS solvency work. Their 
technical input is not only evident in the final outcome but is also explicitly 
acknowledged in the solvency standard.
Finally, in the case of the IASB, this study found that there was also a 
supply and demand dynamic evident between the IASB and public regulatory 
agencies, based on the need for US and EU to find a way to harmonise their 
different accounting systems. This gave rise therefore to the high demand for 
an international accounting standard-setter that was based neither on the US
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nor EU system of accounting and as a result, the IASB therefore provided a 
politically palatable and alternative source of technical expertise which both 
sides of the Atlantic would be willing to comply with.
Due to this demand, public actors in this case have played a pivotal 
role in legitimising and endorsing the IASB’s standard-setting activity. There 
was therefore a strategically beneficial relationship between the IASB and 
regulatory agencies which contributed to the significant increase in the 
IASB’s governance stature globally. The result is that the standards that the 
IASB produces are now used in almost 100 countries and in some parts of the 
world, are also legally binding through their domestic laws, the most notable 
being in the EU.
Regulators in all three cases were therefore active instigators of power 
capabilities that were needed to enhance their roles and activities. However it 
is at this juncture that another significant variable comes into play and that is 
the way in which those regulators utilised institutional practices to constrain 
capture. Even though regulators initially sought private power capabilities in 
order to fulfil their respective mandates, the negative impact that these 
private capabilities were perceived to have on the authority of regulators 
prompted regulators to curb the full extent of private influence over 
outcomes, using primarily institutional practices.
This study proposes that adopting institutional practices through 
norm creation, policy development and decision making are the primary 
substitutes for the legislative instruments for enforcement that regulators 
lack in the global arena. What was found in each case study was not only a 
situation of ‘capture’ based on a high demand and low threat from industry,
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but also a subsequent a high threat from industry, such that outcomes were 
in the end not wholly captured by private interests. Private influence 
therefore became subject to the policy ‘machine’ within the standard-setting 
institutions, which significantly affected the way vested interests were diluted 
or even reconstructed in standards outcomes that were produced. As a result, 
what this study consequently established was that the institutional 
infrastructure was a pivotal reason for why outcomes did not necessarily 
mirror the initial supply and demand of private power.
In the case of the BCBS, a high threat from industry was established 
when regulators began to assess the impact that the revised methodologies 
would have on their respective jurisdictions. Regulators began to perceive the 
changes as a threat to their national regulatory prerogatives when it became 
clear that the benefits would flow unevenly to the largest international banks. 
This created internal tensions and divisions between largely the EU and US 
BCBS members, which then prompted members from the EU to introduce 
other requirements to counter the full impact of the revised methodologies 
and more importantly, enhance their ability to exercise their supervisory 
control over banks. The result of this has been the contradictory nature of 
Basel II, which incorporates the adoption of private internal model 
paradigms to promote incentive structures to reduce capital with the 
imposition of other capital charges (for example, the operational risk charge) 
as well as the addition of Pillar 2 supervisory discretion to further increase 
capital requirements above minimum Pillar 1 levels11. As a result, Basel II has 
become a complex patchwork of rules which is over 347 pages long,
11 Basel II contains ‘three pillars’ each referred to as ‘Pillar 1 ’ (minimum capital requirements), ‘Pillar 
2’ (supervisory review) and ‘Pillar 3’ (market disclosure). These will be discussed further in Chapter 
4.
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compared to the 30 pages of requirements under the original Accord. From 
the point of view of the large international banks, the BCBS has cumulatively 
built in elements of conservatism, thereby negating any capital incentives 
that they hoped would have resulted from the adoption of the internal 
models’ methodologies. If we therefore place the case of the BCBS within the 
matrix of influence outlined earlier, we find that ‘institutional constraints’ 
have been put in place by regulators.
In the case of the IAIS, a high threat was also established when some 
regulatory members became increasingly uneasy with the direct participation 
of private industry Observers. These regulators perceived their authority and 
‘domain’ of rule-making to be compromised and threatened by the presence 
of private actors. As a result, the regulators of the IAIS imposed deliberate 
rules to govern the participation of private Observers. Regulators were able to 
decide whether to open meetings to Observers, partially open meetings so 
that Observers could sit in on only some agenda items, and also close 
meetings so that Observers could not have any access to regulatory 
discussions. This ultimately led to the ‘included exclusion’ of Observers such 
that their participation was structured to ensure that the ultimate decision 
and influence over outcomes resided with Members. Again, when we place 
this finding within the matrix, we can also establish a case of institutional 
constraints in the case of the IAIS.
Finally in the case of the IASB, the IASB posed a high threat to 
regulatory agencies when it was the impact that the full application of the fair 
value option in IAS 39 would have on other international financial standards 
that threatened the authority of regulatory agencies. This is because IAS 39
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impinged on the interests of banking regulators who had their own vested 
interest in maintaining their domination over certain paradigms, namely over 
the definition of capital. Consequently, the IASB has not been able to shift as 
easily towards a fair value paradigm because of the actions taken by 
regulators. Led by the BCBS, as well as other financial agencies, these 
agencies have imposed their own institutionalised constraints, through the 
imposition of carve outs and prudential filters so that the IAS 39 could not be 
recognised in full for prudential reporting purposes. As a result, these 
constraints were pivotal in the IASB’s decision to substantially modify the fair 
value option so that it could fulfil prudential purposes. This means that 
prudentially regulated financial entities must report regulatory amounts that 
are potentially much higher than would be required under IAS 39. The case of 
the IASB shows some elements of institutional control applied by regulators 
in the EU, but by and large we can also see practices applying institutional 
constraints in order to limit the choice sets available to the IASB.
A comparative assessment of these findings therefore reveals a much 
more constrained picture of private influence and capture. The findings 
emphasise the importance of the supply and demand relationship between 
regulators and private actors, but highlight that this relationship is based on a 
precarious demand that is conditionally based on whether the supply of 
private capabilities enhances the authority of regulators. When private power 
capabilities do fulfil the regulator’s required policy mandates, regulators will 
accommodate private influence by adopting institutional practices that serve 
to include private interests so that standards reflect these market-based 
norms. When they do not and are instead perceived to undermine their
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authority, regulators resort to empowering their positions using quasi­
legislative mechanisms through the use of institutional constraints in the 
international policy making domain. The case studies therefore show that 
based on the matrix outlined earlier, there is both ‘capture’ and ‘institutional 
constraint’. Consequently, norm creation, policy reconstruction, decision 
rules determining deliberation and participation are found to be utilised in 
order to assert authority over private actors in the transnational governance 
arena.
These findings above all show us that private influence is part of a 
much larger policy and governance machinery, where both private and public 
actors play a pivotal role in providing inputs into the broader policy 
framework. Furthermore, the findings help to illustrate that balance in 
governance is an institutionally enmeshed ‘fabric’ that encapsulates both the 
vertical and horizontal interweaving of decision making, policy formation, 
deliberation and ultimately norm creation by both public and private actors 
within international governance. These findings therefore may help to shape 
further scholarship on how best to incorporate private actors in global 
governance and how institutions may be designed to ensure appropriate 
accountability to broader public welfare goals.
1.5 Outline o f  the Study
This study continues in Chapter 2 with a background on the current global 
financial crisis and the corresponding debates this has prompted from 
leading academic commentators about the role private influence has played 
in not only generating the crisis but also how global finance influences 
international financial standard-setting more generally. The chapter however
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highlights key areas where the scholarship could be further enriched with an 
analysis of how private influence operates in international financial standard- 
setting and how it impacts outcomes. Chapter 3 addresses these limitations 
by providing an alternative theoretical framework for which to analyse 
influence in international financial governance. It further outlines the 
conditions and propositions to be tested in an empirical study. The empirical 
studies of private influence are undertaken in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. The 
findings of these studies then enable to the study to undertake a comparative 
assessment in Chapter 7, which outlines the conclusions and implications of 
the study for the issue of global financial governance more generally.
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2Global Financial Crisis, International Financial 
Standardisation and the role of Private Influence
The global financial crisis has magnified the issue of private influence in 
global financial governance and has raised important questions about the 
role private market actors play in producing global regulations. It also 
highlights the role private influence has played in producing the regulatory 
environment that is being blamed for contributing to the crisis. Scholarship 
accounts for private influence in international financial standard-setting in a 
number of different ways, from the ‘two-level game’12 approaches, to 
‘transgovemmental’ capture to private authority. These approaches are 
examined in this chapter, in order to establish the core assumptions made 
about private influence in international financial standardisation. In 
particular, it focuses on a growing body of literature that highlights the 
transnational characteristics of private influence, where private market actors 
not only participate directly in international financial policy forums but also 
exercise their own ‘authority’ in financial governance (Baker 2006, Cutler et
al 1 9 9 9 ).
This study shares the assumptions made in this transnational body of 
literature that private market actors have become a core feature of new forms 
of authority and governance in the global realm (Graz and Nolke 2007). 
However, where it seeks to farther its inquiry is how this feature of private
12 This term was used by Putnam (1988) and is discussed in later in the chapter.
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influence affects policy outcomes and whether these new forms of 
transnational governance support and enhance the influence and authority of 
private actors. Three key variables of this literature are examined, which are 
the actors involved, where this interaction is taking place and how, as a 
result, private influence materialises through participatory and deliberative 
‘spaces’. It can be argued that these transnational features generate outcomes 
which are prone to capture or that are captured, because of the direct 
participation of private actors in these global forums (Baker 2006, Underhill 
and Zhang 2005).
However, an underlying weakness found in the literature is that it pre­
determines both outcome (captured outcomes) and causality of outcome 
(private influence) without addressing the causal mechanisms which lead to a 
situation of private capture. Private actors who participate in these global 
deliberative spaces are assumed to affect outcomes because of their close 
interaction with policymakers, but there is limited analysis on how 
participation and closeness in these forums leads to capture. This study 
argues therefore that there is further scope to enrich the literature by 
examining how private actors are able to influence in these global forums, 
and by querying whether institutional features of these new forms of global 
governance are causal variables for the way in which private market actors 
are able to influence policy outcomes.
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2.1 G lobal financial crisis, in te rn a tio n a l financial regu la tion , and  
regu la to ry  cap tu re
The Global financial crisis: market failure or ‘capitalistfools’^ ?
As the global financial community takes stock of the events that have 
unfolded since what began as a sub-prime mortgage crisis in the United 
States (US) in 2007, questions are now being asked as to how and why this 
US housing crisis could have led to the systemic meltdown of global financial 
markets and the collapse and bailout of several global financial institutions. 
The magnitude of the current crisis is unprecedented in recent history, with 
global names such as Lehman Brothers no longer in existence, whilst others 
such as American Insurance Group (AIG), Citi, Bank of America, Lloyds TSB, 
Merrill Lynch and Royal Bank of Scotland merged with other banks and or 
extended government lifelines in the form of multi-billion dollar bailouts. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the scale of the US and United Kingdom (UK) rescue 
packages in their attempt to keep the global financial system afloat1*.
13 Stiglitz (2009)
14 Data is sourced from the IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2009 found at
http://vvww.inif.org/extemal/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/weodata/index.aspx and the BBC at 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/in depth/business/2007/creditcrunch/default.stm
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Figure 2.1 US and UK rescue packages
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S o u rce : IMF an d  BBC
The magnitude of the crisis is reflective of the way in which global financial 
markets have grown in scale and complexity as a result of financial 
globalisation. Financial globalisation can be understood as the result of a 
series of events which took place after 1971 with the end of the Bretton Woods 
system. The end of Bretton Woods marked a new era of a floating rate 
exchange system among currencies and the gradual liberalisation of financial 
markets and the easing of international capital controls. One of the 
implications of the floating rate exchange system and the liberalisation of 
international capital flows has been the ability and inclination of some 
market players to pursue more speculative short term ‘arbitrage’ 
opportunities in the money markets (such as the differences among foreign 
currencies or interest rates).
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To add to such opportunities for arbitrage, the end of the fixed rate 
exchange system was also accompanied by the simultaneous rise of new 
computerised technologies that not only accelerated the pace of financial 
transactions made on organised stock exchanges but also paved the way 
towards the creation of a vast ‘over-the-counter’ (OTC) market for financial 
transactions. Computerised OTC markets have allowed individual market 
participants to enter into exchange-type transactions between themselves 
without having to trade as members of an organised exchange. Such 
computerised networks are said to have created “shadow stock markets and 
traders” which has further fuelled the pace of financial integration across 
borders (Francis 1993: 192).
The scale of globalised financial markets and the importance of these 
markets to the overall global economy can not be underestimated (refer 
Figure 2.215). This can be illustrated for instance by the notional amounts of 
both OTC and exchange-traded derivative contracts that are transacted 
globally. For example, the total amount of OTC contracts since 1998 has 
increased almost ten-fold, with the notional value of these derivative 
contracts worth approximately US$684 trillion in June 2008 (from US$72 
trillion in June 1998)16. Derivative financial instruments traded on organised 
exchanges have also increased to significant proportions since 1998. Traded 
futures contracts have almost tripled to approximately US$20 trillion in
15 Data derived from Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Derivative Statistics, statistical table
19, http://www.bis.orti/statistics/derstats.htm
16 Theoretically the notional amount is the amount that counterparties would need to ‘settle’ when the 
contract ends, however this sum in practice is often offset or ‘netted’ out against matching contracts in 
the market. Hence, counterparties would only then need to replace the cash flow  in any mismatches or 
differences in market values o f  contracts when the contract ends. However, financial institutions still 
face the notional credit ‘settlement risk’ i f  one o f  its counterparties fail. Refer to the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), Derivative Statistics, statistical table 19 for more details,
http: //w w w . b i s . or g/sta ti stics/ders tats. h tm
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December 2008, whilst traded options have increased six-fold since 1998 to 
around $40 trillion in December 2008^. To place these figures into some 
context within the ‘real’ economy, the total value of world exports in both 
merchandise and commercial services in 2007 was only around US$23.9 
trillion in comparison18. Furthermore, the total aggregated gross domestic 
product (GDP) of all OECD countries in 2007 was approximatelyUS$39 
trillion at current prices and exchange rates1^ . It is evident therefore that the 
scale of derivative activity dwarfs the productive sectors, or the ‘real’ 
economy.
Figure 2.2 Global OTC Derivative activities
OTC F utures Trade GDP a d v a n c e d
D eriv a tiv es e c o n o m ie s
The scale of global financial markets therefore is unquestionable. However, 
what has also been a distinguishing feature of this new financial landscape 
has been the increasing and ongoing consolidation of financial institutions in
17 Ibid, see table 23 A for more details, http://www.bis.org/statistics/extderiv.htm
18 World Trade Organization (WTO), International Trade Statistics 2008, see table II. 1 and table III. 1,
http://www.wto.org/english/res e/statis e/its2008 e/its08 toe e.htm
19 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Comparison o f  Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) for OECD member countries , http://stats.oecd.orgAVBOS/index.aspx
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the last decade. In fact, international financial conglomerates and their 
subsidiary networks have been a key factor in the globalisation of finance by 
standardising the types of financial transactions that are made available to 
customers across jurisdictions. A study commissioned by the Group of Ten 
(G-io) found that as large multinational enterprises (MNEs) increased the 
geographic scope of their operations, in doing so they simultaneously created 
a demand for financial intermediaries to provide the necessary financial 
products to operate in those markets, such as foreign exchange and interest 
rate hedging (G-io 2001).
Financial institutions in response opted to consolidate through 
mergers and acquisitions in order to attain critical mass in wholesale 
financial markets, provide the volume of business that such MNEs required, 
as well as maximise profit margins where higher volumes in wholesale 
markets are necessary to generate higher returns (G-10 2001). Banks in 
particular have pursued the option to merge with and acquire existing 
institutions within certain target markets as “the acquirer gains a more rapid 
foothold than would be possible with an organic growth strategy” (G-10 2001: 
74). A desired outcome for banks is indeed to build “a global retail system” 
that is more traditionally associated within domestic contexts (G-10 2001).
To further complicate the financial landscape, financial institutions 
such as banks are not only merging with and acquiring other banks in order 
to gain critical market mass, they have also been engaged in ‘cross-sector’ 
acquisitions. In fact, as Herring (2003) illustrates, many well known large 
international financial institutions are to some extent a financial 
conglomerate where they have combined at least two of the three formerly
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distinct functions of banking, securities or insurance. Financial groups ING 
and Fortis in the Netherlands, Credit Suisse in Switzerland, and Citi in the US 
are all such examples. A result of such conglomeration is that there has been 
an increase in concentration risk in certain areas of financial activity (Herring 
2003, G-10 2001).
By way of example, the top 10 largest financial conglomerates 
accounted for approximately 55 per cent of OTC derivative trading in foreign 
exchange and interest rates in the major financial centres at December 1999 
(G-10 2001). The top 10 financial conglomerates had similar market shares 
(if not larger) in debt and equity underwriting and various securities activities 
such as international equities and bond trading (G-10 2001). Whilst these 
indicators are by no means definitive evidence to suggest that global financial 
activity is concentrated within a certain number of financial conglomerates, it 
does lend weight to political concerns that financial globalisation is a rapidly 
expanding reality20. It also explains how susceptible the global financial 
landscape was to the systemic knock on effect on a localised housing crisis on 
the rest of the world’s financial institutions.
Whilst there are a number of different views and factors that 
ultimately led to the systemic collapse of global markets and global financial 
institutions21, the Group of Twenty (G-20) provides its assessment of the 
causes that led to the global credit market disruptions, which stemmed in 
essence from “a period of relatively low interest rates around the world (in 
both notional and real terms) associated with abundant global savings, a
20 These concerns stemmed from the G-10 2001 Report.
21 Commentary on the global financial crisis is found at various news sources, such as the Financial 
Times, BBC, New York Times.
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global ‘search for yield’ in financial markets, and what is now recognised to 
have been a general under-pricing of credit risk” (G-20 2008a: 3). More 
importantly for financial markets, “the growing importance of the ‘originate 
and distribute’ mortgage model and of structured financial products, 
facilitated a general increase in risk-taking”22 (G-20 2008a: 3).
However, even though the G-20 formally acknowledges that “market 
participants sought higher yields without an adequate appreciation of the 
risks and failed to exercise proper due diligence”, it is also quick to qualify 
this view with the admission that “Policy-makers, regulators and supervisors, 
in some advanced countries, did not adequately appreciate and address the 
risks building up in financial markets, keep pace with financial innovation, or 
take into account the systemic ramifications of domestic regulatory actions.” 
(G-20 2008b: 1). This recognition of essentially the mistakes made by some 
of the main G-20 members is a serious indictment of the role played by 
regulators in creating the conditions necessary for the high levels of leverage 
in the system.
The important question that arises therefore is how risks and leverage 
were allowed to accumulate. One underlying cause that commentators in the 
media and practitioners generally have highlighted is the failure of 
policymakers to adequately govern global finance. Some have attributed this 
to the problem that policymakers had bought in to the liberal market belief 
system, whilst others have attributed the crisis to outright regulatory capture 
(Gieve 2009, Johnson 2009, Buiter 2009, Kauffman 2009). However 
described, most commentators agree that policymakers were influenced by
22 Refer also to the Turner Review, Financial Services Authority (2009)
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those in financial markets and as a result, policymakers have allowed 
financial transactions to become more opaque and increasingly leveraged 
(Financial Times 2009a).
Attention is swiftly turning away from the view that markets simply 
‘failed’, to the argument that those governing the markets were essentially to 
blame. As the Financial Times reported in May 2009, the global financial 
crisis has not been a pure failure of markets but instead “financial institutions 
and markets operate within macroeconomic, regulatory and political 
framework created and maintained by public bodies, and it is not empirically 
difficult to point to the serious deficiencies of this framework that 
contributed to the present crisis” (Financial Times 2009c). Danielsson has 
also recognised that whilst banks have played their part “by creating all these 
complex structured products”, essentially “they did this under direct 
regulatory oversight” and as a result “regulatory failures have been a 
significant contributor to the financial crisis” (2009: 53). High profile 
practitioners such as Henry Paulson, a high profile ex-Wall Street executive 
and former US Treasury Secretary has also categorically attributed the crisis 
to ‘serious flaws’ in the system, calling for global policymakers to co-ordinate 
internationally and fundamentally reform the regulatory architecture 
(Paulson 2009).
What were these fundamental deficiencies and flaws? The underlying 
cause of the current crisis is being blamed on the “cavalier thesis that less 
regulation is always better”, which commentators are now realising was 
‘faulty’ and ‘false’ (Financial Times 2009b). What has been made clear in 
commentary covering the crisis is the view that “economic policymakers
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could have limited these dangers, but they did not do so. Instead, they 
allowed the bubble to inflate and let financial transactions become 
increasingly opaque and ever more leveraged” (Financial Times 2009a). The 
argument that policymakers allowed such activity to take place highlights one 
of the most important aspects to the failure of regulatory governance and that 
is the willingness on the part of policymakers to accommodate risk taking and 
yield seeking. The problem has not been lax regulation but the more 
fundamental adoption of the free market ethos, where market participants 
and regulatory policymakers were at one in their belief that “markets are self- 
adjusting and that the role of government should be minimal...” (Stiglitz 
2009:1)
Senior economic officials have also acknowledged this as the more 
fundamental problem. As Lord Turner, Chairman of the UK’s Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) commented, "the financial crisis has challenged the 
intellectual assumptions on which previous regulatory approaches were 
largely built, and in particular the theory of rational and self-correcting 
markets” (FSA 2009b). Nobel Prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz has 
also blamed the ‘capitalist fools’ for embracing “this flawed economic 
philosophy made it inevitable that we would eventually arrive at the place we 
are today” (2009:1). Former US Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, 
a well known advocate for self-correcting markets, has even acknowledged 
that “I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interest of organizations, 
specifically banks and others, was such that they were best capable of 
protecting their own shareholders and their equity in the firms (Greenspan
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2008). As the Financial Times reported, “these are indictments of capitalists, 
not capitalism” (Financial Times 2009b).
Former deputy governor of the Bank of England Sir John Gieve has 
blamed this on the problem of regulatory capture and ‘groupthink’. In his 
words, “It is not so much that the private sector is full of clever people who 
pull the wool over supervisors’ eyes -  although some of that goes on -  but 
that banks and regulators are in constant discussion and negotiation and 
tend to develop shared views and shared misjudgements, as they did on 
structured credit and wholesale funding.” (2009: 1) Buiter has called this 
‘cognitive capture’ and argues that such capture “need not take the form of 
bribery, blackmail, corruption or deliberate perversion of the regulator's 
mandate” but rather “the process through which those in charge of the 
relevant state entity internalise and adopt, as if by osmosis, the objectives, 
interests, fears, hopes and perception of reality of the vested sectional 
interest they are meant to regulate.” (2009: 38) Kaufmann has also pointed 
to ‘capture’ in the systemic failures of oversight, regulation and disclosure in 
the financial sector. In his view, the problem that abounds in industrialised 
economies is that “undue influence is often legally exercised by powerful 
private interests, which in turn influence the nation’s regulators, policies and 
laws” (2009:1).
It has been argued that this is what happened in the US, where “the 
American financial industry gained political power by amassing a kind of 
cultural capital -  a belief system...the attitude took hold that what was good 
for Wall Street was good for the country” (Johnson 2009: 6). More 
concerning was that “a whole generation of policy makers has been
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mesmerised by Wall Street, always and utterly convinced that whatever the 
banks said was true” (Johnson 2009: 6). As a result, Simon Johnson argues 
that for over the past 30 years, this sector has benefited from a process of 
‘cultural capture’, “through which regulators, politicians and independent 
analysts became convinced this sector had great and stabilising technical 
expertise” (Financial Times 2009e).
Indeed, this cultural capture has been fuelled by intense lobbying by 
the finance sector in the US. As reported by the Financial Times, between 
1998 and 2008, Wall Street investment banks, commercial banks, hedge 
funds, real estate companies and insurance conglomerates paid an estimated 
US$1.7 billion in political contributions and spent a further US$3.4 billion on 
lobbyists (Financial Times 2009e)23. Furthermore, in 2007 the financial 
sector employed nearly 3,000 lobbyists, or five for each member of Congress, 
to influence policymaking (Financial Times 2009e). Furthermore, it is 
reported that “such purchasing of political influence is widely believed to 
have helped secure for Wall Street the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, which 
prohibited the merger of commercial and investment banks, and the blocking 
by Bill Clinton’s administration of a Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission initiative to regulate financial derivatives” (Financial Times 
2009e).
It is therefore evident from these accounts by leading commentators 
and practitioners that ‘capture’ and influence have played a significant part in 
the unravelling of the global financial turmoil. But where has this ‘capture’ 
taken place? Commentators have referred to regulators and policymakers
23 The figure comes from a report by Essential Information and The Consumer Education Foundation, 
two non-profit organisations
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more generally, others to policymakers in the advanced economies and some 
pointing to regulators in the US. However due to the systematic nature of the 
global financial collapse, it would appear that the underlying issue is what 
Paulson described as “fundamental flaws in the system”. The issue that is 
central to this crisis therefore is whether the global regulatory architecture in 
place, in the form of international financial standards has helped to not only 
harmonise ‘pro-market’ liberal regulations but more worryingly, contributed 
to their development and proliferation among the advanced economies.
The failure o f global standard-setters? The case o f Basel I I  and fa ir  value 
accounting
In the aftermath of the financial turmoil, attention and criticism has swiftly 
turned to the most influential international capital standard for banks and 
that is the Basel II Capital Framework (Basel II). Critics have argued that the 
Basel II rules exacerbated the crisis because of the underlying philosophy that 
capital should be closely aligned to a bank’s assessment of risk (Financial 
Times 2009d). Academics have argued that the Basel II models permitted 
banks to hold capital levels that were far lower than what was socially 
optimal, creating serious systemic risk in the global financial system, which 
contributed significantly to the global financial crisis (Alexander 2009). More 
seriously is the allegation that “Basel II permitted regulators to approve more 
market-risk sensitive capital models, which led to lower levels of regulatory 
capital and created an incentive for banks to increase their leverage levels in 
the structured and securitisation markets” (Alexander 2009: 880).
This in essence is one of the most important issues raised by critics 
and that is the propensity for Basel II to be procyclical. In short, this means
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that risk-aligned capital is likely to fluctuate with the broader economic cycle, 
so when for instance the economy is in an upturn, capital levels go down and 
correspondingly in downturn, capital requirements are also likely to go up, 
creating funding pressures in the market and thereby exacerbating the 
negative economic conditions. To elaborate, procyclicality is associated 
mainly with credit risk and procyclicality issues are considered to be greatest 
under the internal ratings based (IRB) methodology under Basel II as these 
have the greatest use of risk sensitive measures (FSA 2006). The IRB 
treatments of performing assets are more risk sensitive because these 
measures rise and fall in a corresponding downturn and upturn in the 
economy.
For example, the downgrading of a credit risk rating or a deteriorating 
loan-to-value (LTV) on residential mortgages will put these credits into a 
higher risk weight. This is considered problematic because an increase in the 
credit risk charges and hence an increase in capital comes at a time when 
there is unwillingness in the market to raise new capital due to pricing and 
general funding pressures (eg liquidity). Banks also resort to more 
conservative behaviour in a downturn, by reducing their lending and thereby 
magnifying the downturn by causing more of a credit crunch. However, due 
to the fact that credit risk modelling is based on banks own IRB 
methodologies, the extent of procyclicality depends on the risk measures 
being used by different banks (FSA 2006).
The BCBS has acknowledged this to be a problem, and announced in 
2009 measures to address the procyclicality in Basel II (BCBS 2009b). 
However the BCBS maintain that despite criticisms that Basel II has failed to
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perform in the recent turmoil, overall the framework is robust and that Basel 
II enhances capital regulation, supervision, risk management and market 
transparency (Wellink 2008). The General Manger of the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) Jaime Caruana has also come to the defence 
of Basel II, arguing that there was no correlation between the adoption of the 
Basel II rules and the financial crisis (Financial Times 2009d).
Basel II is not the only international framework under the spotlight. 
Similar criticisms have been made of fair value accounting under the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) developed by the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). As the name suggests, fair 
value accounting is the valuation of assets based on their ‘fair’ or their current 
market values. It is assumed that quoted prices in an active market provide 
the ‘fairest’ measurement because it is directly observable to the market 
(otherwise referred to as ‘mark to market’) (Magnan 2009:2). However, 
where there is no active or observable market, certain assets are then valued 
on what market participants assess to be fair based on mathematical 
modelling exercises that are based on various economic, market or firm 
specific conditions (otherwise referred to as ‘mark to model’) (Magnan
2009).
Critics are highlighting that the problem with this methodology is that 
fair value accounting may actually deepen financial crises. This is due to the 
very simple reason that when credit markets ‘seize up’, asset prices fluctuate 
based on the market’s short term evaluation of the financial position of firms 
and as a result further exacerbate volatility of financial markets, thereby 
triggering “quite erroneous decisions in the allocation of capital”. (Boyer
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2007: 782) Hence, from a financial reporting perspective, fair value 
accounting is said to magnify the changes in the value of financial assets and 
thereby increasing the volatility of returns through their profit and loss 
account. (Hamilton 2009) Put simply, when there is a crisis, the prices of 
assets tend to fall below their pre-crisis levels because as critics argue, 
marking to market forces firms to unload assets at fire-sale prices which then 
cause values to fall even further (Pozen 2009:86).
The allegation that fair value accounting has exacerbated the global 
financial crisis prompted the US Congress in 2008 to require the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to undertake an assessment of mark-to- 
market accounting, and specifically the impact that such accounting had on 
the bank failures in 200824. Proponents of the fair value model have argued 
that such attention to the fair value accounting model is misguided and akin 
to ‘shooting the messenger’, particularly at a time where “transparency of 
financial information -  no matter how painful the economic reality -  will be 
a key ingredient in helping to restore economic confidence” (Institute of 
Chartered Accountants UK 2009). However, it is precisely the accuracy of 
this ‘transparency’ which is scrutinised. According to Magnan, there is a 
circular dynamic in fair value accounting, “with markets providing the input 
for the measurement of many assets, thus affecting reported earnings, which 
are then used by analysts and investors to assess a firm’s market value” and
24 The Securities and Exchange Commission announced on 7 October 2008 additional details on the 
process and initial steps that the SEC has undertaken to conduct a study on "mark-to-market" 
accounting, as authorized by Sec. 133 o f  the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act o f  2008, signed 
into law by President Bush. The study includes: the effects o f  such accounting standards on a financial 
institution's balance sheet; the impacts o f  such accounting on bank failures in 2008; the impact o f  such 
standards on the quality o f  financial information available to investors; the process used by the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board in developing accounting standards; the advisability and 
feasibility o f  modifications to such standards; and alternative accounting standards to those provided 
in [Financial Accounting Standards Board] Statement Number 157. Found at 
http: //www. sec. go v/spotl i gh t/fai rvalue. htm
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when markets are volatile, there is a knock-on effect on this circular chain 
(2009:1).
However, the issue that remains is the question of whether private 
influence over international financial standards has helped harmonise ‘pro- 
market’ liberal regulations and the implication this has for the safety of global 
financial markets. For some scholars like Alexander, there is no question that 
the secretive and closed manner in which the BCBS conducted their 
deliberations allowed the excessive influence that banks had on the BCBS 
regulators, resulting in the BCBS G10 members to adopt weak capital 
standards for banks and “thereby bringing the world economy’s fall into a 
serious economic recession” (2009: 881). The failure of the BCBS with its 
“opaque decision making processes” as well as other international financial 
standard-setting bodies to adequately “anticipate the virulent risks created in 
the financial system over the last ten years” highlights not only the role of 
regulators in the crisis but more importantly the international financial 
standards regimes (Alexander 2009: 881).
Private influence at this level of global policymaking is highlighted as 
an elusive but ever-present factor for contributing to the development of pro­
market standards. In fact, prior to the onset of the crisis, scholars had argued 
for some time that international financial standardisation is a vulnerable area 
for market influence and capture, arguing that this setting “provide private 
interests with the opportunity to capture policy-making and regulatory 
processes in the financial domain and to influence the nature of monetary 
and financial governance” (Underhill and Zhang 2003: 84). These concerns 
form part of a wider literature which debates the role of private influence
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over international financial standardisation. The remaining half of this 
chapter examines this literature, in order to establish the core assumptions 
made about the role of private actors in global financial standardisation. By 
assessing this literature, it argues that scholarship can be enriched further by 
examining how private actors are able to influence outcomes by establishing 
the causal mechanisms which lead to captured outcomes.
2.2 The question o f  influence: from  state pow er, to  transnational 
capture and private authority in  international financial 
standardisation
From state power to a’ new world order’2$
Earlier accounts of international financial standardisation have focused on 
the primary role of the state in producing standards outcomes. These 
approaches encapsulate the way in which powerful states, their domestic 
institutions and domestic political pressures have influenced the production 
of international financial standardisation outcomes. Private influence in this 
literature is embedded within the domestic political economy, and standards 
outcomes at the international level of coordination are argued to be the result 
of state power (Kapstein 1994; Oatley and Nabors 2001; Simmons 2001; 
Singer 2004). This sort of approach on international policy outcomes was 
conceptualised by Putnam (1988) referred to as ‘two-level games’. This is 
where at the national level, interest groups pressure governments to adopt 
favourable policies and governments create vested coalitions to enhance their 
power. At the international level, governments then seek to maximise their 
interests by pursuing these favourable policies in order to satisfy domestic
25 From Slaughter (2004)
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pressures (Putnam 1988). Private influence in this approach is seen through 
the lens of the domestic political economy, where private industry not only 
constitutes a state’s economic power base but also where private actors help 
to shape a state’s regulatory preferences. State actors are motivated by 
domestic political pressures and incentives, such as re-election or the 
preservation of office.
Private power or more practically the presence of private lobbying 
within the domestic political economy is one of the more common ways of 
conceptualising private influence in international financial standardisation. 
This conceptualisation of private influence is evident in one of the earlier 
accounts of the Basel Accord, where multilateral central bank cooperation 
was argued to be a case of bureaucratic self-preservation, where central 
bankers were attempting to serve several conflicting public and private sector 
interests in an effort to maintain if not enhance their positional power in 
their domestic political structures (Kapstein 1992). The Accord was not solely 
‘rigorous scientific investigation’ but also reflected a political decision. The 
central bankers could have pursued other regulatory alternatives but many of 
these were dismissed as being politically unacceptable either to the banks or 
to elected officials (Kapstein 1992). In short, the story of international 
banking regulation suggests that “the political authority of existing 
bureaucracies (namely central banks) was increased, and the international 
response reflected in large measure the distribution of power capabilities” 
(Kapstein 1992: 268).
The creation of the Basel Accord is argued to be a primary example of 
the way in which politics underscored international financial regulation
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(Oatley 2000). It has been argued that international financial regulation has 
little to do with correcting market failures that arise from international 
financial integration but instead, is concerned mainly with governments 
adopting international regulation to minimise the distributional 
consequences of regulatory reform in an increasingly integrated international 
financial system (Oatley 2000). In fact, the Basel Accord was referred to as an 
instance of ‘redistributive cooperation’ which is “the creation of an 
international institution that intentionally reduces at least one other 
government’s welfare compared to the status quo” (Oatley and Nabors 1998: 
36).
The reason behind redistributive cooperation is that domestic politics 
creates incentives for politicians to propose redistributive international 
institutions as a way of satisfying interest group and voter pressure demands 
without imposing costs on domestic producers. Hence politicians initiate 
international regulation that satisfies voter demands and transfers wealth 
from foreign producers to compensate domestic firms for the costs of the 
regulation (Oatley and Nabors 1998: 42). The ‘regulatory capture’ model 
could therefore be extended “to show how rational politicians operating in an 
open economy can have an electoral incentive to propose a redistributive 
international institution” and that the creation of international standards 
such as the Basel Accord “corresponds more to a redistributive rent-seeking 
than to a market failure logic” (Oatley and Nabors 1998: 37,42).
International financial standards outcomes have also been modelled 
under a ‘principal-agent’ framework between the legislature and a regulator, 
for analysing regulator behaviour (Singer 2004). This approach emphasises
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the idea that international standards and harmonisation is a political 
response to declining confidence in the stability of financial institutions and 
is a primary means of satisfying domestic political pressures. However, the 
principal-agent framework predicts that the regulator chooses a degree of 
regulatory stringency that falls within its ‘win-set’, which is the range of 
policy choices that do not result in legislative intervention. Exogenous shocks 
or voter confidence in financial stability decreases the size of the regulator’s 
win-set and make intervention more likely. In these situations therefore the 
regulator has incentives to seek international regulatory harmonisation as a 
means of increasing the size of its win-set and safeguarding its autonomy. In 
short, “the regulator’s domestic political environment prompts an 
international solution” (Singer 2004: 532-33).
These accounts emphasise the prerogative of domestic political 
pressures and incentives, but other accounts focus on the power of states in 
international financial standardisation forums. For example, harmonisation 
is said to occur within an international framework which involves strategic 
interactions between a dominant ‘regulatory innovator’ and the rest of the 
financial world (Simmons 2001). Explanations for how harmonisation 
unfolds fall into two dimensions. Firstly, the incentives other regulators face 
to emulate or diverge from the regulatory innovation of the dominant 
financial centre and secondly the nature and extent of the externalities 
produced by this reaction, as experienced in or anticipated by the dominant 
centre. Within this framework, US regulators can be thought of as 
unconditional first movers because the concentration of financial power in 
the US (in terms of the size of the internal US market) has profound
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implications which give US regulators an incentive to make unilateral 
decisions even if foreign regulators don’t follow suit. In this account, private 
influence is seen through US economic power to dominate the global 
regulatory agenda (Simmons 2001).
The great financial powers therefore remain the primary actors for 
handling the social and political externalities created by globalisation, with 
their preferences on regulatory issues firmly rooted in domestic politics 
(Drezner 2007). As the primary actors, Drezner (2007) argues that the great 
powers are consistently the most successful in achieving their preferences 
relative to others and will naturally prefer that global regulations mirror their 
own national standards as this reduces the adjustment costs. Non-state 
actors accordingly are important and can still influence outcomes “on the 
margins”, but it can be argued that their interactions with states are more 
nuanced than the globalisation literature suggests (Drezner 2007).
These accounts conceptualise private influence as primarily embedded 
within the domestic political economy. Domestic political agents seek 
international solutions to satisfy domestic pressures. However, scholars have 
also recognised that international financial standardisation does not 
necessarily encapsulate unitary ‘states’ but rather agencies from within states 
engaging in informal policy networks. States in a paradigmatic sense still 
exist but it can be said that they are “disaggregated” along functional lines 
(Slaughter 2004). International financial standardisation is conceptualised as 
part of a ‘new world order’, which is “simply the rising need for and capacity 
of different domestic government institutions to engage in activities beyond 
their borders, often with their foreign counterparts” (Slaughter 2004: 12).
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For instance, central bankers and regulators engaging in horizontal 
governance networks are argued to be the ‘new diplomats’, who have 
developed their own identity and autonomy in specific issue areas (Slaughter 
2004: 11). Importantly, these networks are interacting with their foreign 
counterparts either abroad or above individual government institutions, and 
alongside more traditional state-to-state interactions through more formal 
international institutional channels (Slaughter 2004:14).
This new world order has also been described as new forms of 
transgovemmentalism26, which was conceptualised as direct interactions 
among sub-units of different governments not controlled directly by the 
cabinets or heads of state (Baker 2006: 6). The international financial 
architecture is characterised by a limited number of regulators and central 
state agencies that dominate and control global financial governance 
resulting in closed insider processes (Baker 2006). Unlike the state-led 
accounts, this strand of literature highlights the increasingly important role 
of private actors in global deliberations and forums. Private actors no longer 
remain “on the margins” but are instead at the forefront of developing norms 
which were once the prerogative of states (Drezner 2007, Cutler et al 2002).
A distinguishing feature of the new world order therefore is that global 
governance has realigned along functional lines, cutting across the territorial 
basis of political institutions “with a propensity to merge sub-national, 
national, international and supranational arenas” (Graz and Nolke 2007:10). 
Furthermore, whilst the involvement of private market actors in global 
governance issues is not necessarily considered new, it is how some global
26 The concept was originally developed by Keohane and Nye (1974)
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private actors “have managed to develop a new relationship with the polity” 
(Graz and Nolke 2007: 11). The functionality of international financial 
regimes and the relationship these regimes have with a range of different 
private market actors are therefore crucial elements of the new transnational 
modes of governance.
For these reasons, research on transnational governance that 
encompasses both public and private elements is argued in this study to be a 
more fertile ground for exploring private influence in international financial 
standardisation than state-led approaches. This is because international 
financial standardisation is a type of governance which is not only 
undertaken by sub-units of different governments, but is also undertaken by 
private actors engaged in cooperation across borders to establish rules for 
their behaviour (Nolke and Graz 2007, Cutler et al 1999). Consequently, 
whilst domestic political pressures are still factors for consideration in 
standard-setting regimes that consist of government agencies with domestic 
regulatory imperatives, private standards regimes do not have the same types 
of concerns27. The following sections therefore survey the literature on 
transnational governance and private authority, and examine the core 
assumptions made on private influence in international financial 
standardisation.
27 This study will discuss the issue of private authority later in this chapter. Member firms or 
associations that interact at the global level may still have concerns for the domestic practices o f their 
constituents but these are not considered the same as the political pressures faced by regulatory 
authorities.
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Influence through transnational deliberation: private networks and global 
capture
Rather than seeing private influence as embedded within a domestic political 
structure, private actors from the major economic powers are identified as 
agents in their own right, acting on their own behalf in increasingly global 
networks. Private influence begins to transcend domestic national borders 
and is seen to operate directly at the global standard-setting level. There are 
three main features of this transnational literature which underpin private 
influence and ultimately policy capture. These are the actors involved, where 
this interaction is taking place and how private influence materialises 
through participatory and deliberative ‘spaces’ (Baker 2006, Underhill and 
Zhang 2005). It can be argued therefore that these transnational features 
generate captured outcomes because of the direct participation of private 
actors in these global forums.
A distinguishing feature of this transnational landscape is what is 
argued to be the emergence and expansion of both formal and informal 
decision-making forums that encompass both public and private elements 
“that cut across, constrain and jostle with states” (Cerny 2002: 194). 
Transnational modes of governance are likened to ‘webs’ of governance 
within and across borders, which involve complex interactions between 
markets, hierarchies and networks (Cerny 2002). Markets are said to have 
become entrenched not just as mechanisms to facilitate economic exchange 
but as “quasi-political governance structures in their own right deriving from 
the crucial systemic functions markets perform and the range of actors and 
transactions they encompass” (Cerny 2002: 198). The most market-based
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sector is argued to be finance, and as a result the transformation of markets 
into governance structures has involved the development of new institutional 
forms and the emergence of highly significant private institutions for market 
regulation (Cerny 2002).
The development of these new institutionalised forms in international 
financial regulation include networks between senior officials from finance 
ministries and central banks, technical problem solving networks involving 
exchanges between regulatory specialists in specific issue areas, and multi­
agency networks concerned with the system as a whole (Baker 2006). What 
makes these networks problematic is the limited number of actors involved in 
these forums. In fact, it is “the exclusive nature of participation in the global 
financial architecture that gives it its transgovemmental character” (Baker 
2006: 22). Officials who participate in these governance networks are 
considered to be insulated from societal and political interests, because of the 
tendency of these officials to approach their work as merely a technical task 
(Baker 2006).
However, the growth in transnational modes of governance in 
international finance has also corresponded with a growth in the importance 
of transnational actors, particularly those from the private and business 
sectors (Mosley 2006). Whilst private participation in public policy is not 
necessarily new28, regulatory officials and technocrats are said to have a more 
sympathetic relationship with those most directly involved in the 
international financial system which are the internationally active financial 
institutions (Baker 2006). This is because regulatory agencies are mandated
28 See for instance Cutler (2002) who discusses the history of cartels by way o f example.
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to work with financial institutions to fulfil their supervisory functions 
(Underhill and Zhang 2003). Add to this a ‘revolving door policy’ between the 
largest international banks and regulatory agencies and according to Baker, 
we can begin to appreciate that technical consensus on how best to run a 
global financial system is far from politically impartial or neutral and “may 
actually disproportionately benefit a large number of internationally active 
commercial and financial interests...and unlikely to be representative of 
broader range of socio-economic interests and views” (Baker 2006: 24).
Private sector participation is therefore said to have become 
increasingly important in this transnational setting, where the close nature of 
interaction between public regulators and financial institutions has provided 
this sector with more opportunities to influence and capture policy making in 
monetary and financial governance (Underhill and Zhang 2003, Baker 2006, 
Mosley 2006). Consequently, private influence has produced rules and 
regulations which are created for the benefit of private market 
competitiveness, the result being “the emergence of ‘market-based’ 
approaches to supervision, where private firms are responsible for risk 
management through complex mathematical models implemented under the 
approval of supervisory agencies” (Underhill and Zhang 2003: 84). In these 
new webs of hybrid transnational governance, states are increasingly seen to 
be enforcement agents that are forced to integrate market-friendly norms and 
practices that both formal and informal transnational organisations come to 
develop as ‘best practice’ and ‘benchmarking’ (Cerny 2002). The content of 
regulation is therefore argued to have undergone a major shift towards ‘pro­
market re-regulation’ and the principal benefits of this pro-market
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transnational governance are expected to flow to the largest firms with an 
established transnational presence (Cerny 2002, Underhill and Zhang 2003).
The primary concern raised about these forms of transnational 
governance therefore is that the narrow, technocratic, closed insider policy 
process remains largely impenetrable to a wider range of concerned societal 
interests (Baker 2006, Underhill and Zhang 2003). Private actors in 
particular are said to have become as or if not more important than public 
regulators and this has left public regulators little choice but to realign their 
policy preferences to the preferences of powerful market actors. The finance 
sector is argued to have the determining influence on the rules governing its 
industry and “if finance is not satisfied with the policy output -  attempts will 
be made to circumvent the policies until such time as the state accedes to its 
demands” (Harris 2004: 748). Consequently, international financial 
standards regimes “have actually become instruments of private economic 
interests rather than of the public good” (Underhill and Zhang 2003:86).
The problematic aspect of the nature of the policy communities 
responsible for making decisions in international financial standardisation 
was exemplified in the case of the securities standards regime, the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). In his study, 
Underhill argues that IOSCO is an example of transnational governance with 
“with extremely close ties to the industry they purport to supervise” (1995: 
261). Regulators are becoming as concerned with financial competitiveness as 
with issues of safety and soundness, and in this environment, “greater levels 
of autonomy are necessarily conferred upon market actors” (Underhill 1995: 
261). In fact, because regulators develop their policies in “commensurately
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close consultation with market intermediaries”, the situation is argued to be 
“not far from classic regulatory capture” (Underhill 1995: 272-3).
In the case of the new Basel II Capital Framework, one key feature that 
has been highly scrutinised is that “the big banks have been able to pressure 
the Committee directly through comments and indirectly through 
representation to national banking authorities in order to prevent what they 
have seen as an overly burdensome new capital framework.”(Wood 2005: 
149). Again, because of the close interaction between the BCBS and industry, 
the consultation and deliberation processes resulted in “drastic changes to 
the initial proposals for Basel II that have watered down the Committee’s 
proposals in a number of key areas” (Wood 2005:123). Furthermore, where 
the big banks have refused to accept the BCBS’s proposals, Wood argues that 
the Committee has been forced to back down on a number of issues and thus 
“regulatory capture features as an issue...” (2005:123).
Private participation in the formulation and implementation of 
regulation is highlighted as a primary reason for the changes made to the 
Basel II Framework but as Tsingou (2006) argues, this reasoning does not 
take into account the fact that private sector preferences have been 
internalised in financial policy processes. According to Tsingou, this has not 
happened as a result of conscious and deliberate strategy of capture. Instead, 
it is seen as the consequence of formal and informal practices of public- 
private interaction and agreement among an increasingly coherent and 
transnational policy community (2006: 56). This small elite group of private 
actors have had a pivotal role in shaping the interests of the BCBS as well as 
the agenda guiding the reform of the Basel Accord. Consequently, they have
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in the context of Basel II acquired semi-institutionalised functions in the 
making of global rules which indicates that private preferences and interests 
are defining policy debates and restricting policy options and alternatives. Of 
more concern is that the influence of private sector participation is seen as 
legitimate (Tsingou 2006).
The financial regulators’ dilemma is that they can never have accurate 
information about a bank's balance sheet, its exposure to off-balance sheet 
vehicles or its internal incentive structure. Regulatory capture is considered a 
fact of life and regulators everywhere and at all times have been at risk of 
being captured by the industry or private interest they are meant to regulate 
in the public interest (Buiter 2009: 38). However as already highlighted by 
Underhill and Tsingou, capture need not take the overt forms of bribery, 
blackmail, corruption but occur though “cognitive regulatory capture”, which 
is “the process through which those in charge of the relevant state entity 
internalise and adopt, as if by osmosis, the objectives, interests, fears, hopes 
and perception of reality of the vested sectional interest they are meant to 
regulate” (Buiter 2009: 39).
In sum, transnational capture does not necessarily encapsulate the 
participation of private market actors per se, but the consequence that direct 
participation has on the internalisation of market norms, ideas and 
preferences within regulatory policy domains. Closed, narrow and exclusive 
deliberation and representation support the propositions advanced by Mattli 
and Woods (2009) that a limited institutional supply of global due process, 
characterised by closed and exclusive forums with minimal transparency, 
combined with weak demand for change because of suppressed information
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about the social cost of poor regulation or failure of other demand side 
conditions will favour sustained regulatory capture. In their model, 
regulatory institutions which supply participatory mechanisms that are fair, 
transparent, and accessible and open (a case of ‘extensive’ institutional 
supply) are more likely to produce common interest regulation, however even 
in their opinion “these are difficult conditions to fulfil in global politics” 
(Mattli and Woods 2009: 4).
Influence through private authority and governance
The discussion so far on transnational private governance has focused on 
private actors participating in exclusive policy domains that are 
predominantly occupied by government officials, regulators and technocrats. 
Private influence is most evident in the way in which the underlying norms 
adopted by regulators are reoriented to be in the interests of market 
efficiency as well as stability. However, transnational governance also 
encompasses private actors cooperating outside the boundaries of inter-state 
or inter-regulatory coordination, producing their own standards for 
enforcement. This has resulted in private actors exercising ‘authority’ in 
governance at the global level, ultimately influencing the choice sets of states 
and the underlying paradigm of states as primary actors in the global system 
(Cutler et al 1999).
The development of private international regimes through the 
cooperation of firms, business associations and other corporate actors is 
considered to be significant because firms “are supposed to compete 
ruthlessly in the marketplace to attain the highest profits possible” (Cutler et 
al 1999: 7). Even though there again is nothing new in the cooperation of
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firms (evident in the history of the formation of carte ls 2^ ) what is considered 
distinct from this idea of cooperation is that private cooperative 
arrangements are also increasingly engaged in authoritative decision-making 
“that was previously the prerogative of sovereign states” (Cutler et al 1999: 
16). It is therefore the degree to which private arrangements act as a 
substitute for regulatory functions usually associated with the state which 
therefore raises important questions about the notion of private power in 
transnational governance (Cutler et al 1999, Graz and Nolke 2007).
There are two principal types of private authority evident in the 
literature, which are described as institutional market authority and 
normative market authority (Biersteker and Hall 2002). The former authority 
refers to the capacity of private actors to set standards that are recognised 
and adhered to by others, whilst the latter refers to the general acceptance of 
the idea that markets should determine decision-making over important 
issues (Biersteker and Hall 2002: 214). The former authority is generally 
more highly institutionalised than the latter, which are responsible for 
developing formal standards that are recognised officially (Biersteker and 
Hall 2002, Salter 1999). The operation of private formal standards 
organisations is likened to that of any formal bureaucratic organisation, 
where decision-making is organised in levels from the high-level policy 
meetings that make decisions for the organisation as a whole to the lower 
sub-group levels that are responsible for developing the technical standards 
(Salter 1999:107-108). On the other hand, normative market authority is the 
more abstract form of authority that is less formally institutionalised but
29 See for instance Cutler et al (1999)
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more inherently based on the power of private norms infiltrating public 
policy agendas (Biersteker and Hall 2002, Sassen 1999).
Private arrangements and private authority therefore vary 
considerably, particularly in their degree of institutionalisation (Cutler et al 
1999: 9). There is also debate over whether or not such authority has been 
delegated to private actors by states, where governments not only tolerate 
such arrangements but also welcome, legitimise and approve them (Strange 
1996, Biersteker and Hall 2002, Pauly 2002, Sassen 2002). Given that there 
is such variation between the institutional and organisational forms of private 
cooperation, Strange (1996) argues that non-state authority can only be 
determined on the basis of outcomes. Private authority is significant where 
non-state actors exercise structural power where “any association, 
organisation or institution other than the state whose decisions indirectly 
affect the choices of others in society in ways comparable to that produced by 
the actions of state agencies” (Strange 1996: 91). Hence, whenever the choices 
open to others are changed, particularly when they are narrowed so that 
fewer choices are available “then it is likely that authority has been exercised 
structurally to produce that change” (Strange 1996: 91).
Above all, the transnational authority and power of private actors is 
seen to be a pervasive presence in global governance, where “the gravity of 
world politics has shifted during the last quarter century from public agencies 
of the state to private bodies of various kinds, and from states to markets and 
market operators” (Strange 1996: 95). These propositions raise a number of 
questions, which scholars still continue to grapple with (Graz and Nolke 
2007, Biersteker and Hall 2002). The remaining sections of this chapter
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highlight areas of the literature which may be enhanced by further empirical 
study in the area of international financial standardisation. This study aims 
to contribute further thoughts and empirical evidence to this literature, by 
focusing specifically on various forms of international financial standards 
regimes, their relationships and interactions with private market actors and 
how this affects outcomes by way of international financial standards.
2.3 Private participation, c loseness and capture: the m issing  links
Reconciling participation, closeness and capture
Private actors participate in and are also said to have authority in new modes 
of transnational governance. At the extreme, this participation and authority 
is argued to exacerbate already narrow and democratically unaccountable 
policy processes, which leave public policy makers highly susceptible to 
industry influence and capture. However, an underlying weakness with this 
literature is the way in which scholars link participation and deliberation in 
policy processes with the outcome of capture, without addressing how 
participation and closeness in these forums generate captured outcomes. 
These approaches presume substantive outcomes as a result of the 
interaction between public and private actors. Private actors are said to have 
influence and authority but there is little discussion on what this influence 
constitutes and how it is exercised in order to produce captured outcomes.
For example, Tsingou (2006) raises the way in which the IIF, the 
global industry association for banks, played an active role in the drafting, 
revision and final version of Basel II. In her view, “the end result has been 
that the IIF preferences for market generated standards and market based
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oversight solutions have been internalised in the Basel process, and that 
consequently large sophisticated banks are the best placed and best suited to 
the ensuing proposals” (Tsingou 2006: 62). Hence, the participation through 
drafting and revision to standards gives us some indication of how private 
influence affects outcomes. However Tsingou also makes the observation that 
“as part of the extensive consultation process, the IIF along with a plethora 
o f other actors (public and private) was regularly sounded out and offered 
consistent feedback including providing expertise on highly technical issues 
throughout the process”(20o6: 62) (emphasis added). This latter observation 
only leads to further questions about why the IIF preferences were 
internalised and the preferences and contributions of the “plethora of other 
actors” which were also sounded out for their technical expertise were not 
internalised. It also raises the question of why the BCBS regulators have no 
preferences and if they do, where they end up in the process.
The second underlying weakness found in this literature is that it does 
not recognise the varying ways in which private actors ‘participate’ in these 
standard setting forums. The three main strands of literature surveyed in this 
chapter for instance highlight three very different ways private actors are said 
to participate. In the first strand of literature, private actors can participate 
in influencing regulatory preferences through domestic lobbying channels. 
The second strand of literature highlights the ways in which private actors 
participate and deliberate directly in international regulatory processes, 
whilst the third strand of literature focuses on the way in which private actors 
participate as standard-setters engaging in broader governance
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constellations. The key question that is raised therefore is whether all these 
forms of participation lead to the same captured outcomes.
The third strand of literature in particular raises an interesting 
conceptual dilemma of how participation can be reconciled with the concept 
of private authority, particularly institutional market authority that is directly 
responsible for developing formal standards that are recognised by other 
actors, including states. Private standards organisations are participating in 
the development of global norms within the broader concept of transnational 
governance, and they do so often with the explicit recognition given by states 
and other public agencies. However, there is very little analysis of how these 
private global norms come to be accepted as legitimate. Are they accepted as 
legitimate simply because states have delegated authority, and as such, left 
private organisations to their own devices? Or is private authority responsible 
for persuading public officials to buy in to the market-based discourse and if 
this is the case, how have they been able to do this?
One main criticism with the way in which the literature deals with 
private participation is that public actors are assumed to simply be vessels 
through which private influence passes. Becker has criticised this aspect of 
capture because politicians, political parties and even voters in their analyses 
“are assumed mainly to transmit the pressure of active groups” (1983: 372). 
Levine and Forrence argue that the main problem with capture theories 
generally is that they “do not explicitly consider the relationships among 
actors in the governmental process nor the mechanisms by which the acts of 
regulators are made to conform to the desires of organised sub-groups” 
(1990: 170). The interaction between public and private actors is assumed to
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take place within a ‘black box’ where the institutional dynamics that 
constitute their relationship are often ignored (Levine and Forrence 1990). 
Furthermore, this interaction between public and private actors is also 
assumed to remain fixed or static and as a result, outcomes are expected to 
reflect the initial structure of interaction that was established in the first 
place. This does not contemplate the idea that relationships between public 
and private actors do not remain fixed, but develop and evolve in a process of 
interaction.
A prevalent theme surveyed in literature can be neatly summarised by 
the term ‘cognitive capture’ (Buiter 2009). This is an important aspect of the 
debate concerning capture in international financial regulation, because it 
brings us closer to what sort of captured outcome we are contemplating in 
this policy arena. However, the literature applies this concept of cognitive 
capture in much the same way as participation, where the norms and 
discourse of the market are again simply assumed to pass through public 
agents as though they were ‘empty vessels’. Private actors are seen to pass 
cognitive influence on to public actors ‘by osmosis’ who then accept and 
adopt these norms and discourse (Buiter 2009). Cognitive diffusion and 
transfer in other words is understood as a one-way osmosis with little 
analysis on how private actors are able to influence the thoughts and ideas of 
public policymakers. The underlying weakness with this analysis is that the 
diffusion and transfer of norms and discourse between actors occurs as a 
two-way dialogue; the development of norms is a constitutive exercise where 
ideas and norms arise due to the interaction itself.
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For instance, Underhill and Zhang (2003) make an important 
contribution to the debate by highlighting that public and private actors can 
have ‘shared world views’, which means that within their ‘symbiotic 
relationship’, public actors also have the opportunity and means to pass their 
normative ideologies and discourse on to private actors. The authors refer to 
instances where “private interests converted themselves into public and 
legitimated purposes through their successful integration into key policy 
processes” (Underhill and Zhang 2003: 771). Furthermore, Underhill has also 
importantly highlighted in his work on IOSCO that “achieving agreement in 
IOSCO is often an extremely arduous and conflictual process” and that “the 
road to an IOSCO agreement on capital adequacy has been a difficult one” 
(Underhill 1995: 263, 268).
This is an important recognition because it not only challenges the 
notion that actors adopt a wholesale acceptance of any norms, let alone 
private market ones, but also that the process itself is an interactive one 
where ideas, preferences and discourse are not simply taken for granted but 
instead are highly contested domains. If public and private actors shared the 
exact same ideas and preferences for private market norms and discourse for 
rule making, then the process for reaching agreement would not be an 
arduous one but instead one in which outcomes would be more easily 
achieved. The transfer of market norms from private actors to public 
authorities may indeed be occurring in their close interaction, but the main 
point to be emphasised is that this is only one-half of the dialogue which may 
be taking place.
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Rethinking influence and institutional form s as causal variables
How does participation and authority lead to capture? Or how have private 
actors influenced policy to the extent that outcomes reflect market-based 
preferences and solutions? This study argues that the literature on 
transnational capture and private authority in international standard-setting 
can be enriched with a discussion about what private influence constitutes, 
and how it is able to capture outcomes. Participation and deliberation may 
constitute a form of influence, but this conceptualisation does not elaborate 
how closeness through participation enables capture. As such, this study 
seeks to identify the various forms of private influence, which can then lead 
to an examination of how they operate to capture outcomes. Core questions 
that this study addresses are how can private influence be detected in 
international financial standards regimes? Why are particular types of private 
influence evident in international financial standards forums? Do these forms 
of private influence lead to captured outcomes, or can private influence be 
evident without outcomes becoming captured?
This study posits that different forms of private participation are based 
on the same fundamental dynamic, which is the supply and demand of 
private capabilities. Private influence is evident in different standards 
regimes because the existence of particular types of private capabilities will 
depend on the demand by public policymakers for that type of private input. 
This framework of analysis therefore re-introduces public policymakers and 
regulators as dependent variables that play a critical and active role in 
facilitating the transmission of particular modes of private influence based on 
a demand for power. However, it also posits that because private influence is
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based on public demand, private influence may also be constrained and 
curbed by regulators using the same mode of power acquired from private 
actors.
How does this occur? Private influence and its interaction with public 
agencies does not occur in a vacuum but instead takes place within 
institutionalised boundaries. The different approaches to institutional theory 
helps us to see that whilst institutionalised structures are a critical variable in 
shaping and constituting the supply and demand relationships between 
public and private actors, the role of agency is also important in a study of 
influence by assessing how the institutional infrastructure can be used to 
facilitate and constrain relationships within those boundaries.
The question that is raised is whether these transnational modes of 
governance are distinct from other formal international organisations and if 
so, whether these distinctions are contributing or enhancing the ability for 
private actors to exercise their power. Scholars such as Baker (2006) have 
noted such attributes as the unrepresentative composition of standard- 
setting regimes, narrow and closed policy processes, exclusive deliberation 
with private actors and the lack of any form of accountability. These 
attributes are therefore examined to decipher whether and how these 
institutional characteristics contribute to private influence over outcomes.
Exclusive interaction with private actors through narrowing the 
institutional representation of standard regimes is hypothesised in this study 
as a strategy for enhancing the ‘supply and demand’ power relationship in 
place, which at the same time enables public policymakers to constrain 
private actors if they are perceived to be encroaching on their authority.
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Closeness therefore is characterised as a conditional closeness, enforced 
through the institutional mechanisms that are tailored to include private 
actors when the demand for private power is high, and exclude private actors 
when the demand for private power is low. The outcome of the supply and 
demand power relationship, within narrow and closed institutional contexts 
would therefore generate outcomes that encapsulate both public and private 
interests. These institutional features therefore may be used as intentional 
mechanisms by public agencies to not only facilitate their close relationships 
with private actors, but to also curb private influence when their own 
authority is perceived to be under threat.
2.4  Conclusion
As surveyed in this chapter, international financial standardisation presents 
some considerable analytical as well as practical issues. The expanding scope 
and proliferation of financial standardisation not only raises questions about 
the legitimacy of these technocratic agencies in global financial governance 
but more importantly for this study, also raises concerns about the role 
private market actors play in governing financial activity. The underlying 
concern raised by critics is that private market actors not only influence 
governance outcomes but they also influence the public figures who are 
supposed to protect broader public interests. The question that this study 
intends to address therefore is whether international financial standards 
bodies have indeed been ‘captured’ by private interests and if so, what 
implications this has for the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in global financial markets. 
The remainder of this study proposes an alternative framework for 
understanding the dynamics of public-private interaction, namely by way of
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introducing an institutional framework of analysis that offers a much more 
comprehensive means of assessing whether a captured relationship 
necessarily produces captured outcomes. The study will then apply this 
framework to three comparative empirical cases and conclude based on the 
empirical findings.
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3Private Influence in International Financial 
Standardisation: analysing the institutionalised supply 
and demand of private power
Private influence in international financial standardisation is conceptualised 
by scholars as part of a broader issue involving the role of private actors in 
new modes of transnational governance (Baker 2006, Nolke and Graz 2007, 
Cerny 2002). Central to these debates is the notion that private actors and 
public policymakers interact in close and exclusive policy settings, which 
allow private actors to influence and capture policy outcomes. Whilst these 
debates provide important insights to the study of private influence, an 
underlying weakness found in the literature is that it pre-determines both 
outcome (captured outcomes) and causality of outcome (private influence) 
without addressing the causal mechanisms which lead to a situation of 
private capture. Given the important ramifications of these arguments for the 
ongoing legitimacy of international standards regimes, this study argues that 
more attention is needed to establish the theoretical and empirical links 
between private influence and policy outcomes.
This study proposes an analytical framework that sets out how private 
influence operates in international financial standard-setting and the 
circumstances under which influence does and does not determine decision 
outcomes. This framework incorporates important theoretical contributions 
already made in the literature on power, economic regulation and institutions
82
but combines these insights to provide an explanation for how private 
influence operates and affects outcomes in these international financial 
standards forums. It does so by examining what private influence constitutes 
and the reasons for why private influence is evident in international financial 
standard-setting. It firstly proposes that private influence is part of a ‘supply 
and demand’ relationship where regulators demand private power 
capabilities to enhance their own policy or political needs and private actors 
willingly supply these capabilities to influence outcomes. It argues that 
captured outcomes as a result of this relationship are likely to arise when 
demand for a specific private capability is high; that is, when regulators are 
not able to fulfil their regulatory roles and policy requirements without 
private power capabilities, due to the specialised and technical nature of 
specific regulatory issue areas. On the other hand, captured outcomes are not 
likely to arise when demand for private capabilities is low. Demand for 
private power may be low when private power capabilities have fulfilled the 
regulator’s initial purpose, or when regulators perceive the capability to be a 
threat to their political and/or policy-making authority.
However, whilst these factors outline the reasons why influence and 
capture may arise in international financial standardisation, they do not 
provide for how supply and demand relationships produce outcomes that are 
captured or not. As a result, the study’s central thesis is these relationships 
are bound by institutions and as a result, private influence may be enhanced 
and/or constrained in institutionalised settings. Specifically, whilst 
institutional structures will constitute the supply and demand dynamic 
between regulators and private actors, regulators will attempt to use
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institutional mechanisms to include private actors when the demand for 
private power is high, and exclude private actors when the demand for 
private power is low. This means that whilst institutions can facilitate 
capture, they can also frustrate and constrain private actors from producing 
outcomes which are favourable to their vested interests. As a result, 
standards outcomes are likely to encapsulate both public and private 
interests, the extent of either depending on the supply and demand dynamics 
interceding with institutional mechanisms.
3.1 W hy private influence? Explaining the supply and dem and o f  
private capabilities
Private influence in international financial standard-setting
In order to attain an understanding of how international financial standards 
are influenced by private actors, it is necessary first to understand what 
private influence is and the nature of the power that private actors possess in 
international standards-setting in order to obtain political objectives or goals 
(Fuchs 2005). Private market actors as agents of capital are said to exercise 
‘power’ in the political arena but as Fuchs (2005) argues, this power is 
frequently referred to in popular literature in terms of the size of firms or 
their market share in certain market segments. Whilst this identifies 
characteristics of those private actors, it does not tell us how private actors 
use those characteristics in a political arena and whether those characteristics 
alone give private actors the power to construct or change political outcomes. 
Consequently, private influence must be assessed as the power of private 
actors “to pursue successfully a desired political objective” (Fuchs 2005:774).
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In international financial standardisation, the objective is to influence 
the content of standards. This is because the creation of an international 
financial standard is about the creation of norms, or how authorities should 
regulate their financial institutions and how financial institutions should 
behave in accordance with those principles. At the very heart of what an 
international financial standard should look like is a fundamentally 
normative process concerning ideas. The ideas that actors hold will affect 
how they define their interests and preferences in the first place. Therefore, 
private actors will attempt to influence the ways in which policymakers 
understand how to govern and regulate international financial market 
activity, which in essence is the way in which private industry would like to be 
governed in accordance with their private market principles.
There are three main approaches to power in international relations 
which help to inform our understanding of private influence. These are firstly 
the ‘instrumentalist’ perspectives, which emphasise the ability of private 
market actors to act cohesively in the political arena to pursue to political 
goals, using largely their material resources; secondly the ‘structural 
dependency9 approaches which emphasise the dependency within a market 
system that the state has on private sector activity and profitability; and 
finally the cultural or discursive approaches, which focus on the ideological 
paradigms that private market actors generate based on their private sector 
activity (Levy and Egan 2000). Private actors therefore possess and employ 
these three sources of instrumental, structural and discursive power 
capabilities in political arenas to influence political activity. This chapter will 
discuss each source of power briefly, but concentrate on one form or ‘face’ of
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power which is most relevant to the ‘supply and demand’ proposition 
outlined in this study: instrumental sources of power.
We begin with this first ‘face’ of power as it is the most overt form of 
influence and one that is often associated with private market actors because 
of its emphasis on instrumental causality on outcomes where the power of 
private market actors can be assessed in policy or decision outputs. Private 
market actors can influence international financial standards by exercising 
‘instrumental power’ where ‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get 
B to do something that B would not otherwise do’ (Lukes 2005a: 16). 
Instrumental power is also frequently associated with private actors because 
it is linked to the ability of private actors to utilise their specific human, 
organisational or financial resources as well as their close access to decision­
makers (Fuchs 2005). Instrumental power, through such tangible forms as 
material resources, is a crucial part of the power ‘arsenal’ that private actors 
have available to them. In fact, it is the ability of private actors to use and 
devote their resources to their wider political objectives such as taking part in 
international policy initiatives and other forms of business and political 
‘roundtables’ that provide them with exclusive and privileged access to 
decision makers in the first place (Fuchs 2005: 781-2).
Prevalent examples of instrumental power include private lobbying 
and political and campaign financing where corporations and business 
associations not only join forces at the domestic level of politics to lobby 
politicians but are also organised as transnational networks that lobby in all 
international arenas of strategic importance (Fuchs 2005). This is an 
important source of private market power in international financial standard-
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setting because of the need to employ the human and material resources to 
respond to policy proposals and where possible lobby directly at international 
forums. The rise of international financial associations such as the 
International Institute of Finance (IIF) who are mandated by the world’s 
largest financial institutions to lobby and respond to policy initiatives of the 
various international financial policy arenas is one example of the exercise of 
instrumental power3°.
The ability of private actors to devote their resources to generating 
information and using this information is also another example of 
instrumental power in policy arenas. Policymakers in international financial 
standard-setting may rely on private market actors for information that they 
in turn rely on for policy input. For instance, regulators will often be in 
situations where there is an asymmetry of information where they rely 
heavily on the information provided by the financial sector regarding their 
own activities. Moreover, due to resource pressures, regulators may also rely 
on the ability of the finance sector to dedicate more time and resources to 
collecting and assembling that information that regulators would otherwise 
need to undertake. The technical complexity of financial activity and 
correspondingly, the rules needed to regulate that activity is one of the 
reasons why it is argued the finance sector has a ‘special’ status among 
stakeholders in regulatory and policy deliberations.
In addition to instrumental power, private market actors also have a 
less overt form of influence where states have a structural dependence on
301 discuss the IIF and its role in the Basel II process in more detail in Chapter 4. The IIF has for 
instance been singled out by scholars such as Tsingou (2006) for having disproportionate influence 
over the Basel II policy process.
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private sector activity. Specifically, instrumental sources alone “fail to capture 
the potential influence that the dependence of political elites on private sector 
profitability has on political agendas and policy options” (Fuchs 2005: 775). 
As the main source of economic productivity and growth, it can be argued 
that business has a kind of ‘silent’ power over policymakers because of their 
need to ensure that regulation does not unduly burden business interests and 
profitability (Falkner 2008). This is particularly pertinent for global financial 
policymakers who are well aware of the systemic risk that global financial 
conglomerates pose for the global economy, as highlighted by the global 
financial crisis.
This structural power is was what Bachrach and Baratz argued to the 
be the power of ‘non-decisions’ or as they argue, “to the extent that a person 
or a group -  consciously or unconsciously -  creates or reinforces barriers to 
the public airing of policy conflicts, that person or group has power” 
(1962:949). Even though power is thought to be exercised in decision-making 
when A participates in the making of key decisions that affect B, power is also 
said to be exercised when A can also effectively prevent certain issues from 
reaching a decision agenda (Bachrach and Baratz 1963). Structural sources of 
power can therefore predetermine the behavioural options of political 
decision-makers through existing material structures which then allow 
private actors to determine suitable alternative solutions before actual and 
observable bargaining is undertaken (Fuchs 2005). An example of structural 
power in the case of financial regulation is that certain regulatory policy 
options might not even be considered due to the implications of such 
decisions on financial sector profitability. At the global financial policy
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setting level, these options might also not be considered because of broader 
global systemic stability considerations.
These sources of power neglect yet a third source, which is argued to 
pre-exist these first and second dimensions of power. Private market actors 
also have the power to shape the preferences and desires of actors which can 
then shape the direction in which decisions and non-decisions take (Lukes 
2005). In an international forum such as financial standard-setting, where 
the political objective is to determine the underlying norms understood by 
policymakers, the exercise of this power source is critical. Specifically, “A may 
exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but 
he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his 
very wants” (Lukes 2005: 27).
Power in this respect is seen to be a function of norms and ideas and is 
captured by sociological and discursive perspectives on power relations in a 
political process. Actors engage the strategic use of discourse to shape the 
norms and ideas of others and therefore policy decisions are not just a 
function of resources, or structural dependencies but “is a function of 
discursive contests over the frames of policies” (Fuchs 2005: 777-8). The 
third dimension of ‘discursive power’ is a crucial source of power because it 
can enhance an actor’s instrumental and structural power (Fuchs 2005). 
Whilst instrumental and structural power are fundamental for getting private 
actors to a privileged position at the policy bargaining table, discursive power 
is then pivotal in influencing the nature of policy decisions through the ability 
to shape underlying norms.
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Private market actors exercise their structural power by being able to 
provide information that public actors do not have access to, however, 
instrumental and structural power alone may not necessarily influence the 
way in which that information is then subsequently used by policymakers. 
Instead, discursive power is the ability of actors to frame that information, so 
that policymakers adopt the underlying normative values that actors wish to 
diffuse. Put simply, it is not only about influencing how policymakers should 
understand financial market regulation but also the underlying function 
financial regulation should have in financial markets. ‘Technical’ knowledge 
in this line of argument, or knowledge which is said to be based on empirical 
fact, may not be technical or empirical at all, but rather the ability to convince 
others that such information is ‘right’ and ‘objective’. Hence “regulatory 
discourses are thus strongly influenced by the discursive power of firms 
rooted in their privileged economic position” (Falkner 2007: 32). 
Importantly, discursive power is crucial in a normative or policy-making 
arena, because it is in a policy-making environment that the most influential 
discourse prevails through to policy outcomes.
Private influence can be seen through instrumental, structural and 
discursive frameworks and all three faces of power are crucial for 
understanding the context within which private influence emanates, is 
constituted and exercised. It is difficult to disaggregate these sources of 
power because they are ‘faces’ of one multi-faceted phenomenon, interlinked 
in their purpose, which is the shaping of outcomes. Furthermore power is not 
only multidimensional -  taking on both visible and invisible forms -  but 
must also be contextualised and studied in specific policy domains. Empirical
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context is crucial in the analysis of private power as an empirical analysis 
would highlight that private actors may have greater propensity to influence 
with only one of these sources of power as opposed to others (Falkner 2007).
For this reason, this study explores how private actors influence 
international standard-setting arenas using instrumental sources of power. 
This is because in regulatory policy arenas, there is often a fundamental 
asymmetry of instrumental power capabilities, in the form of resources, 
information and expertise. This asymmetry therefore precipitates the 
functional regulatory need for these forms of capabilities, thereby creating 
the conditions for ‘capture’ through close interaction and participation in 
regulatory policy domains. This is otherwise referred to as the ‘supply and 
demand’ of private capabilities, which is discussed further in this chapter. 
Private instrumental capabilities may therefore secure private actors a 
privileged position at the policy bargaining table, often precluding other 
stakeholders from participating in these forums. The need for and provision 
of private instrumental capabilities therefore is proposed to be the functional 
rationale of private influence in international standard-setting arenas.
The conditions fo r  capture: the supply and demand o f private power
Private actors can exercise instrumental sources of power in regulatory policy 
arenas to pursue strategic objectives but the exercise of this power may not 
necessarily forced upon unwilling recipients. It may not, in other words, 
always be the case that ‘’A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to 
do something that B would not otherwise do’ (Lukes 2005a: 16). One of the 
core tenets of the theory of economic regulation is the supply and demand of 
regulation. Importantly, both public policymakers and private market actors
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engage in close relationships because they are ultimately rewarded by such a 
mutually beneficial exchange. The theory of economic regulation advanced by 
Stigler begins from the premise that regulation is not necessarily rational and 
indeed “the problem of regulation is the problem of discovering when and 
why an industry (or other group of like-minded people) is able to use the 
state for its purposes, or is singled out by the state to be used for alien 
purposes” (1971:4). Stigler goes on to argue that “as a rule, regulation is 
acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its 
benefit” (1971:3).
The theory of economic regulation is therefore based on a ‘supply and 
demand’ model where public actors essentially incur costs for enacting 
legislation or policy -  “costs of operation, costs of maintaining an 
organisation and competing in elections” (1971: 12). As a result, Stigler 
argued that the industry with the most interest in obtaining favourable 
regulation “must be prepared to pay” with two things political actors most 
needed -  votes and resources (1971: 11-12). Consequently, Stigler’s model of 
regulation is based on the transaction costs between self-interested suppliers 
-  that is, legislators, executives and their regulatory agents -  and self- 
interested demanders, which determine the regulatory outcome (Peltzman 
1993:822).
This supply and demand model is an important theoretical 
contribution that warrants more attention in an analysis of private influence. 
This model provides important insights into the reciprocal aspects of 
instrumental power, where instrumental power not only takes on different 
forms but can also be understood as a resource which is exchanged in a
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political marketplace. By adopting this premise, public actors are no longer 
passive agents subjected to private power but instead are active instigators 
seeking to ‘sell’ their policies and legislation at a cost. Private market actors 
therefore calculate the costs of providing these resources against the cost of 
uncertain or unfavourable regulation and determine that it is much more 
beneficial to provide the resources than to pay the ‘deadweight losses’ from 
acquired regulation (Stigler 1971, Peltzman 1993). At the heart of private 
influence in economic regulation therefore is an incentive for both parties to 
engage in such mutually beneficial interaction, to the exclusion of other 
interested parties and or stakeholders. The exchange of power capabilities is 
considered valuable to both parties because it ultimately enhances their 
positions of power. The result can be what is referred to as ‘regulatory 
capture’ which is “the triumph of the cohesive producer interest over the 
diffuse consumer interest” (Peltzman 1993: 823).
This study however takes a slightly different approach to the supply 
and demand model advanced by Stigler (1971) and argues that private actors 
don’t exercise power but instead supply power to policymakers who have a 
demand for it. This means that private actors supply various instrumental 
capabilities because it enhances their leverage for obtaining favourable policy 
outcomes. Public regulators and policymakers also use these sources of 
power to enhance their own political standing or professional security. Such a 
relationship can therefore create a ‘win-win’ for both sides. Furthermore, this 
study also proposes that capture does not occur simply because there is a 
supply and demand relationship between regulators and private industry, but 
when demand for a specific private capability is high; that is, when regulators
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are unable to fulfil their regulatory roles and policy requirements without the 
input of private power capabilities. This demand is accentuated by the fact 
that financial regulation can be highly technical and policy development 
relies on a limited number of specialists with the required knowledge. 
Because this specialised knowledge is largely developed and generated by 
markets through financial product innovations, private actors involved in 
these technical areas are considered to have the most capabilities when it 
comes to dealing with these issues.
When this asymmetry of power occurs, regulators will consider that 
the benefit from the use of private power capabilities outweighs the cost to 
regulators of not having these resources at all, or the cost of generating the 
capabilities themselves. However, this study further argues that regulators 
will only seek the use of private power capabilities if these capabilities are 
able to help regulators undertake their mandated tasks, thereby enhancing 
their positions of political and /o r policy-making authority. If their positions 
of authority are enhanced, regulators will use the private power capabilities 
favourably in order to produce the required regulation as well as provide 
private actors with the incentive and pay-off they are ultimately seeking 
through favourable policies and regulations. This is argued to constitute the 
captured ‘win-win’ condition for both parties.
Based on this theoretical approach, private capture in international 
financial standards regimes would involve two variables: firstly, when 
regulators are in need of a power capability and actively seek it from the most 
dominant private actors within the industry; and secondly, those dominant 
private actors within the industry provide that capability. Examples of such
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‘supply and demand’ would include for instance the supply of material 
sources of power through political and campaign financing in exchange for a 
privileged position at the bargaining table. Public actors may also for instance 
depend and rely heavily on the information provided by private actors of 
their own activities. Moreover due to resource pressures, public actors may 
also rely on the ability of the private sector to dedicate more time and 
resources to collecting that information that public actors would otherwise 
need to undertake. Finally, private actors may also be better equipped to 
provide technical ‘expertise’. Technical knowledge in this line of argument, 
or knowledge which is said to be based on empirical fact, may not be 
technical or empirical at all, but its ‘ready to use’ format may be more 
convenient for public actors to consume than developing this technical 
knowledge themselves, making it again less costly to develop legislation.
However, where this study fundamentally diverges from the theory of 
economic regulation is the presumption of outcome. The outcome of the 
supply and demand model within the theory of economic regulation is that 
regulation acquired by the industry is designed and operated primarily for its 
benefit (Stigler 1971). Transferring this to the argument presented in this 
study, this means that regulatory capture is based on a continually high 
demand from regulators for private power capabilities. Whilst this may 
indeed be the case, it still fundamentally neglects the possibility that 
regulators may not always have a high demand for private power capabilities 
and in fact, may choose to design and operate regulation that is not beneficial 
to private interests.
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For instance, if we take the example of the political actor accepting the 
campaign funding from a private constituency, this does not in itself 
guarantee that policy outcomes will reflect the preferences of that private 
constituency. We can only assume that the acceptance of private material 
resources would ensure a place at the bargaining table. Likewise, the 
collection of information from private actors does not tell us anything about 
the subsequent use of that information by policymakers. Information by its 
very nature can be reformulated to the point where it no longer resembles 
what was initially collected. Similarly, information that has been provided by 
technical ‘experts’ does not in itself ensure that this expertise is either used or 
adopted in final policy decision outcomes. It may influence how regulatory 
actors think of and address a particular problem, but the same expertise may 
not be adopted in other policy decisions.
Why would this occur? Why would there be instances where outcomes 
are not captured by private interests, even when regulators utilise private 
capabilities? We can surmise that demand for private power capabilities is 
high when regulators are dependent upon the private power source, but this 
demand may also fall when the capability has fulfilled the regulator’s initial 
purpose, thereby reducing the utility of that power source. The regulator may 
therefore choose to use the power source to enhance its authority, and once 
the regulator’s task has been fulfilled and authority has been achieved, 
demand for private power capabilities may then wane. Demand for private 
power may also fall when regulators perceive private power to be a threat to 
their authority. The reason for this perceived threat is that because regulators 
lack certain power capabilities, and private actors are able to provide these
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capabilities, regulators may assess that the cost of acquiring private 
capabilities outweighs the benefit that it could potentially provide in the 
initial transaction costs associated with implementing policy and legislation. 
The self-interest of regulators to preserve their control over policy-making in 
this instance is greater than the uncertainty of not being able to produce the 
required regulations.
This supply and demand dynamic between public and private actors is 
argued by this study to be accentuated in transnational policy arenas for two 
main reasons. Firstly, the technicality and complexity of financial products 
that are transacted on a global basis means that there are fewer private 
market participants with this highly specialised knowledge, making ‘supply* 
limited. Secondly, the uncertainty of what constitutes the political and or 
policy-making authority of regulators in these informal global deliberations 
creates conditions that are both more and less conducive to seeking power 
capabilities from such a limited supply of private sources. Unlike the formal 
mandates given to them by domestic legislative mechanisms, regulators in 
international financial standards forums are there as voluntary members and 
as such, have no legislated ‘authority* to exercise over transnational private 
actors.
The informality of the standard-setting mandates is, for example, most 
clearly exemplified by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 
which categorically states that it “does not possess any formal supranational 
supervisory authority” and its conclusions were never intended to have legal 
force. Instead, the underlying basis for the BCBS is to “encourages
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convergence towards common approaches and common standards’^ 1. It is for 
this reason that the perception of authority in these settings largely relies on 
the contributions of members. Private power capabilities therefore may 
initially enhance and boost the authority of regulators in these global forums 
by providing these resources, but because authority ultimately rests on 
legitimacy, they can also ultimately threaten the policy-making positions that 
regulators assume in financial standardisation.
The relationship between international regulators and transnational 
private actors is therefore one that rests on a limited supply and competing 
demands. Whilst it may be in the interests of both parties to engage in close 
and cooperative exchanges to produce outcomes that are beneficial for the 
status and authority of both parties, this may not always prove to be the case. 
This is because the uncertainty of the authority that regulators hold in these 
transnational forums generates political insecurities amongst regulators. 
Under these conditions, regulators will be motivated more by self- 
preservation than mutual gains and as a result, private capture of policy 
outcomes is not guaranteed. The question that remains is how do outcomes 
arise as a result of either a high or low demand from private suppliers?
The core contention of this study is that because regulators lack formal 
mandated authority in the transnational global policy arena, they not only 
use private power capabilities to enhance their own positions of authority but 
also attempt to curb private influence, using primarily institutional 
mechanisms. These institutional mechanisms are used as a ‘substitute’ for the 
domestic legislative authority which regulators lack in the transnational
31 Refer BCBS History at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/historv.htm
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governance arenas. The remaining half of this chapter discusses the linkages 
between the supply and demand relationship between public and private 
actors, and the institutional environments that bind, enhance and constrain 
the way in which this relationship generates policy outcomes.
3.2 Private influence and private capture: enhancing and  
constraining private pow er through institutional m echanism s
Explaining the structure and agency o f institutionalised supply and demand
One key question raised in this study is how private actors capture 
international financial standards outcomes. This study argues that private 
actors are able to capture outcomes if there is a high demand from public 
regulators for a specific private power capability, and alternatively, not able 
to capture outcomes if demand from regulators is low. Whilst this provides 
the reasons why capture may or may not be possible, this still does not 
explain the operation of how outcomes become captured or become 
prevented from being captured.
One of the problematic issues raised in the literature on transnational 
governance is the exclusive nature of these closed policy environments. Their 
composition and deliberative processes are said to be narrow, and 
impenetrable to the wider public, leaving important issues of public 
regulation to be undertaken behind closed doors (Baker 2006, Underhill and 
Zhang 2003, Cemy 2004). The question that this raises is whether “blurring 
the boundary lines between public and private, indeed, is part of an 
intentional effort to render opaque political responsibility for the wrenching 
adjustments entailed in late capitalist development” (Pauly 2002: 77). Were
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these institutional features an ‘accident’, or have they been intentionally built 
to achieve something other than global standards for ‘best practice’?
This study hypothesises that these institutional features of exclusivity 
and the “blurring the boundary lines between public and private” have been 
reinforced by the path-dependent nature of the ‘supply and demand’ 
relationship between public and private actors in contemporary international 
financial governance. The relationship has been fostered by the pace of 
change in global finance as discussed in Chapter 2, which has then created 
and sustained these institutional features, which in turn propels the 
relationship to generate the output required by these new modes of 
governance.
This study further proposes that these features are an important 
means for public regulators to not only foster their supply and demand 
relationship with private actors but to also enforce their authority through 
these institutional means. The narrow and exclusive institutionalised features 
of these forums means that it is much easier to exert ‘control’ and to 
manipulate outcomes with fewer interests than it is when there are broader 
constituencies to take into account. The supply and demand relationship has 
therefore evolved itself with structures and processes in place to ensure that 
strategic supply and demand between these two parties works so that private 
actors can provide their input based on the specific capability required and 
regulators can produce the required standards.
Institutional theory provides us with two variables that help us to 
understand how and why international financial standardisation has formed 
in this informal manner: firstly, institutions that are viewed as systems or
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structures which bind and constrain agents as well as predefine their 
ideological dispositions; and secondly, institutions as processes generated 
and negotiated by agents who are constituted through their common social 
interaction, giving rise to distinct organisational norms and identities.
At the very simplest level institutions can be considered systems that 
define the context within which actors operate and interact with one other 
(Campbell 2004). Actors choose to work collectively to achieve their goals 
because the development of such an organisational form is said to reduce the 
transaction costs by facilitating exchange between parties (Campbell 2004, 
Hall and Taylor 1996). Furthermore, once firmly established, organisations 
are said to develop and assume their own distinct identities, making them 
independent of their founders or those who constitute their membership 
(Reed 1992). This concept of organisation emphasises the organisations’ 
characteristics of being goal-oriented, purposeful and constituted through the 
way in which it is geared to the functional needs of the system (Reed 1992). 
The result is argued to be an ongoing tension between the organisation’s 
demands and the needs or interests of its individual members (Reed 1992).
Organisations seen in this light are therefore seen as structures above 
and beyond its individual members, possessing “an independent logic of their 
own that be isolated and analysed without reference to social actors and the 
shared meanings through which they frame on events” (Reed 1992: 93). 
However, it can also be argued that organisations are reflections of the 
macro-configurations of power, which are geared towards the advancement 
of the dominant economic, political and social interests prevailing within the 
societies of which they are part. Specifically, formal or complex organisations
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are seen as tools or mechanisms through which dominant groups secure and 
maintain the conditions necessary for their social reproduction and survival 
over time (Reed 1992). For this reason, some scholars argue that states as 
actors of the international polity for example spend a great deal of time and 
effort, and even fight over the construction and design of institutions 
precisely because institutions in their own right can advance or impede state 
goals and thus affect outcomes (Koremenos et al 2001).
When this occurs, organisational structures and practices create biases 
which automatically favour not only dominant interests but also underlying 
ideological assumptions and values such as ‘rationality’ and ‘efficiency’ (Reed 
1992). As a result, “the institutional structure builds in a set of constraints 
with respect to downstream changes that biases choices” (North 1998: 20). 
Furthermore institutional structures are also ‘path-dependent’ where path 
dependent processes mean that “history is remembered” and once a 
particular path is established, “self-reinforcing processes are prone to 
consolidation or institutionalisation” (Pierson 2000: 75). For this reason, it 
can be argued that path dependence structures the way in which the 
preferences and the interests of actors are shaped because an actor’s 
rationality is constrained by how they think about time. Actors are therefore 
seen to have a ‘bounded’ rationality, a rationality that is limited by that 
actor’s worldview, meaning that individuals will often turn to established 
routines or patterns of interaction that are familiar to them in order to attain 
their purposes (Hall and Taylor 1996: 939).
The implication of deeply embedded path-dependent organisational 
structures and the resultant bounded rationality is that any fundamental
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change to the status quo is difficult to achieve without endemic conflict and 
“the uneven struggle between dominant and subordinate groups to exercise 
some degree of control over the conditions through which organisational 
existence is secured -  is the primary source of structural change within 
complex organisations” (Reed 1992: 94). On the other hand, if private actors 
are supported by the dominant power groups which have established and 
reinforced the structural conditions in favour of their interests, private 
influence is evidently enhanced by these structures. However, the structural 
approach treating the organisation as a tool or a strategic venue in which 
“contending class or group interests slug it out and rationally manipulate 
internal structures and practices according to their sectional interests” is 
criticised by sociologists for treating the organisation like a black box (Reed 
1992: 103). For this reason, sociological institutionalists stress the 
importance of the social mechanisms of norm diffusion which generates 
patterned and institutionalised interaction.
This then leads to the second institutional variable that focuses on the 
role of agency in the construction of organisations as symbolic or cultural 
forums. The structural boundaries of institutions are in this approach the 
manifestation of the collective values and the organisational cultures which 
are shaped by the collective experiences and meanings given by the 
organisation’s members (Reed 1992). Institutions are, in short, “systems of 
meaning” providing routines, symbols or scripts and hence are ‘templates’ for 
behaviour (Peters 1999, Hall and Taylor 1996: 948). As a result, institutions 
affect an actor’s perceptions of what is appropriate practice and “individuals 
who have been socialised into particular institutional roles internalise the
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norms associated with these roles, and in this way institutions are said to 
affect behaviour” (Hall and Taylor 1996: 948). Institutions are said to have 
normative influence not only in the way in which actors believe they should 
behave in a given context but also a more cognitive influence, “by specifying 
what one can imagine oneself doing in a given context” (Hall and Taylor 
1996: 948). Actors therefore derive meaning, as well as their identities from 
the institutional context in which they interact, and in this way institutions 
are said to not only affect the strategic calculations of individuals but also 
their understanding and interpretation of their preferences and roles within 
institutions (Hall and Taylor 1996).
At the heart of this approach is the internal culture of the organisation 
which becomes “the basic resource and process through which social action 
and interaction are continually constructed and reconstructed to form a 
shared ‘organisational reality”’ (Reed 1992: 105). This means that 
organisations “simultaneously support and question dominant structures of 
meaning, power and control” because dominant cultures may try and frame 
the symbolic creation of ‘rational’ discourse but ultimately the acceptance of 
such an organisational reality is dependent upon its socialised members 
(Reed 1992: 107). The implication is that private influence can either be 
constrained or enhanced by certain ‘cultural’ elements such as values, norms, 
constructed rules, beliefs and taken-for-granted assumptions, defining “the 
way the world is and should be” (Barley and Tolbert 1997:93). Institutions 
are therefore argued to influence how people communicate, enact power, and 
determine what behaviour to sanction and reward primarily because 
institutions encode interactions where actors simply behave according to
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their perception of the way things are done within that organisation (Barley 
and Tolbert 1997). Institutions therefore establish normative ‘ways of doing 
things’ which actors conform to, even if actors consciously become aware that 
it is not their interests to follow such norms.
As a result of both agency and the overall structure of dominant 
financial powers engaging cross border cooperation, the exclusivity of the 
transnational standards-setting environment not only becomes the norm but 
also begins to reinforce and justify the functionality of the supply and 
demand relationship between public and private actors. Agents within these 
settings therefore become so engrained in the environment that having 
specialised relationships with stakeholders is part of the dominant culture 
established within these forums. These environments also determine the 
ways in which relationships between public and private actors are 
undertaken, and as a result, both regulators and private industry actors come 
to be aware of their roles and expectations of behaviour. These modes of 
interaction in transnational governance are therefore geared towards 
generating exclusive outcomes, which can otherwise be justified as ‘efficiency 
gains’.
Enhancing and constraining private influence through institutional 
mechanisms: enforcing demand-side authority
Institutional theory gives us two important variables for understanding how 
relationships can be enhanced or even constrained in their ability to produce 
outcomes. This study hypothesises that the exclusive nature of transnational 
governance, empirically characterised by international financial standard- 
setting institutions, has come into existence because of the underlying nature
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and dynamic of the supply and demand relationship between regulators and 
private actors. However, this study is also interested in the agency of action 
which underpins the supply and demand incentive structure. Agency here is 
characterised by the way in which agents, in this case regulators, can utilise 
the institutional infrastructure in a way that supports the supply side of their 
relationship with private actors, but also simultaneously supports the 
demand side of regulatory authority and power over standards outcomes. The 
study is in other words interested in ascertaining how capture operates 
within institutional boundaries.
In the case of international financial standardisation, this study argues 
that standardisation has three institutionalised characteristics that are 
critical to the way regulators conduct and enforce the demand-side of their 
relationship with private actors. The first is that international standardisation 
is an exercise in the creation of norms, which means that actors battle to 
manipulate the language and methodologies of those standards so that the 
ultimate benefits flow to those who create the norms. The second 
characteristic is that the creation of norms can be dependent on policy­
making processes, which can significantly alter decisions along the policy­
making path. This means that the content and creation of norms can be 
reconstructed. Finally, standard-setting occurs within collective decision­
making structures, consisting of decision structures internal to the 
institution, as well as decision-structures that sit in other vertical and 
horizontal governance networks. Outcomes in collective decision-making 
structures are not contingent upon the decisions made by one or even a few
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specific actors but on groups of actors who are required to make group or 
‘consensus’ decisions.
This study argues that these three institutionalised characteristics of 
international financial standard-setting act as the causal mechanisms that 
can either lead to captured outcomes, or that prevent outcomes from 
becoming captured. This study proposes that regulators will attempt to use 
these institutional mechanisms in order to either support their high demand 
for private capabilities in order to generate favourable outcomes, or constrain 
private influence when their demand is low, in order to generate outcomes 
that enhance the authority of regulators. It is further argued that these 
institutional mechanisms are used as the primary ‘substitute’ for the 
legislative authority with which regulators are deemed within their respective 
domestic jurisdictions, and consequently lack in the transnational 
governance arenas. As a result, institutional control over norms, processes 
and decision making allows regulators to exercise some degree of authority 
over their supply and demand relationships.
Norms. The first institutional characteristic which allows regulators to 
exercise some control over outcomes is that the creation of international 
financial standards is about the creation of norms, or how states should 
regulate their financial institutions and how financial institutions should 
behave in accordance with those principles. International financial standards 
in other words are not something that is neutral or technical but is “laden 
with power relations, social exclusion and ideology” (Holzscheiter 2005: 734). 
The creation of international standards is a less overt power play between 
actors because as Holtzscheiter argues “the construction of common
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knowledge or the creation of commonly agreed definitions and perspectives -  
these are the dimensions of international politics upon which the notion of 
global governance heavily relies” (2005: 735).
International policy-making through the construction of standards is 
not without conflict. Instead, international policy-making such as standard- 
setting is what Jachtenfuchs argues to be a ‘frame competition’, which is “the 
struggle between different problem definition, the latter being the basis for 
the emergence of interests and preferences” (1996: 29). In political systems, 
this struggle is characterised as a struggle for power, “the power to define a 
situation authoritatively for all participants in the system and thus pre­
structure the way interests can be articulated, claims be made and policy 
decisions be taken” (Jachenfuchs 1996: 29). For this reason, actors will 
attempt to change frames as part of their strategy to pursue their political 
goals or in addition to this they will also try to promote a certain frame which 
serves their interests well (Jachenfuchs 1996: 30). International financial 
standard-setting therefore is an arena where both regulators and private 
actors will attempt to frame standards in order to exert their authority.
How do certain frames win over competing ones? It is through 
discursive means of what Risse (2000) calls the logic of ‘argumentation’. In 
line with a rational choice or instrumental paradigm, Risse (2000) argues 
that instrumentally rational actors who are interested in realising their values 
and interests must be interested in ‘getting the facts right’ and correcting 
what they see as false information in order to pursue and contribute to 
‘common knowledge’. Specifically, even rational actors know that they need 
to have a common understanding on what it is that they are actually
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bargaining about. The logic of argumentation is therefore one that is based on 
actors who seek to adjudicate normative frames through the process of 
arguing. It is where actors not only try and challenge the validity of claims 
made in causal or normative statements but where they also seek a 
communicative consensus about their understanding of a situation as well as 
provide justifications for the principles and norms guiding their action (Risse 
2000: 7). This logic above all relies on the perception that the frames in 
which actors communicate have some validity in its intention of creating 
common knowledge as opposed to ‘cheap talk’ or rhetoric (Risse 2000: 8). 
The ability of actors to use language and communication towards creating 
and constructing common knowledge is therefore one of the ways in which 
actors can affect outcomes and the more successful they are at providing a 
legitimate contribution to the policy framing problem, the more successful 
they will ultimately be at influencing the end outcomes.
The normative nature of the standards-setting task means that the 
power to frame those standards so that they can pre-structure the way in 
which interests are articulated rests on technical expertise and discursive 
capabilities. The successful use of expertise is closely tied to the perception of 
discursive legitimacy; that is, the more the language used in framing a 
problem is considered ‘objective’ (less partisan) in the eyes of other 
participants and decision makers, the more powerful or influential it becomes 
in creating policy consensus. However, expertise is also considered just as 
dangerous if actors are seen to lose their discursive legitimacy in the eyes of 
others, and thus lose their discursive credibility (Fuchs 2005: 794). Thus, the 
consequences of private expertise will depend on how private actors
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participate in the process of argumentative consensus (that is, in the creation 
of ‘objective knowledge’) and the extent to which regulators perceive this to 
be legitimate thereby contributing to consensus.
Process. The second institutional characteristic that regulators utilise 
in order to enhance, constrain or reconstruct private technical expertise is 
through policy processes. International financial-standard-setting is a policy­
making exercise, where “each element to policy-making is considered to 
cause a particular output and outcome” (John 1998: 2). The policy making 
process may be seen to be a rational exercise where faced with a given 
problem, actors will evaluate the best possible alternative among choices and 
make a decision accordingly. However, this understanding does not take into 
account the way in which actors and the actual process itself can cause 
particular outputs and outcomes, involving processes of generating ideas 
about policy options and alternatives, incorporating or not incorporating 
those ideas into the policy paradigm and then framing or shaping those ideas 
through path-dependent policy adaptation.
The process of sourcing, generating, and putting forward ideas about 
policy alternatives is a crucial component of the ‘framing’ process. However, 
the framing process also to a large extent involves the process of ‘refinement’ 
which Lindblom (1968) refers to as policy ‘incrementalism’. Ideas are said to 
go through a ‘pushing and shoving’ process of incremental policy adaptation 
toward the desired ends of those within the policy making stages. A process 
of ‘incrementalism’ is defined as a process of mutual adjustment among a 
multiplicity of actors having different self-interests. Mutual adjustment 
among a multiplicity of decision-making actors with varying preferences and
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values means that policies and policy changes occur through a succession of 
incremental changes or through a “sequence of approximations” where a 
process of feedback, consultations (or ‘deliberation’) and adjustments will 
lead to minor policy amendments (Lindblom 1958, Hayes 1992: 13). The 
sequence of approximations means that policies are “tried, altered, tried in its 
altered form, altered again and so on” (Lindblom 1958: 301) giving rise to 
further demand for modification or expansion and triggering a continuum of 
a new policy process (Hayes 1992: 13). As a consequence, the way in which 
policies can emerge is not necessarily from a direct process of calculated 
choice among strategic alternatives, but rather adjustments that lead to a 
further sequence of approximations.
The power to influence outcomes therefore is perhaps most effective 
during the policy framing stage, where actors can play a significant role in 
influencing adjustments through the deliberation and consultation 
mechanisms. Haas (1992: 2) argues that private ‘epistemic’32 or policy 
communities play a crucial role in framing ways to think about certain 
problems, by articulating for decision-makers the cause and effect 
relationships of complex problems, helping actors to identify their interests 
as a result as well as framing issues for collective debate and identifying 
issues for negotiation. These professionals who tend to be viewed as 
‘technicians’ have important discursive capabilities and are seen as an 
important determinant of international policy coordination as the diffusion 
of new ideas and information can lead to new patterns of behaviour (Haas 
1992: 4).
32 Epistemic communities are defined as “a network of professionals with recognised expertise in a 
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue 
area.” (Haas 1992: 2)
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However, at the same time, Lindblom argues that the advantage of the 
process of deliberation or incrementalism is that it can also offer “the best 
chance of introducing into the political system those changes and those 
change-producing intermediate changes that a discontented citizen might 
desire” (1979: 520). To transpose this to the international standards arena, 
this means that actors with access to the policy-making process can also 
influence the normative outcome of decisions. Actors can include not only 
decision makers, but also support staff (such as Secretariats) and other 
bureaucrats with access to the policy process. The consequence of the policy 
making process with its ‘successive adjustments’ through multiple rounds of 
feedback, consultation, adjustment, further feedback, further adjustment, 
and so on is that policy can be attributable to either ‘public’ or ‘private’ 
sources. Policy-making is not therefore “a kind of machine into which are fed 
the exogenous wishes, preferences or needs of those for whom the machine is 
designed and out of which come policy decisions to meet these wishes, 
preferences or needs”; it is instead argued to be a machine that can 
manufacture policies as well as ‘reconstruct preferences’ (Lindblom 1968: 
Chapter 12) [emphasis added].
Furthermore, the policy machine does not simply make policy once 
and for all but “is made and re-made endlessly. Policy-making is a process of 
successive approximation to some desired objective in which what is desired 
itself continues to change under reconsideration.” (Lindblom 1959: 86) This 
means that there is never a fixed end point or policy outcome -  there is only a 
succession of outcomes which are continually being revised and updated 
based on a “past sequence of policy steps” which have given decision makers
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“knowledge about the probable consequences of further similar steps” 
(Lindblom 1959: 86). It is difficult to determine therefore when an outcome 
reaches its desired goal, as it can always be amended to incorporate 
additional policies.
Institutions can also, according to Barnett and Finnermore (2004), 
develop their own ‘pathologies’; that is, once created, they develop a personae 
and life of their own, diverging from the initial goals and mandates given to 
them when originally established. As Barnett and Finnermore argue, 
“organisations frequently develop distinctive internal cultures that can 
promote dysfunctional behaviour, behaviour that we call ‘pathological’. We 
define pathological behaviour as behaviour generated by the internal 
organisational culture that violates the self-understood core goals of the 
organisation. Dysfunctions of this type flow from constitutive features of 
bureaucracy as a social form” (2004: 38).
The bureaucratic form, with its operating procedures and routines as 
well as their compartmentalised ‘division of labour’, is said to have important 
consequences for the way in which individuals internal to the organisation 
can also affect the nature of policy process outcomes (Barnett and 
Finnermore 2004). Institutions can develop divisions and subunits that 
generate “their own cognitive frameworks that are consistent with but still 
distinct from those of the larger organisation, further complicating this 
process” (Barnett and Finnermore 2004: 38-9). The result is that even 
though some regulators for instance may wish to enhance the interests of 
private actors, ‘breakaway’ sub-units within the institution with their own
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cognitive preferences may develop policies which run counter to those that 
support captured outcomes.
Decision structure. The third institutional characteristic that can be 
used as a substitute for formal authority is the collective decision-making 
arena. The most dominant collective decision structure that has come to be 
institutionalised in many collective organisations is the bureaucracy, which is 
characterised by a high degree of specialisation, hierarchical authority 
structure, impersonality of relationships between organisation members and 
the recruitment of officials based on ability and technical knowledge and not 
political affiliation (Mouzelis 1975: 39). The way in which actors are able to 
interact and carry out their particular tasks within a bureaucracy depends on 
how it organises what is essentially a ‘division of labour’.
In complex organisations, this division of labour is what Hall (1991) 
describes as both ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ differentiation. Horizontal 
differentiation simply refers to the ways in which the tasks performed by the 
organisation are subdivided. Clearly, the more tasks that an organisation is 
required to do, the more complex the horizontal structure becomes. Various 
specialists may be required for tasks requiring different skills. Vertical or 
more aptly hierarchical differentiation is essentially the levels or layers in 
which horizontal specialists need to go through until final ‘decisions’ are 
made. As Hall (1991) argues, authority is distributed in accordance with the 
level in the hierarchy and the more and the higher the levels, the greater the 
authority in ‘decision’ weight.
The ways in which decisions are made depend on the way in which 
decision hierarchies operate. In international institutions, decision-making
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more often than not takes place within collective structures, where the power 
to make decisions is not confined to individuals but rather to committees 
(Vandenbussche 2006). The ‘committee structure’ in so many words reduces 
the vertical hierarchy of decision-making by merging a number of decision­
makers (who are more than likely from around the world) to within the same 
setting. Unlike those within a complex organisation who undertake the more 
‘horizontal’ or specialist tasks of researching options, drafting technical policy 
solutions, and shaping these into policy outputs for wider and hierarchical 
consultation, committee decision-makers are there to set agendas and make 
final decisions by providing broad approvals and endorsements of certain 
policy options.
Amalgamating several decision makers into one committee however 
means that decision outcomes will depend on the size, composition and the 
decision rules of that committee (such as whether decisions are made by 
majority rule or by consensus) (Vandenbussche 2006). In international 
institutions where the ‘decision rule’ is through simple vote, frames or norms 
are said to win over competing ones due to ‘majority’ rule. However, where 
the decision rule is based on consensus agreement, it can be argued that 
argumentative processes are much more important because agreement has 
yet to be reached (Jachenfuchs 1996: 29). Thus, within a consensus based 
decision making committee, ‘frame competition’ not only occurs along the 
‘horizontal’ policy making path but also then takes place between decision 
makers themselves.
The decision rule of consensus therefore means that there will be 
power struggles within decision making committees because outcomes can be
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contingent upon which decision makers are able to form or push through 
their preferred norms. In international forums, this means that consensus 
decision making is ultimately political, where the most dominant political 
actors use their material and structural power to convince and cajole their 
counterparts to ensure their domestic political interests are served. This is 
why private lobbying is considered such an important part of the arsenal of 
instrumental capabilities as simply having the means to be present at 
decision-making meetings and roundtables is significant because it gives 
private actors the ability to engage in what Lindblom (1968) refers to as a 
crucial but also very ‘grey* area of decision-making, which is the universally 
understood but analytically sidelined process of the informal wheeling and 
dealing behind the scenes. Such informal interplay through more subtle 
forms of persuasion and the personal ‘airing’ of views between actors is an 
important supplement to the more formally organised methods of policy 
cooperation (Lindblom 1968).
Complex committee decision structures means that the exercise of 
power within these structures can occur at various ‘levels’ or layers within the 
organisation and hierarchy. It also means that these collective decision 
structures may constrain the effective exercise of private power because 
influencing numerous decision-makers who need to reach consensus is 
logistically more difficult. Furthermore political actors all vying for a piece of 
a consensus decision can also use their power to block or obstruct private 
influence if those actors are seen to be a threat to the political preferences of 
actors. Blocking or obstructing private influence can simply be the act of 
excluding or removing private actors from the committee decision process or
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by opposing member decisions which reflect those private preferences and 
thereby disabling the ability of the committee to come to a consensus. 
Political ‘wheeling and dealing’ therefore become more important in 
consensus environments as the need to reach a meeting of the minds 
becomes more critical than serving sectional private interests. This then 
creates a complex setting of a myriad of different ‘micro’ organisations each 
with their own power structures and simultaneously residing within the 
wider ‘macro’ organisation.
It is argued in this study that these three characteristics, norm 
creation, policy process and collective decision structures are the key features 
through which both public and private actors carry out their supply and 
demand relationship. This means that preferences, if they get through the 
institutional maze, can be shaped, moulded or more significantly 
reconstructed within the ‘pathologies’ of institutions to produce varying 
outcomes. Using these three institutional characteristics, the following 
sections outline how regulators facilitate and constrain the production of 
captured outcomes, based on their varying demand for private capabilities.
The mechanisms fo r  facilitating and constraining capture: a framework fo r  
empirical analysis
Earlier in this chapter, it was proposed that regulators and private actors 
engage in what is described as a supply and demand relationship, where 
private actors supply various instrumental capabilities because it enhances 
their leverage for obtaining favourable policy outcomes. Public regulators and 
policymakers also use these sources of instrumental power to enhance their 
own political standing or professional security. Such a relationship can
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therefore create a ‘win-win’ for both sides. Furthermore, this study also 
proposed that capture does not occur simply because there is a supply and 
demand relationship between regulators and private industry, but when 
demand for a specific private capability is high; that is, when regulators are 
unable to fulfil their regulatory roles and policy requirements without the 
input of private power capabilities. The proposition that regulatory demand 
could also fall was also put forward, based on when the capability has fulfilled 
the regulator’s initial purpose, or when regulators perceive private power to 
be a threat to their authority.
The study has also argued that whilst this explains the reasons for why 
regulators and private actors engage in this sort of exchange dynamic, it does 
not provide the causal mechanisms for how this dynamic produces outcomes 
which are captured or not. As such, the study also proposes that regulators 
will attempt to use institutional mechanisms, by way of adopting certain 
institutional practices, to either enhance the supply of private capabilities 
thereby leading to captured outcomes, or alternatively constrain the supply of 
private capabilities, thereby reducing the likelihood of outcomes becoming 
captured. This has been illustrated in Figure 3.1 and Table 3.2 where varying 
regulatory demand will lead to different institutional practices.
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Figure 3.1 Matrix of Influence
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As seen in Figure 3.1, there are four main scenarios of influence based 
on the varying level of demand and level of perceived threat to regulatory 
authority. The first scenario of capture is based on a high demand for private 
capabilities and where the use of private capabilities is perceived by 
regulators to enhance their authority (or a ‘low threat’ from private actors). In 
this scenario, institutional practices will be used to facilitate the adoption of 
private preferential norms into standards outcomes. The second scenario is 
based on the status quo, where no change or action is prompted based on a 
low level of demand from regulators and a low corresponding threat from 
private actors. The third scenario however is one that is based on a high 
demand for private power capabilities but a correspondingly high threat from 
the same sources of power. A high threat means that regulators will perceive 
private capabilities to undermine their political and or policy making
High Demand
High demand/low threat 
Capture
High demand/high threat 
In stitu tional C onstraints
Low demand/low threat 
Status quo
Low demand/high threat 
In stitu tional control
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authority. In this scenario, regulatory action will be geared towards using 
institutional practices to include private actor when the source of power is 
needed, but also simultaneously exclude private actors so that regulators 
maintain their decision making authority over outcomes. The fourth scenario 
is where demand for private power capabilities falls and the corresponding 
threat to regulatory authority is perceived as high. In this instance, regulators 
will utilise institutional mechanisms to ensure they can ultimately control the 
process and outcome of decisions.
These scenarios warrant a discussion on just what and how these 
institutional practices work to produce these varying outcomes. The following 
table 3.2 provides an illustration of the institutional practices that can be 
utilised in order to facilitate capture, to put in place institutional constraints, 
and also to ensure institutional control over outcomes. These practices or 
mechanisms are based on the three main institutional characteristics of 
international standard-setting forums, namely institutionally generated 
norms, processes and decision structures. It is proposed that these practices 
are used instrumentally by regulators in order to enhance their interests and 
importantly, their political and or policy making authority.
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Table 3.2 Institutional practices to enhance regulatory demand
Tools
y
High demand/low  
threat1
Capture
I
High demand/high 
threat1
Institutional
Constraints
i
Low demand/high 
threat1
Institutional
Control
1
Norms Norms sourced from 
private actors, 
drafted by private 
actors
Norms sourced from 
private actors, drafted 
by regulators
Norms sourced from 
and drafted by 
regulators
Private norms 
introduced and 
adopted
Private norms 
reconstructed to 
include vested 
regulatory interests
Private norms 
rejected or existing 
private norms deleted
Norms developed to 
allow private self­
regulation
Norms developed to 
give regulators 
supervisory power
Norms developed to 
give regulators 
legislative power
Process Deliberation with 
private actors 
undertaken 
throughout policy 
development
Limited deliberation 
with private actors 
undertaken in later 
stages of policy 
development
Deliberation with 
private actors not 
undertaken
Frequency of 
meetings with 
regulators increased
Frequency of 
meetings with 
regulators reduced
Access to meetings 
with regulators denied 
or other stakeholders 
included
Comments from 
private industry 
adopted and 
standards changed
Comments from 
private industry 
partially adopted and 
standards partially 
amended
Comments from 
private industry not 
adopted, no changes 
to standards
Decision
Structure
Private decision 
making authority
Private decision 
making authority 
changed to regulatory 
decision making 
authority
No private decision 
making authority
Decision making 
authority at Board, 
sub-committee and 
sub-group levels
Decision making 
authority at Board 
and sub-committee 
decision levels
Decision making 
authority at Board 
level only
Private participation 
in committee 
structure
Private participation 
in committee 
structure limited or 
structured
No private 
participation in 
committee structure
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Based on the types of institutionally generated practices outlined in 
Table 3.2, we can begin to construct a framework for an empirical analysis of 
how supply and demand relationships can produce outcomes which are 
captured, or alternatively, how captured outcomes may become constrained 
by the ways in which regulators will resort to the institutional infrastructure 
to enhance their leverage over private actors. Firstly, we can begin to 
understand how outcomes are able to become captured, through the ways in 
which institutional norms, processes and decision structures can be 
intentionally shaped by agents so that these features can support policy 
outputs which favour the optimal supply and demand cycle of private 
capabilities and therefore enhanced regulatory policy authority. However we 
can also start to deconstruct where, in the institutional framework, regulators 
can begin to manipulate policy inputs to the extent that outcomes can be 
fundamentally reconstructed in order to place the onus of authority and 
control back in the hands of regulators.
This matrix of influence therefore contemplates that outcomes are not 
always ‘captured’ as a result of a close relationship between regulators and 
private actors, but instead there is a spectrum of outcomes which can ensue 
from the supply and demand dynamic between regulators and private actors. 
It also contemplates the proposition that regulators are not simply ‘vessels’ 
through which private power passes through, but are in fact important causal 
forces shaping how capture is produced and facilitated. This means that 
regulators can facilitate private power over norms, process and decision 
structure where each of these elements is crucially linked in their causality:
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that is, private actors and their respective capabilities must ‘get through’ 
these stages in order for an outcome to be captured.
High demand, low threat - enhancing capture: the ability to shape the 
underlying normative framework of standards is the first way in which 
private capabilities can be used and lead to captured outcomes. Shaping the 
underlying normative framework of standards through the provision of 
resources either by way of technical expertise, data or more generally 
information means that the ultimate benefits flow to those who create the 
norms. Regulators facilitate and enhance private norms when such resources 
are sourced from private actors or if standards are drafted by private actors. 
Evidence of standards that are sourced from or drafted by private actors 
would include the identification of private actors within the ‘horizontal’ task 
areas within standards organisations (such as within working groups or 
committees), or policy proposals drafted by private actors external to a 
standards organisation which are then adopted by policy makers.
Private capture may also be evident if regulators are convinced of the 
merits put forward or practised by private industry, thereby adopting similar 
practices in regulatory standards. This can otherwise be referred to as the 
norm of ‘self-regulation’ where the onus is placed on industry to monitor and 
evaluate the riskiness of their activities. This means that regulators are not 
only ‘sympathetic’ to the approaches proposed by private industry, but they 
also adopt the ideas proposed by private actors, including their rationale, 
discourse and methodology for those ideas within their standards content. 
The result is that standards have adopted underlying market ideologies or
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methodologies that are based on market norms and thus more likely to reflect 
the preferences of private actors.
In addition to this however, capture would be evident if these norms 
are maintained throughout the process of deliberation and policy 
‘incrementalism’. A key condition that would lead to captured outcomes is if 
standards that have been shaped by private actors are not changed by 
regulators during the consultation and deliberation mechanisms to reflect 
other views. This means that deliberation, consultation and views obtained 
from the wider public do not impact the market-sourced standards content 
and deliberation undertaken by regulators is simply a formality. Evidence of 
this condition would show that what was initially drafted by private actors or 
sourced from private actors does not change over the process of deliberation.
Capturing the policy process is also evident if standards, which were 
not initially shaped by market norms, are amended by regulators to reflect 
private views obtained from policy deliberation. Standards that do not reflect 
private preferences have the potential to become captured when changes that 
are made to a standard are only made because private actors have advocated 
the change in consultative forums. Evidence of this includes any substantial 
changes from initial drafting, ultimately reflecting the views and preferences 
of private industry.
Capture can also be established if there is decision power over 
standards outcomes. Decisions at this stage will have already been shaped 
through establishing market norms in standards content and decision­
making is simply the formal seal of approval. Capture over final outcomes 
indicates that there are limited or no argumentative processes within
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collective decision structures because regulatory decision-makers have 
formed consensus agreement based on this premise. In addition to this, 
capture over decision outcomes may also be evident if standards outcomes 
are the result of private actors exercising decision authority, or where private 
actors participate directly in policy groups which exercise decision authority. 
For instance, where there is private participation in groups with decision 
authority, captured decision outcomes for standards may also be greater 
where decision authority is given to a number of different ‘vertical’ decision 
levels (sub-groups, working groups etc) as opposed to restricting all decisions 
to the Board or ‘apex’ level of decision making.
Therefore, it is proposed that when regulatory demand for private 
capabilities is high, the institutional infrastructure would also support private 
capture over norms, processes and decision structures so that outcomes 
reflect private market preferences. However, when demand falls, or 
simultaneously when the perceived threat from private actors increases, 
capture is not likely to occur when institutional norms, processes and 
decision structures are used to constrain private preferences.
High demand, high threat - constraining capture: regulators may be 
in situations when their high demand for private capabilities corresponds or 
is followed by a perceived threat to their policy-making authority. When this 
occurs, regulators can resort to the institutional infrastructure and attempt to 
curb the full extent that private actors may capture outcomes. For instance, 
regulators threatened by the technical authority of private actors may not be 
in a position to establish their own discourse to counter private norms, but 
they are empowered through institutional means to reconstruct private
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discourse and tailor it to suit their own purposes so that the perception of 
their authority is enhanced. Private actors supply their discursive capabilities 
to regulators, but what regulators choose to do with this capability will 
depend on how it is seen to enhance their authority. When it is seen to be 
detrimental, regulators can resort to using the ‘policy machine’ to reconstruct 
or fundamentally pare back the market-based discourse. Various 
amendments to existing discourse could also be made, reconfiguring initial 
market methodologies and norms to include vested regulatory interests, and 
thereby changing its intended utility designed to enhance private industry 
activities.
Regulators can also constrain capture through the policy process, by 
introducing “intermediate changes that a discontented citizen might desire” 
(Lindblom 1979: 520). Regulators in decision-making capacities may choose 
to delay, change or even remove certain market-based norms at the various 
stages and levels of decision-making. Regulators may also resort to changing 
the nature of interaction or even frequency of deliberation with private 
actors. This means that the participation of and interaction with industry 
could also be closed off or opened only at the very last stages of deliberation 
and undertaken simply as a formality. The end result of this is that rather 
than being seen to be dependent on vested interests, regulators can use 
existing discourse to serve dual purposes: firstly, to serve the supply-side of 
the relationship, where regulators adopt elements of private discourse and be 
seen to be in touch with ‘market realities’; and secondly, to justify their own 
positions of authority, by including elements that are compatible with their 
domestic regulatory mandates and to fulfil their wider public function.
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The decision structure may also be changed to restrict private actors 
from either participating in policy groups or making decisions at any of the 
decision levels. The restrictions on private actors participating in sub-group 
levels may also correspond with changing decision making authority from 
sub-group levels to Committee or Board levels. These institutionalised rituals 
of changing participation or decision rules is not primarily to ensure that 
regulators are empowered to make decisions; instead, they act as more overt 
actions to signal that private actors are encroaching on regulatory policy 
authority and in conjunction with using norms and processes, is designed to 
simultaneously foster private supply of capabilities as well as emphasise the 
ability of regulators to change outcomes if need be.
Low demand, high threat -  controlling outcomes: this last scenario 
arises from a substantial drop in demand for private capabilities and 
correspondingly high level of perceived threat to regulatory policy authority. 
This situation would indicate that there has been an extraordinary shock or 
event that has undermined the position of regulators and as a result has 
forced them to use their institutional environment to bolster their power. 
Private capabilities as a result are correlated with this threat to regulatory 
authority and as such, regulators resort to sourcing information from other 
regulators and standards are then also drafted by regulators. There is no 
attempt to incorporate private norms, and existing private norms are also 
removed from standards. The most fundamental way in which regulators 
seek to control standards outcomes and indirectly, over private actors is to 
seek legislative power to enact their policy and decision authority.
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In this scenario, policy deliberation with private actors is either 
restricted or not undertaken and access to meetings with regulators is also 
denied. Meetings, if conducted, are a formality and conducted in open and 
formal settings where a number of other different stakeholders also attend. 
Comments from open deliberation do not have any effect on standards 
content, and regulators go ahead with proposed changes despite the potential 
for the changes to have a negative impact on private actors. Participation in 
policy groups is also denied and decision authority is also centralised at the 
apex or Board level of authority. Overall, regulatory seek to use the 
institutional infrastructure to fundamentally control outcomes so that they 
enhance the perceived authority of regulators.
Based therefore on the scenarios outlined in the matrix, there are four 
potential findings that we may be able to conclude from an empirical 
analysis. The first potential finding is that there is evidence of captured 
outcomes, meaning that the demand for private capabilities is high and that 
the supply of private capabilities enhances the perceived authority of public 
regulators. Furthermore, this captured relationship is then able to thrive 
within institutional boundaries meaning that market norms survive the 
formation, process and decision stages in the comparative standardisation 
cases. The captured relationship has been able to sufficiently ensure that 
outcomes are favourable to private preferences and interests, representing a 
‘classic’ case of regulatory capture. We can surmise that if this is the case, 
then the power capabilities of private actors provided to public actors would 
have contributed to the establishment of institutional settings that were also
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geared towards private preferences making it easier for private preferences to 
‘get through’ the process and structure of institutionalised deliberation.
The second potential finding is that there is no or low demand for 
private power capabilities or where there is demand, private industry has not 
been able to provide this capability sufficiently. This would include instances 
where regulators have sought power capabilities from private industry and 
rejected them, or private actors have not been in the position to provide the 
specific capability. Furthermore, where there is weak or insufficient supply of 
capabilities, private actors have not been able to exert power over 
institutional boundaries, meaning that they are not able to influence the 
underlying normative frameworks, have not been able to affect changes 
during policy deliberation and have not been able to exert pressure or power 
over decision makers to get outcomes reversed or amended. Either way, a 
willing demand and supply of private power cannot be established and the 
outcome would result in the status quo being maintained or put simply, no 
capture. These findings would evidently refute the thesis of private capture 
but would nonetheless generate some interesting insights into not only why 
there were barriers to the capture of the public-private relationship but also 
why institutional boundaries acted in such a prohibitive way.
The third potential finding is where demand for private power 
capabilities is high, and the use of such capabilities also poses a high 
perceived threat to the authority of regulators. This would indicate that whilst 
private power has been able to fulfil an initial purpose, it has in the process 
veered from its initial utility and prompted regulators to impose institutional 
constraints. This means that there could be instances of initial capture, and
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outcomes that ultimately are not captured by private interests. For instance 
during the initial formation and deliberation processes, standards have been 
shaped to include discourse and norms from private sources but have been 
altered or amended during the policy process. Alternatively decision makers 
decide at various stages of the process to include other elements into the 
standards that are not aligned with market preferences. This potential finding 
is what we can only refer to as an embedded outcome, where governance 
results from the integration of public and private norms.
The fourth potential finding is where demand for private power is low, 
and correspondingly private power is perceived to be a serious threat to the 
authority of regulators. In this instance, regulators may resort to curbing 
private power altogether, by using institutional mechanisms to ensure that 
private actors are excluded from any form of deliberation, and that regulators 
are empowered to control the activities of private actors in a ‘top-down’ 
manner. This form of governance could be characterised as ‘dirigisme’, where 
the power to decide ultimately resides with regulators. This potential finding 
would indicate that there has been an extraordinary ‘shock’ or event that has 
undermined the position of regulators and as a result has forced them to use 
their institutional environment to bolster their power.
The third and fourth potential findings have important implications 
for understanding how the nature of private influence may differ in 
accordance with the type of demand, the way in which the power capabilities 
are supplied and how the institutional mechanisms are used to either 
enhance or curb private power. The nature of integrated public and private 
outcomes may therefore be the result of public or private power intervening
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at different stages of the governance process, which can be described as either 
the public integration of private power or the market integration of public 
authority. For instance, the public integration of private power would 
indicate that whilst public actors are the policy and decision makers within a 
standards organisation, private actors play a key role in shaping the 
normative content of those standards through deliberation. On the other 
hand, the market integration of public authority would indicate that whilst 
private actors act in policy and decision making capacities, public actors also 
then play a critical role in shaping the underlying normative frameworks of 
market standards to include public priorities and normative considerations.
This means that there is a dual functionality to the understanding of 
private power in governance, which does not necessarily entail the 
preponderance of private market interests. What it does potentially show is 
that the relationship between public and private actors is a constitutive one; 
that is, neither public nor private actors can undertake governance without 
the other and their actions are reinforced and constituted by the actions of 
the other. Private capture may simply be a case of private power prevailing 
over outcomes. However, the more interesting possibility is that ‘capture’ is a 
much more embedded and integrative governance relationship between 
public and private actors. Important for this analysis is the way in which 
institutional boundaries of interaction may determine the integrative and 
constitutive nature of the public-private relationship, which can then yield 
important insights into how institutions can frame a balance in the exercise 
of both public and private power.
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3*3 Conclusion
There is no denying that private actors exercise influence in international 
policy arenas, and an important question that this study seeks to address is 
how influence leads to capture, particularly at the translational level of 
financial governance. What this chapter has canvassed is that private 
influence is part of a supply and demand relationship between regulators and 
private actors that has been institutionally reinforced and engrained. The 
relationship thrives when there is a high demand from regulators and a 
willing supply from private industry, creating conditions for the mutual 
benefit of both parties. This relationship leads to capture if it is reinforced 
through the institutionalised norms, processes and decision structures that 
support and enhance the supply and demand cycle of interaction. This study 
proposes that the mechanisms that lead to capture therefore are institutional 
mechanisms, which are determined on the basis of whether private power 
capabilities fulfil the demands of public regulators and enhance their 
authority, thereby leading to regulators producing standards which reflect 
this mutually beneficial ‘win-win’.
However, the framework also provides for the scenario when demand 
for private capabilities falls, because the utility of the capability wanes or 
these capabilities threaten the authority of regulators. Under these 
conditions, regulators are likely to resort to the ‘policy machine’ in order to 
curb the influence of private actors and enhance their own authority. When 
assessed in this manner, institutions are an important variable in 
understanding the way in which private influence operates. An institutional 
analysis of supply and demand power relationship helps to identify the causal
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links from the ‘close’ relationship between public and private actors and 
subsequent policy outcomes through an analysis of the underlying formation 
of norms, policy processes and decision structures. Policy outcomes are 
therefore contingent on the institutional conditions that govern the working 
relationships between policymakers, private market actors and their 
‘transaction costs’.
133
4
The Basel II Capital Framework and the ‘creeping 
conservatism’ of the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision
The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS33) has become one of 
the central organs of global economic governance, acting not only as a locus 
for financial decision-making but also as a key facilitator for coordinating the 
actions of other international financial institutions (Wood 2005). The BCBS 
standards are so influential that they have in effect become the blueprint for 
the regulation and supervision of international banking, governing a range of 
supervisory issues for regulators around the world34. However, such a level of 
influence over the governance of international banking raises serious 
questions about the nature of the BCBS’s power and the implications of this 
power for wider public interest imperatives. More importantly for this study 
is the assessment of how this standards regime is influenced by private 
industry.
Adopting the theoretical framework advanced by this study, this 
chapter argues that in the case of the BCBS, there has been a high demand by 
regulators for private information and technical resources. The regulators of 
the BCBS have demanded and sought the expertise of private industry in 
order to access information that they would otherwise not have been able to 
attain. In return the largely American (US) and European (EU) international
33 Also referred to as ‘the Committee’
34 The BCBS has itself stated that its Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision have become 
a “comprehensive blueprint for an effective supervisory system.” See the History o f the BCBS at
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/historv.pdf
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banks have willingly supplied this information to try and influence the 
decisions and standards content produced by the BCBS. The example used to 
show this is the case of the Basel II Capital Framework (Basel II). Basel II has 
been highly influenced by private market norms, due to a high demand for 
technical alternatives to the outdated methodologies evident in the first Basel 
Accord (Basel I). The large international banks have been at the forefront of 
supplying these technical alternatives, by supplying their internal ratings 
based (IRB) methodologies to regulators. These approaches fulfilled the 
demand from regulators, initially enhancing their credibility by producing an 
alternative to Basel I that was seen to be more aligned with market realities.
However, this chapter also finds that as these approaches were 
gradually developed, some aspects were perceived to undermine the domestic 
regulatory prerogatives of regulators. As a result, the BCBS has 
simultaneously reconstructed Basel II to include elements of ‘conservatism’ 
that have acted to counter the incentives produced by the internal models 
approach. It has introduced these elements of conservatism through 
primarily ad hoc policy proposals and consensus decision processes, where 
disagreements between members mitigated the full adoption of private 
norms. As a result, private norms initially adopted by regulators were 
gradually reconstructed to suit the preferences of largely the EU regulators of 
the BCBS. Regulatory fragmentation in the US has also enabled the EU to 
exert power over the BCBS policy process. As a result, this chapter shows that 
the BCBS has been a case of both capture and constraint, resulting from high 
demand but a corresponding increase in perceived threat from private 
industry.
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4*1 H igh dem and, low  threat: the BCBS, private norm s and the  
capture o f Basel II
The BCBS and the supply and demand o f information
The BCBS has been a pivotal force, if not the impetus towards the steady 
proliferation of financial standard setting bodies we see today35. Its influence 
over both domestic regulatory outcomes and more importantly over the 
paradigm of banking regulation more generally is unquestionable. It is for 
these reasons that the issue of private industry influence becomes more 
pertinent as the Committee’s influence continues to grow in financial 
governance. This is also particularly important given its expanding role going 
forward in light of the fallout from the global financial crisiss6.
A brief examination of the BCBS’s history gives us some background as 
to why the BCBS has had a high demand for information and technical 
resources. The BCBS was initially established in 1974 by the G10 Central 
Bank Governors as a Standing Committee of the BIS. Until only recently37, 
there were 13 members of the Committee, namely Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. These member countries 
are represented by their central bank and also by the authority with formal 
responsibility for the prudential supervision of banks. The Committee reports 
to and seeks endorsement from their respective central bank Governors and
35 The BCBS was one of the first standard setting bodies established and the first Basel Accord (Basel 
I) was a significant precedent for other international financial standard setting bodies established in 
other financial issue areas. See for instance Wood (2005), Davies and Green (2008) and Tarullo 
(2008) for more information on the rise of the BCBS.
36 The G-20 has already mandated that the BCBS deal with the weaknesses revealed by the crisis, by 
expanding the scope of the Basel Framework to include such measures as a leverage ratio and 
increased capital requirements. See the G-20 (2008a) and G-20 (2008b)
37 In March 2009, the BCBS announced that it had expanded its traditional G10 membership base to 
include Australia, Brazil, China, India, Korea, Mexico and Russia. See BCBS (2009a)
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to the heads of supervisory authorities of these countries where the central 
bank does not have formal responsibility. The Committee itself meets only 
four times a year, but is provided with a full Secretariat by the BIS, which is 
staffed by 15 professional supervisors on temporary secondment from 
member institutions.
The Committee also has four main sub-committees that meet more 
frequentlys8. These sub-committees are responsible for undertaking the 
standard-setting work on which the Committee makes decisions. There are 
also ‘sub-working groups’ within each of these sub-committees that specialise 
in specific issue areas. Furthermore, within these sub-groups there are also 
dedicated ‘drafting groups’ which as the name suggests are responsible for 
the actual drafting of working papers and ultimately standards. One of the 
more important sub-committees of the BCBS is undoubtedly the Policy 
Development Group (PDG), whose primary objective is to support the 
Committee by identifying and reviewing emerging supervisory issues and, 
where appropriate, proposing and developing policies that promote a sound 
banking system and high supervisory standards. The PDG oversees a further 
seven sub-working groups, which cover dedicated issue areas such as risk 
management, liquidity, the definition of capital, trading book issues, and 
cross-border resolution issues. Another main sub-committee is the Standards 
Implementation Group (SIG) which focuses on implementation of Basel 
Committee guidance and standards more generally. It oversees a further two
38 See the History o f  the BCBS at http://w w w .bis.org/bcbs/history.txlf
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sub-working groups dealing with validation of systems and operational risk39. 
The structure of the BCBC is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1 BCBS Organisation Charts
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The composition and structure of the BCBS therefore highlight four 
important characteristics. Firstly, the BCBS is represented only by public 
regulatory authorities who report directly to their political Heads of 
Supervision, which in most cases are national Finance Ministries. Secondly, 
the BCBS is evidently a very small group of regulators, most from the most
39 For an overview o f  the BCBS sub-committees, refer to BCBS website
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/indcx.htm
40 BCBS chart found at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/organigram.pdf
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wealthy and powerful economies in the world*1. It is, as Baker (2006) argues, 
an explicit case of the club model populated originally by G-10 countries who 
engage in inner circle bargaining, and are accountable only to the respective 
Heads of Supervision and Finance Ministers. Thirdly, there are only four 
opportunities a year for the BCBS Committee members to meet and to make 
key decisions on outcomes placing great significance on these meetings for 
progressing issues and finalising policy matters. Finally, these meetings are 
explicitly ‘closed’ which means that only members of the BCBS Committee 
attend, unlike other standard-setting bodies that allow ‘Observers’ or ‘Guests’ 
to participate in Board meetings*2.
Based on these four characteristics, the BCBS has been less 
sympathetic to the more overt forms of private influence through lobbying 
and structural ‘sway5 based on market share and size for two main reasons. 
Firstly, the fact that the BCBS represents many of the most powerful markets 
in the world means that the majority of member countries have very large 
global banking conglomerates domiciled in their jurisdictions which, in a 
global banking market place, have equally significant systemic impact should 
one of them fafi43. Hence, from a systemic and prudential perspective, the 
structural conglomeration of the world’s major banks across borders and 
their dominance in the innovation of financial markets make them all
41 Moreover, Committee members are also said to ensure that there be at least one representative from 
their own home jurisdictions sit on all of the major sub-committees and, if  important enough, on the 
sub-working groups as well. This is important, considering that most of the sub-committees consist o f  
no more than 20 to 30 members, with some sub-committees populated by more than one member from 
a single jurisdiction. This was based on confidential interviews with the BCBS undertaken in 2006.
42 These bodies include the IAIS which includes private Observers as part o f the IAIS membership -  
see Chapter 5 for details. Another case is the IASB which although is a private body also invites 
‘Observers’ and ‘Guests’ to be part of their Board meetings -  see Chapter 6 for details.
43 It was also recognised by the BCBS and private industry in confidential interviews undertaken in 
2006 that some of the members of the BCBS have more systemic impact over global markets than 
others.
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important due to their systemic importance. Secondly, and more practically, 
because BCBS meetings are ‘closed’ to external parties and stakeholders, and 
these meetings take place only four times a year, the BCBS expects that the 
more traditional forms of lobbying have already taken place at the domestic 
level of deliberation. Members are expected to come to the BCBS meetings 
with their views and preferences based on their domestic regulatory 
prerogatives already inherently included in their BCBS-level of
deliberations^.
However, one resource that the BCBS as an institution does depend on 
and needs from private industry directly is information - in particular, 
information that has already been sourced from the wider banking 
community worldwide and ‘assembled’ ready for BCBS use and consumption. 
A crucial reason for this need for private industry input is that the BCBS (or 
the member countries of the Committee) cannot freely obtain this 
information from other regulators around the world because of domestic 
privacy laws; that is, they are unable to freely access private industry data on 
regulated industries unless there are bilateral agreements or domestic laws in 
place which allow other foreign regulators to access this information. The 
alternative for the BCBS bas been to send out ‘surveys’ and other data 
gathering exercises^ to foreign regulators which not only take time to 
distribute but also require significant time and resources to compile and 
assemble.
44 Based on confidential interviews with the BCBS undertaken in 2006.
45 In the form of the Quantitative Impact Surveys (QIS). The impact o f the QIS exercises will be 
discussed later in this chapter.
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Given the difficulties associated with obtaining information, large 
private industry groups and large global banks individually have ascertained 
this demand from the regulators and sought to supply the BCBS with such 
information directly. Moreover, they have also ascertained this demand as an 
opportunity to influence outcomes by influencing the normative frameworks 
upon which regulators would base their understanding - put simply, 
preferential market discourse. In other words, privately generated 
information not only offers regulators intimate knowledge of how the 
industry operates but it also enables banks to put forward information that 
benefits and favours their normative preferences.
Packaged as ‘technical advice’, private industry have used their 
technical resources as a means to not only infiltrate the closed decision 
making Board meetings but more importantly, the preliminary work 
undertaken by the Board’s four main working groups and sub-groups. 
Tapping in to this unique opportunity, a number of major national and 
international banking associations that represent the largest G-io banking 
conglom erates^6 such as the International Institute of Finance (IIF), 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), London Investment 
Bankers Association (LIBA), the British Bankers Association (BBA), the 
Financial Services Roundtable and the European Banking Federation (EBF) 
to name a few have been pivotal in not only acting as a vital communication 
link between the major international banks and the BCBS but also in 
providing the BCBS with readily available ‘assembled’ information for their 
use. They are not there to simply lobby the BCBS but rather to act as sources
46 The G10 study commissioned on Financial Conglomeration specifies ‘G10’ conglomerates to 
include those in the G10 countries plus Australia and Spain. Refer G-10 (2001)
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of technical information about the business of their members and the way in 
which their members operate in the market. Above all, what makes their 
influence effective is the fact that they are organised in such a way as to 
ensure that they are promptly responsive to the information needs of the 
BCBS.
All of these major banking associations (as well as some of the larger 
individual conglomerate banking groups) have established specific working 
areas that are dedicated solely to providing information to the work 
undertaken by the BCBS. Taking the IIF as an example, this global body 
represents more than 320 of the world's largest commercial banks, 
investment banks, as well as a growing number of insurance companies and 
investment management firms. Being a global association, it has explicitly 
organised and aligned itself to mirror the work of the BCBS Committee and 
sub-committee structures. Specifically, like the BCBS, the IIF is made up of a 
Board of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Chairs from the major G-10 
banking groups, strategically considered no doubt in order to maximise their 
influence over nationally affiliated Committee members. It is also organised 
alongside each strategically important sub-committee and sub-working group 
so that a dedicated team of specialists in that particular area can have 
maximum technical input and proximity to the working groups who are 
responsible for drafting and amending the standards.
For instance, the IIF established its own ‘Steering Committee on 
Regulatory Capital’ which has set up its own sub-working groups, such as the 
‘Working Group on Operational Risk’ (WGOR) to deal exclusively with the 
BCBS’s Operational Risk Subgroup (AIGOR) and “engage with the Basel
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Committee's Operational Risk Sub Group in regular dialogue on the form and 
structure of the regulatory capital framework for operational risk at banks’^ .  
This sub-structure established by the IIF is designed not only to address the 
issues at hand in more dedicated detail but also to maximise interaction and 
contact with the BCBS’s own sub-structure. As one key industry insider 
revealed, this structure has enabled them to contact key BCBS sub-committee 
members by phone directly if need be^8.
The BCBS has also actively sought information and input from private 
industry in its deliberation and consultation mechanisms, as well as through 
their Quantitative Impact Studies (QIS) concerning primarily the impact of 
the Basel II proposals on banks. As will be further elaborated, the QIS 
exercises to collect data played a pivotal role in prompting the BCBS to adjust 
key areas of Basel II that increased capital as opposed to the intended aim of 
providing incentives for banks by way of a capital reduction. The BCBS has 
also used private industry (and particularly the major banking associations) 
as regular sounding boards for pipeline proposals. As one source revealed, 
major banking associations were a convenient way for the BCBS to obtain a 
lot of views from the one p la c e d .
As a result of the BCBS composition, closed meetings and “opaque 
decision making process” (Alexander 2009), private industry has had more 
opportunity to use their discursive capabilities through the provision of 
information to the BCBS, as opposed to more overt forms of lobbying. There 
is no denying that the latter also exists, particularly at the domestic level of
47 Refer to the IIF website for further details http: //w  w w . i i f  . co m/re gu 1 a to r y/bas e 1/
48 Based on confidential interviews conducted in 2006.
49 This comment was made by a BCBS official in interviews undertaken in 2006
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regulatory politics, but the important point to emphasise is that the BCBS has 
openly sought private information resources directly through the deliberation 
and consultation mechanisms. Furthermore, this discourse has been 
assembled in a way which is easily consumable by the regulators and above 
all, seen to be ‘technically objective’ as opposed to pushing a vested agendas0. 
Given this opportunity for influence, one of the most important standards 
produced by the BCBS has been significantly influenced by private industry 
as a result of their discursive input.
The BCBS’s high demand for private industry’s technical resources was 
for instance exemplified by Basel II. One of the most significant standard- 
setting areas of the BCBS has been the Basel Capital Framework which are 
standards governing the level and quality of bank capital. The first Basel 
Accord established in 1988 or in short ‘Basel I’ was a highly contested and 
controversial issue area, namely because of its attempt to apply what has 
been referred to as a ‘one-size fits all’ approach to bank capital which over 
time proved to be increasingly ill-suited to the differences that existed in the 
portfolios and businesses of internationally active bankss1. As a consequence, 
during the 1990s the BCBS was increasingly called upon by the international 
banking community as well as regulators to provide qualifications on aspects 
of the Accord in order to improve its applicability and efficacy for 
international banks. Furthermore financial innovations were beginning to 
outpace the static and largely crude ‘risk bucket’ approach of the original 
Accord, calling into question its intended utility^2.
50 This comment was made by a BCBS official in interviews undertaken in 2006
51 For an overview o f the main criticism of Basel I, see Tarullo (2008)
52 The original Basel I framework incorporated a number o f ‘risk buckets’ within which certain assets 
were placed and a corresponding capital requirement assigned. As Tarullo explains, the simplicity of
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However, it was the political impact of the emerging market financial 
crises of the 199OS53 that placed significant pressure on the BCBS to come up 
with alternative approaches to deal with increasing complexities evident in 
rapidly globalised financial markets. The impetus towards creating a new 
Accord was in the words of the Committee due to the “the risks that 
internationally active banks from G-10 countries have had to deal with have 
become more complex and challenging”, highlighted by the economic 
turbulence arising from the financial crises in the emerging market 
economies during the 1990s (BCBS 1999:4). The Committee was therefore in 
a position where it needed to not only revise a standard but also develop new 
or more updated methodologies for calculating and providing for regulatory 
capital at a time where the world’s financial systems were looking for ways to 
address the financial innovations that were seen to be destabilising the global 
economy (BCBS 1999 )54. The escalating need to qualify the Accord 
culminated in the BCBS’s decision to undergo a complete revision of the 
original Basel I and in 1999 the BCBS issued its proposal to establish a new 
capital adequacy framework, referred in short as ‘Basel II’.
The BCBS therefore had a high demand for discursive and technical 
input that would solve the BCBS’s dilemma as to how to address capital for
this approach meant that assets with very different ‘economic’ risks were being assigned the same risk 
weight. This raised concerns that that because the risk weighting could potentially diverge 
substantially from the actual risks entailed by certain assets that the resulting minimum capital levels 
would be insufficient to achieve the desired level o f safety and soundness. See Tarullo (2008) pages 
79-80
53 Emerging market financial crises began in Mexico in 1994, and culminated in the East Asian crisis 
of 1997-1998. The IMF argues that unhedged currency and interest rate exposures played a central 
role in the Mexican and East Asian crises. Refer IMF (1998)
54 The political significance o f international standards without doubt escalated after the emerging 
market crises of the 1990s when the IMF and World Bank incorporated international standards as 
‘best practice’ into its plans to ‘strengthen the international financial system and to better manage the 
risks associated with globalisation’. Refer Report o f the Managing Director to the International 
Monetary and Financial Committee on Progress in Strengthening the Architecture o f the International 
Financial System and Reform of the IMF, 19 September 2000
145
complex financial innovations that were being developed in the market. 
Regulators, particularly in the US, had become increasingly aware that 
financial innovations and rapid technological developments advancing 
sophisticated risk modelling techniques had become prevalent amongst the 
large US banks. The earliest and most indicative precursor to Basel II was the 
amendment made to incorporate market risk into Basel I.
In 1993, the BCBS had issued a preliminary paper setting out its 
framework for applying capital charges to the market risk incurred by banks. 
In line with the Accord’s original methodology, the BCBS advanced the use of 
a standardised method to measure market risk as the basis for applying 
capital (BCBS 1993). However, the US banks strongly criticised the proposals, 
based on the reasons eventually outlined in the BCBS’s revised framework 
paper issued in April 199555. The BCBS acknowledged the criticisms 
predominantly from the major US banks that the proposals “did not provide 
sufficient incentives to improve risk management”, and more to the point 
“were not sufficiently compatible with bank’s own measurement systems” 
(BCBS 1995:1). Importantly for banks, the BCBS recognised the bank’s core 
argument that “[banks’] own risk management models produced far more 
accurate measures of market risk” (BCBS 1995: 2).
As a result of this recognition that perhaps the banks could provide the 
BCBS with a technical alternative to Basel I, the BCBS conducted its own 
analysis of the possible use of banks’ in-house models for the calculation of 
market risk capital and by 1996, issued a formal amendment to the Accord 
incorporating the internal models approach which industry “strongly
55 See also Tarullo (2008: 63)
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welcomed” (BCBS 1996). Despite built-in conservative elements such as a 
multiplication factor which in effect provided an additional capital ‘cushion’ 
to a bank’s ‘value-at risk’ (VaR) estimates6, the general adoption of banks’ 
internal models became the “valuable starting point for measuring the 
riskiness of a bank's trading portfolio” (BCBS 1996: 3). This change was also 
welcomed by US regulators, who for some time had been advocating the need 
to keep apace with financial innovations. As then Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve Alan Greenspan remarked, “as financial markets change, regulators 
too must adapt to the new technology...[and] one example is the recent 
consensus reached by international banking regulators to use internal model 
approaches for measuring market risks at banks and allocating regulatory 
capital to those risks” (Greenspan 1996).
However, the adoption of internal models for market risk is more 
significant for the process leading to the development of Basel II. US 
regulators again had been publicly advocating the use of internal models for 
regulatory capital more generally. The Governors of the Federal Reserve had 
made several calls for regulators worldwide to review the out-of-date Basel 
Accord as well as to take into account their approach of making “greater use 
of the banking industry’s sound, internally developed models and practices in 
risk management in order to reduce regulatory burden and to improve the 
effectiveness of our supervision” (Phillips 1996). As Former Chairman 
Greenspan remarked,
“the largest U.S. banking organizations are moving into new areas of risk evaluation 
for internal management purposes, including the quantification of credit risk. They
56 VaR is defined as the estimate if  the likely maximum amount that could be lost on a bank’s 
portfolio with a certain degree of statistical confidence. BCBS (1995) page 4
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have—or are developing—procedures for allocating capital against various types of 
loans, based on estimates of credit risk for various categories...These capital 
allocations, as I noted, are for internal management, not regulatory, purposes. But I 
am impressed with what they teach us, the regulators, and what they imply for 
regulatory capital...We at the Federal Reserve are beginning a review of the internal 
credit risk-capital allocation models of major U.S. banks in order to understand 
better the strengths and weaknesses of these models.” (Greenspan 1996)
Despite the Federal Reserve’s push for the regulatory adoption of the 
industry’s internal models, the BCBS had yet to fully embrace the idea that 
internal models could also be used for credit risk. The paradigm shift was in 
words of former BCBS Chairman Tom de Swaan still in “a developmental 
stage” and that although credit risk models could have prudential benefits the 
reality in 1998 was that “there are still serious obstacles on this road” 
(DeSwaan 1998). By the time the BCBS’s ‘New Capital Adequacy Framework’ 
was released in June 1999, there was still no sign of the Committee’s shift to 
internal models and “it disappointed those who favoured using internal credit 
ratings or credit risk models as the basis for capital regulation” (Tarullo 
2008: 93).
Nevertheless, behind the scenes the BCBS had established a ‘Models 
Task Force’ that had been given the mandate to evaluate the option of 
internal models for regulatory capital purposes. In their report, the Task 
Force made it clear that they had been “actively engaged in gathering 
information about banks’ internal rating systems, and assessing both the 
‘best practice’ and overall sound practice in this area” (BCBS 2000a: 2). This 
active engagement included a survey of 30 G-10 banking institutions as well 
as presentations from banks and other industry practitioners given directly to
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the BCBS Task Force. This exercise not only marked the beginning of a new 
and more active BCBS approach to information gathering for the Basel II 
process, but it also signalled its intention that the BCBS’s thinking would be 
guided by the findings from industry (BCBS 2000a) but more importantly, 
that it would signal the beginning of the BCBS’s institutional push to adopt 
these models outright.
Enhancing capture through normative practices: Basel I I  and the adoption 
o f internal models
The BCBS had a high demand for private technical resources at a time when 
firstly, domestic privacy laws made it logistically and often politically difficult 
to obtain information from member countries and secondly, the BCBS was 
faced with a high degree of international pressure to revise the outdated 
methodologies that characterised Basel I. The US regulators (primarily the 
Federal Reserve) had called upon the BCBS to take seriously the information 
that banks (particularly in the US) were generating for themselves, in the 
form of their internal models for the management of portfolio risk.
As indicated by the then Chairman De Swaan in 1998, there seemed to 
be little appetite among other non-US members to turn to private models as 
an alternative to Basel I. However, the “momentum for change strengthened” 
when Dutch Chairman de Swaan was succeeded by the President of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York William McDonough in June 1998 
(Tarullo 2008: 91). In January 2001, the BCBS released its re-packaged Basel 
II (or the ‘second consultative paper referred to as CP2), which incorporated 
industry’s much desired goal of having an internal ratings-based (IRB) 
approach for regulatory capital. The approach incorporated a new ‘tiered’
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framework of approaches where banks could adopt the ‘Basic’ or 
Standardised approach through to more ‘Advanced’ approaches depending 
on their level of sophistication. The underlying idea of the tiered framework 
is for the Basel II Framework to be ‘incentive-driven’; that is, banks with 
more sophisticated or ‘advanced’ risk management capabilities and 
techniques would be able to hold less capital than those with less advanced 
risk management capabilities.
The adoption of the IRB methodologies was widely praised by the 
large international banks, welcoming the BCBS’s progress towards “creating a 
capital framework that can meet the needs of a rapidly evolving banking 
business”, which according to the IIF had been “accomplished in an 
atmosphere of unprecedented and close informal dialogue among banks and 
supervisors at the international level” (IIF 2001: 6). The joint BBA/LIBA 
response goes so far as applauding the BCBS for it “so obviously listened to 
the industry lobby and believe that the proposals, in sum, represent a 
substantial step toward a more risk based Accord” (BBA 2001: 3).
Whilst the political momentum for adopting market methodologies 
certainly changed with the Chairmanship of William McDonough, this does 
not sufficiently explain how Basel II would come to adopt not only the 
internal models paradigm but also adopt the capital incentives needed to 
justify its use. Specifically, one glaring issue raised by industry was that in 
contrast to the stated aim of the BCBS, the CP2 proposals would actually 
increase regulatory capital requirements. Even though the IRB approach was 
intended to provide positive incentives to banks to improve risk 
measurement and management of mitigants through capital reductions for
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various forms of transactions that reduce risk (BCBS 2001a). This criticism 
launched the first of a number of Quantitative Impact Studies (QIS) 
undertaken by the BCBS to gauge the effect the new proposals would have on 
banks’ capital levels.
These QIS exercises were the primary normative means through which 
the BCBS was able to justify and amend the proposals to provide the IRB 
banks with the promised capital incentives. Confirming industry criticisms, 
the QIS 2 and subsequent QIS 2.5 studies showed that on average, the CP2 
proposals for credit risk would deliver increases in capital requirements for 
all groups, including the IRB banks (BCBS 2001c). As the BCBS admit, the 
proposals for the IRB Foundation approach would generate higher overall 
capital requirements than the basic ‘Standardised’ approach, which were 
“counter to the Committee’s desired incentives” (BCBS 2001c: 2)57. As a 
result, the BCBS used the QIS data to propose modifications to the CP2 
framework in order to ensure that “the foundation IRB approach provides a 
modest capital incentive relative to current capital requirements” (BCBS 
200id: 3).
Based on the modifications proposed, the BCBS set out again with a 
QIS version ‘2.5’ to gauge the impact of the modifications on overall capital 
levels. The results showed that whilst the modifications would overall reduce 
the credit risk capital requirements for most banks overall, the net ‘incentive’ 
disappeared when the operational risk charge was added back on (this 
chapter discusses the issue of the operational risk charge in the following 
section). Moreover, the results indicated that whilst the modifications
57 The IRB Foundation approach would generate 14 per cent higher requirements as opposed to the 6 
per cent increase under the Standardised approach.
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resulted in relative declines in capital for some portfolios, the impact on other 
portfolios had yet to be determined, leading to the BCBS’s scheduled third 
QIS in October 2002.
The BCBS’s QIS 3 was a watershed for Basel II, as it was not only the 
most extensive field test of the Basel II proposals (more than 200 banks from 
over 40 countries participated) but it also reflected the Committee’s “desire 
to work cooperatively with industry participants to develop practical 
approaches to difficult issues” (BCBS 2002: 2). In the Committee’s words, the 
“Committee has responded to each new challenge by engaging in active 
dialogue with banks and other market participants, and, where possible, has 
tried to borrow from leading industry practice” (BCBS 2002:1). The need for 
such dialogue through particularly the QIS exercises was borne from the 
Committee’s recognition for “the need to provide tangible incentives for 
banks to adopt the more advanced approaches to capital measurement. The 
QIS 3 process is designed to provide critical information in support of these 
calibration efforts.” (BCBS 2002: 2)
To the BCBS’s satisfaction, the QIS 3 results were indeed consistent 
with the Committee’s objectives. The revised proposals as set out in the 
BCBS’s Third Consultative Paper (CP3) issued in April 2003 would offer an 
incentive for internationally active banks to adopt the more sophisticated IRB 
approaches and minimum capital requirements would decline relative to the 
Basel I levels (BCBS 2003a). The biggest winners from the revised CP3 
amendments would be banks in the G10 and specifically in the EU with large 
retail portfolios, with reported reductions in capital of up to 20 percent. 
Banks adopting the more advanced IRB approach would also benefit from
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reductions in capital requirements, whilst the capital requirement of those 
banks on the basic Standardised approach would increase. Again, despite 
various criticisms of many other aspects of Basel II, the general response 
from the major Gio international banks in relation to the modifications for 
the IRE approaches was favourable, appreciating the Committee’s active 
dialogue with the industry in order to put in place a system much better 
aligned to the industry5s measurements of risks8.
In June 2004, the BCBS officially released ‘Basel II: International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised 
Framework’ (BCBS 2004a). After active consultation, dialogue and input 
from the industry, the BCBS had finally shifted its capital paradigm to be 
aligned with industry practice. The adoption of internal models and the 
repeated QIS exercises to obtain information that would verify the incentive 
structure proposed by the Committee were key examples of the BCBS’s active 
demand for industry information and technical input.
This also exemplified the BCBS’s active facilitation of private models 
through institutional means using primarily the QIS exercises to push the 
IRB approaches through. This study’s framework proposed that when 
demand was high and corresponding threat from industry was low, 
institutional practices would be used by regulators to facilitate captured 
outcomes. The verification and adoption of capital incentives driven by data 
from the QIS are examples of the BCBS regulators using normative practices 
to facilitate capture which, in this instance, was the adoption of the internal 
models paradigm. The BCBS regulators were able to facilitate capture by
58 Refer to BCBS (2003c) The New Basel Capital Accord: Comments received on the Third 
Consultative Paper
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sourcing norms from private actors and by allowing norms to be drafted by 
private actors. The adoption of the internal models paradigm also exemplifies 
that the captured norm is one which allows private industry to self-regulate 
their conduct and behaviour.
The repetitive QIS data exercises to verify capital incentive structures 
is also an example of the way in which regulators use the policy process to 
facilitate capture. Specifically, the QIS exercises support the framework’s 
proposition that in order to facilitate captured outcomes, deliberation with 
private actors would be undertaken throughout the policy development stage 
and the frequency of meetings with regulators would be increased. As a result 
of the deliberation, comments from private industry would then be adopted 
and standards changed accordingly.
Basel II is therefore significant for this case study because it was not 
only a complete revision of the BCBS’s approach to capital regulation 
generally but more importantly exemplified how regulators use normative 
and procedural tools to support and facilitate captured outcomes. The 
captured outcome in this instance was the adoption of the ‘internal models’ 
paradigm used and advocated by the large international banks. As the name 
suggests, the internal models approach is based on the use of a bank’s own 
estimates of risk and ratings of individual credit to calculate appropriate 
levels of capital for those risks. The benefits of the internal ratings approach 
advocated by proponents -  both from the international banking sector and 
from regulators -  were the ability of these internal systems to be more 
sensitive to the variations and levels of risk in a bank’s portfolio (and thereby 
allocating regulatory capital more efficiently) and to provide incentives for
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industry wide improvements in risk management practices and systems 
which assign the internal ratings (BCBS 2000a).
Moreover, as well as providing the BCBS with its much needed 
alternative to Basel I, the BCBS’s authority was also enhanced by the fact that 
it was seen to be in touch with market realities by producing a more risk- 
aligned framework. More practically, the BCBS had saved time and the 
resources needed to come up with an alternative framework by utilising what 
industry had already developed. The task of ‘tweaking’ the model slightly to 
suit regulatory purposes proved not only much more efficient from the 
BCBS’s point of view but also responded directly to pressure coming from the 
industry and its most vocal regulatory champion, the US Federal Reserve.
However, industry’s influence over the framework of Basel II through 
the BCBS’s adoption of internal models and its extensive information 
gathering exercises is part of a much larger and complex picture. Whilst 
industry have been pleased with the influence they have had over the BCBS 
adoption of the IRB methodologies, many of the same large international 
banks have been far from happy with other requirements imposed. This is 
because Basel II has also been significantly expanded, in both the level and 
prescriptiveness of requirements from that of Basel I, which the large 
international banks have fundamentally opposed59. Basel II in comparison to 
Basel I now consists of what is referred to as ‘three pillars’: the first ‘pillar’ or 
Pillar 1 is for the most part what used to be the entire Basel I Accord and has 
been amended to further incorporate an operational risk charge, capital 
floors and calibration factors. Furthermore, Basel II also introduces two
59 These comments are evident in both the CP2 and CP3 responses of the large US and EU banks.
The IIF’s publication responding to Basel II is discussed later in this chapter.
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whole new sections in addition to the original Basel I content (or Pillar 1) 
namely ‘Pillar 2’ and ‘Pillar 3’. Pillar 2 incorporates the supervisory review 
and supervisory discretion of capital requirements and Pillar 3 introduces 
new disclosure requirements. The impact of the changes to Pillar 1 and Pillar 
2 will be discussed in the following sections.
4.2  High dem and, high threat: institutional constraints and the  
‘creeping conservatism ’ o f  Basel II
Constraining capture: reconstructing private norms and enhancing 
supervisory powers
Basel II not only includes the IRB approaches for banks to use their own risk 
estimates for credit risk, but the Framework has also incorporates many 
other requirements that directly and indirectly increase capital requirements. 
Banks have both gained through capital incentives but have also been 
simultaneously disadvantaged through other capital add-ons. This is 
somewhat contradictory to the view that banks have only gained from the 
revised Basel II60. How and why has this occurred? One of the ways in which 
the BCBS has offset the incentives produced through the adoption of internal 
models has been the introduction of new norms, specifically the operational 
risk charge. Furthermore, Basel II also introduces ‘Pillar 2’ supervisory 
review, which in effect gives regulators the power to determine a bank’s 
capital amount over and above the bank’s own internal estimate.
One of the more controversial issues that arose throughout the Basel II 
process was the introduction of a new capital charge for operational risk in
60 See for instance Wood (2005) and Tsingou (2006)
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the minimum capital requirements under minimum capital requirements, 
referred to as ‘Pillar T61. Prior to the first Basel II consultative paper, there 
were only two areas of risk covered by the minimum capital requirement, 
which were credit risk and market risk. Amending the original Accord to be 
more ‘up to date’ with market innovations was already a difficult endeavour, 
but going so far as introducing a new capital charge against what the banks 
thought to be a very qualitative and under-researched risk area was highly 
controversial and strongly opposed. This is quite simply because any new 
capital charge Get alone one which lacked definitive quantitative 
measurement) is considered to be an unproductive use of equity and hence a 
cost to banks.
The earliest indication that the banks were opposed to any specific 
capital charge for Operational Risk is contained in a preliminary issues paper 
on Operational Risk Management issued by the BCBS in 1998, which outlines 
the work that the BCBS had initiated in relation to its research on the 
practices of operational risk management in the industry (BCBS 1998). This 
paper was simply a fact-finding discussion on what the BCBS had found as a 
result of the interviews it had undertaken with approximately 30 banks from 
the different BCBS member countries. Importantly, the BCBS confirmed 
from its interviews with those banks that whilst awareness by senior 
management of the need to monitor operational risk was increasing, many 
sophisticated banks were only in the very early stages of developing an 
operational risk management framework. This means that banks at that early 
stage not only lacked the conceptual and data needs necessary to measure
61 Basel II in comparison to Basel I now consists o f what is referred to as ‘three pillars’: the first 
‘pillar’ or Pillar 1 is for the most part what used to be the original Basel I Accord with two main 
revisions -  the IRB methodologies for credit risk and the additional operational risk charge
157
operational risk for capital purposes but that the cost and time needed to 
devote energies to developing such frameworks were considered significant 
and “in many cases, exceeded the direct costs of the operational losses” 
(BCBS 1998: 4).
Industry opposition to the introduction of a specific capital charge for 
Operational Risk is even noted in the BCBS’s finding that “most banks agreed 
that the process is not sufficiently developed fo r  the bank supervisors to 
mandate guidelines specifying particular measurement methodologies or 
quantitative limits on [operational] risk. Preference was expressed, at this 
stage, for supervisors to focus on qualitative improvement in operational risk 
management” (BCBS 1998: 7) [emphasis added]. In short, the banks opposed 
any role for supervisors to mandate capital for operational risk, and 
moreover were even split on “whether the supervisors should provide a forum 
to facilitate the identification of ‘best practices’, with some expressing 
reservations about the usefulness of best practices given the perceived 
institution-specific nature of operational risk” (BCBS 1998: 7).
Banks therefore were not only opposed to the idea of supervisors 
intrusively determining their capital needs for operational risk but some were 
also opposed to supervisors even suggesting normative practices for 
managing a risk that was considered to be qualitatively specific to individual 
banks. In this report, banks simply noted a ‘potential’ for supervisors to raise 
the level of awareness of operational risk amongst banks but little else than 
this. The outcome of this first preliminary report was the conclusion by the 
BCBS that it would simply “continue to monitor developments in this area” 
(BCBS 1998: 7). However, this promise to simply continue monitoring
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developments in the industry’s management of operational risk was short 
lived when in June 1999 the BCBS released the first Basel II consultative 
paper (BCBS 1999). In this paper, the Committee proposed that that the new 
Accord “develop an explicit capital charge for other risks (such as operational 
risk)” (BCBS 1999:10). More importantly was the Committee’s belief that the 
new framework “should be enlarged so as to cover more explicitly each of 
these major categories of risk” (BCBS 1999: 13) [emphasis added]. The 
proposed enlargement of the new capital requirements was not insignificant; 
the BCBS was not only proposing quantitative applications for developing an 
operational risk charge but was also more importantly qualitative factors 
“such as the integrity of the controls process and internal measures of 
operational risk” (BCBS 1999:15).
Despite the recognition that the industry was not adequately prepared 
to monitor and measure such a risk and the development of such a risk 
charge would be “difficult to quantify”, the Committee re-affirmed its belief 
that “such risks are sufficiently important for banks to devote the necessary 
resources to quantify the level of such risks and to incorporate them into their 
assessment of their overall capital” and that such a risk was “too important 
not to be treated separately within the capital framework” (BCBS 1999: 50). It 
is clear that the BCBS were fully expecting both the quantification and 
qualification of an operational risk charge to provoke industry outciy, 
reflected in the BCBS’s statement that “the Committee anticipates a dialogue 
with the industry on possible specifications” (BCBS 1999: 15). Indeed, an 
example was the submission from Merrill Lynch, which stated that they were 
not only “disappointed to see that the operational risk proposals are a core
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requirement of the Pillar l proposals, and not a component of Pillar 2 as we 
argued in our response to the first consultation paper” but also argued what 
was to become a prevailing theme across most banks that “the imposition of 
capital charges is not an appropriate response to these risks...[and] moreover, 
are disproportionately penal.” (Merrill Lynch 2001: 2)
As confirmed in the subsequent QIS 3, even though it would appear 
that “the tide had been turned in favour of banks that would adopt the more 
advanced IRB approaches”, the actual overall capital reduction for these IRB 
banks was only approximately 2 per cent lower than Basel I levels (Tarullo 
2008: 117). In fact, whilst credit risk capital requirements benefited from 
around a 14 per cent reduction in capital, the net reduction of 2 per cent 
resulted primarily from the capital charges for operational risk (BCBS 
2003b). These results affirm the stated goal of the BCBS, which is to “broadly 
maintain the aggregate level of such requirements, while also providing 
incentives to adopt the more advanced risk-sensitive approaches of the 
revised Framework” (BCBS 2004a: 4). Hence, “insofar as there was 
continuing pressure on the committee to provide advanced IRB banks with 
more flexibility on operational risk, these banks could reasonably have 
expected even more favourable results as further changes were made” 
(Tarullo 2008: 117). However, this was not to eventuate and criticisms from 
industry had little impact on the eventual adoption of the operational risk 
methodologies.
Other academics such as Herring have also been highly critical of the 
BCBS’s inclusion of the operational risk charge into Pillar 1 minimum capital 
requirements. As Herring argues, “the Basel Committee is not simply
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changing regulation to conform to well-established industry best-practice, as 
it did in market risk. It is attempting to define best practice...I believe this 
attempt to set capital charges for operational risk is fundamentally 
misguided” (2002: 5). The issue for Herring as well as industry was that “at a 
more fundamental level, it is unclear why the Basel Committee insists on 
dealing with operational risk under Pillar 1 -  that is, as an issue of capital 
adequacy” (Herring 2002:10).
The addition of the operational risk charge however was not the only 
capital add-on evident in Pillar 1. There were other indirect requirements put 
in place, which ran entirely counter to the incentives supposedly supplied to 
banks through the IRB gains. These were the imposition of somewhat 
arbitrary ‘prudential floors’ and ‘calibration factors’, which in effect further 
negate capital benefits to the IRB banks. Far from being allowed to determine 
their own capital needs based on their own internal economic capital models, 
the BCBS decided after CP2 to apply ‘prudential floors’ for banks adopting 
the IRB approaches, much to the astonishment of industry. The imposition of 
these floors meant that “beginning year-end 2006 and during the first year 
following implementation, IRB capital requirements for credit risk together 
with operational risk and market risk capital charges cannot fall below 90% 
of the current minimum required for credit and market risks, and, in the 
second year, the minimum will be 80% of this level.” (BCBS 2003a: 6) The 
major banks were highly opposed to these floors, with JP Morgan Chase for 
instance arguing that,
“We see no rationale for imposing such a floor. If a supervisor has conducted a 
thorough review of a bank’s rating process and capital allocation methodology, and
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has concluded that the bank is ready to implement the advanced approach, then the 
supervisor should be willing to accept the resulting calculation of minimum capital 
requirements. To impose such a floor would result in our having to calculate our 
regulatory capital twice quarterly over a two year period -  at a multi-million dollar 
cost -  with no compelling safety and soundness benefit” (JP Morgan Chase 2003: 7- 
8).
JP Morgan Chase ‘strongly* recommended that the Committee eliminate the 
floor.
However, the BCBS did not eliminate the floor but instead extended 
the length of time for which the floors would be applied. As they state in the 
final version of Basel II in June 2004, “The Committee believes it is 
appropriate for supervisors to apply prudential floors to banks that adopt the 
IRB approach for credit risk and/or the AMA for operational risk following 
year-end 2008. For banks that do not complete the transition to these 
approaches in the years specified in paragraph 46, the Committee believes it 
is appropriate for supervisors to continue to apply prudential floors...to 
ensure that individual bank implementations of the advanced approaches are 
sound.” (BCBS 2004a: 13) [emphasis added]
In addition to extending the period of time for which supervisors could 
potentially apply these prudential floors, the Committee also added a ‘scaling’ 
or calibration factor that was to be applied to the risk-weighted assets for 
credit risk assessed under the IRB approach. This scaling factor was intended 
to “broadly maintain the aggregate level of minimum capital requirements”, 
which again went against the very grain of aligning the new Accord with 
minimum and risk-sensitive capital (BCBS 2004a: 13). When the BCBS 
released a re-finalised version of Basel II in November 2005, the IIF
162
immediately issued a media release outlining its “serious reservations” 
against the scaling factor, arguing that “the industry has consistently 
challenged this concept because it will detract from the technical consistency 
and the risk sensitivity of the framework and, in fact, partially diminish the 
benefits of a risk-based capital system” and moreover imposing a scaling 
factor was “not only unnecessary but actually punitive to adequately 
capitalised banks.” (IIF 2005: 6)
The argument therefore that Basel II has benefited the interests of the 
IRB banks is difficult to reconcile with the views of private industry presented 
in this chapter. The IIF has repeatedly argued that the BCBS has cumulatively 
built in elements of ‘conservatism’ where “the conservatism of particular 
parameters already results in a significant distancing of regulatory-capital 
calculations from internal risk management and economic capital- 
calculations” (IIF 2005: 7). One leading industry representative confirmed in 
an interview that contrary to the claim that the banks have ‘captured’ the 
BCBS, “the feeling is much more that the regulators have hijacked what was 
supposed to be a bank-centred thing, and have increasingly turned it into a 
more and more prescriptive regulatory thing”62. Evidently, regulators 
‘hijacking’ the Basel II process is not considered a good thing for banks.
This study proposed that evidence of regulators using institutional 
constraints to prevent outcomes from becoming captured are when 
information and private norms are sourced from industry, but ultimately this 
information is reconstructed by regulators to include vested interests. The 
inclusion of the operational risk charge illustrates this practice, where
62 Confidential interview with a representative from a large industry association
163
regulators have not only actively sourced this expertise from industry but 
have then used this information to create a new capital charge, which 
ultimately offset a large portion of the capital incentives created from the 
adoption of internal models. When the operational risk charge did not act to 
neutralise the gains made by private industry, the BCBS went further, using 
the QIS information to recalibrate the capital requirements so that the BCBS 
could “broadly maintain the aggregate level of minimum capital 
requirements” (BCBS 2004a: 13).
In addition to this however, the study also put forward that regulators 
who perceive their authority to be under threat from private norms would 
also resort to developing supervisory powers which enabled regulators the 
ability to exert their authority over industry. One issue that has been left to 
the sidelines of discussion on Basel II is the impact of Pillar 2 on capital 
levels. Pillar 2 incorporates the supervisory review of capital requirements 
and was in many ways recognition by the BCBS of the limitations in having 
‘fixed’ capital requirements in Pillar 1. As they had experienced with the 
original Basel Accord, market innovations and the speed at which new 
financial products can be developed often outpaced regulations. In fact, as 
Harris (2004) has argued, regulation itself has more often than not spurred 
financial market innovations because those financial products are often 
developed primarily to circumvent those regulations in the first place.
In response to these weaknesses, the BCBS state in CP2 that “Pillar 1 
has been enhanced to reflect more accurately a bank’s overall risk profile 
relative to the minimum capital requirement. While this more precise 
measurement of risk is an important step in the effort to align capital charges
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more closely with underlying risk, minimum regulatory capital requirements 
will tend to lag market innovations, and they will not fully capture all 
elements of risk that are specific to an individual bank’s risk profile.” (BCBS 
2001a: 4) The solution to this ongoing problem of regulatory lag therefore 
was the ‘supervisory review’ tool, which, whilst based strictly on principles, 
empowered regulators to not only monitor a bank’s application of its capital 
requirements but also, to intervene if and when a bank’s capital level was 
deemed insufficient to act as a buffer against their relative risks. This means 
that Pillar 2 allows regulators to determine what types of risks could be 
deemed to attract capital over and above Pillar 1.
When the BCBS released its first detailed version of Pillar 2 in CP2, 
most banks were not surprised with what was outlined. The four principles 
contained in Pillar 2 were for the most part similar to the BCBS’s ‘Core 
Principles for Effective Supervision’ which alongside the Basel I Capital 
Accord, had been another major standard-setting area which had been on­
going since 199263. However, what some banks objected to were the 
inclusions of principles three and four. These principles affirmed the 
Committee’s view that ‘Supervisors should expect banks to operate above the 
minimum regulatory capital ratios and should have the ability to require 
banks to hold capital in excess of the minimum” and that “Supervisors should 
seek to intervene at an early stage to prevent capital from falling below the 
minimum levels required to support the risk characteristics of a particular 
bank and should require rapid remedial action if capital is not maintained or 
restored.” (BCBS 2001a: Principle Four)
63 For various versions o f  the Core Principles for Effective Supervision, refer to BCBC website
http://mvw.bis.org/list/bcbs/tid 25/index.htm
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Even though some regulators around the world are already 
empowered to mandate these specific principles within their home 
jurisdictions, and these principles are already contained in the BCBS’s ‘Core 
Principles’, banks objected to the addition of these principles specifically to 
the Capital Accord. This was based on the concern that Pillar 2 legitimately 
gave rise to the possibility that based on these principles supervisors could 
require banks to hold capital over and above the already enlarged Pillar 1 
requirements. As Merrill Lynch argued, “if Pillar l represented a truly de 
minimis capital charge and supervisors were flexible in the interpretation of 
Pillar 2, this would mitigate this concern. However, as currently constituted, 
Pillar l  results in charges considerably higher than economic capital models 
indicate, and is framed much more prescriptively than economic capital 
practice. Moreover, Pillar 2, as currently framed, can only increase capital.” 
(2001: 16) [emphasis added] The BBA/LIBA also argued that “the improved 
risk sensitivity of Pillar 1 makes any routine requirements for banks to hold 
capital in excess of the minimum unjustifiable.” (2001: 66) More concerning 
to some was the possibility that an unbridled use of Pillar 2 by regulators 
around the world would not only render Pillar 1 obsolete but also cause 
serious level playing field issues with respect the different applications of 
capital requirements based on ‘supervisory discretion’6*.
Despite the concerns raised in the CP2 round of consultations, it soon 
emerged with the release of CP3 that Pillar 2 had not only remained 
unchanged but more astonishingly had actually expanded the scope of 
supervisory review. Specifically, numerous issues that had emerged from
64 For example the IIF, UBS and the Financial Roundtable expressed these concerns in CP2 
comments. Refer BCBS (2001a)
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Pillar 1 discussions soon found their way into Pillar 2, with a whole new 
section added by the time the Committee issued a revised framework for CP3. 
This section, titled ‘Specific issues to be addressed under the supervisory 
review process’ not only broadened the scope of supervisory principles but 
also went as far as explicitly stating that the purpose of the new section was to 
cover aspects that could not otherwise be addressed under Pillar 1 (BCBS 
2003a).
According to the BCBS, “the Committee has identified a number of 
important issues that banks and supervisors should particularly focus on 
when carrying out the supervisory review process. These issues include some 
key risks which are not directly addressed under Pillar 1 and important 
assessments that supervisors should make to ensure the proper functioning 
of certain aspects of Pillar 1.” (BCBS 2003a: 145) Put simply, whatever 
couldn’t be agreed upon as a minimum  level requirement within Pillar 1 
ended up within Pillar 2 supervisory discretion. These issue areas for instance 
were not just broad ‘principles’ but almost explicit capital requirements that 
superiors were expected to add on to the Pillar 1 calculation. For example, 
one highly contested issue was whether interest rate risk should be included 
in the banking book. The BCBS state in Pillar 2 that despite comments from 
industry, the “Committee remains convinced that interest rate risk in the 
banking book is a potentially significant risk which merits support from 
capital.” (BCBS 2003a: 165)
This expansion further increased banks’ concerns that Pillar 2 was fast 
becoming an additional and somewhat unlimited means of imposing capital. 
The G10 banks were significantly opposed and some even outraged by what
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was described by one bank to be a substantial “scope creep” in Pillar 2 from 
the January 2001 draft of the new Accord (ANZ 2003: 21). The Belgium 
Bankers Association argued that Pillar 2 “must not be used as a 
compensation for structural shortcomings of Pillar 1, which specifies the 
general calculation of the capital requirements.” (2003: 2) ANZ further 
argued that the proposed coverage of Pillar 2 was not only expanding but that 
the current draft went “well beyond” its original intention by mandating the 
capital that should be held for specific transactional issues which would 
result in “higher than current capital levels which would be contrary to the 
expressed intent of the reform process.” (2003: 21) The BBA/LIBA also 
opposed the ‘blurring’ of the boundary between Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 and “the 
introduction into Pillar 2 of elements that are intended to have "teeth”” 
(BBA/LIBA 2003:19).
The IIF too objected outright, arguing that there was “insufficient 
differentiation” that existed between Pillar 1 and Pillar 2, further questioning 
“the appropriateness of establishing additional system-wide regulatory 
capital buffers for all banks different than the ones already included under 
Pillar One.” (2003: 38-39) UBS also argued that “for a bank with sound 
internal practices and standards, the capital calculated under Pillar I should 
constitute the regulatory capital requirement, with no further 
buffer...regulators should generally not determine the level of capital that a 
bank should hold in excess of the regulatory minimum, as this is a strategic 
decision and the responsibility of the bank’s management” (2003: 3). Finally, 
the Japanese Bankers Association quite simply and bluntly stated that “we
168
cannot accept greater capital requirements under the treatment currently 
required in Pillar 2.” (2003: 3)
Despite these very strong submissions which even culminated in a 
joint letter by all G10 banking associations to the Committee arguing against 
such intrusiveness6s, there were no substantive changes made to the revised 
framework issued by the BCBS in June 2004 (BCBS 2004a). All the 
additional specific supervisory issues mandated for regulatory attention 
remained. Furthermore, the Committee issued a statement accompanying the 
release of the June 2004 framework, reaffirming that “it is critical that the 
minimum capital requirements of the first pillar be accompanied by a robust 
implementation of the second, including efforts by banks to assess their 
capital adequacy and by supervisors to review such assessments.” 
Furthermore, “more generally, under the second pillar, supervisors should 
expect banks to operate above minimum regulatory capital levels.” (BCBS 
2004a)
Whilst the intention and objective of Pillar 2 was for there to be 
continual dialogue between regulators and industry, particularly in relation 
to the IRB methods applied by the large banks, what is evident is that Pillar 2 
became the means by which to facilitate the varying demands of the BCBS 
members. The subsequent revisions to Pillar 2 were not only the result of the 
inability of the BCBS to reach consensus on whether particular risks should 
also be included into Pillar 1 -  interest rate risk being one such area, but 
these revisions have allowed supervisors to determine for themselves what 
risks should appropriately be identified and managed by way of a capital
65 This letter is cited by a number of banking associations including the BBA and EBF, found at 
BCBS (2003c)
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charge. In fact, the inclusions into Pillar 2 exemplify the BCBS’s contradictory 
approach to capital more generally, where it has advocated on the one hand 
that aggregate capital levels should remain broadly unchanged from Basel I 
levels and on the other hand, that the new Basel II framework should create 
capital incentives by way of capital reductions for banks adopting the IRB 
models66. As Tarullo argues “the committee has not elaborated on how these 
potentially conflicting goals are to be reconciled” (2008:160).
In sum, Basel II has been marred by what one private industry insider 
has referred to as ‘creeping conservatism’6?. The estimated costs associated 
with this regulatory conservatism have not been considered ‘beneficial’ to the 
interests of the large banks who have stressed throughout the Basel II 
amendment process that there is a need to align regulatory capital 
requirements with the internal economic capital that banks estimate for 
themselves. What is clear from the analysis of the Basel II process is that 
whilst the BCBS was initially open to making the Framework ‘incentive- 
based’ and risk-driven, it progressively made the Accord much more 
prescriptive and aligned with the interests of certain regulators. The following 
section outlines why, and which regulators, perceived their authority to be 
under threat, leading those regulators to resort to institutional constraints.
Why the regulatory threat? Supervisory ‘tug o f norms’, US fragmentation 
and EUpower o f the policy process
The BCBS has engaged in close and cooperative dialogue with industry 
throughout the Basel II process, but this dialogue has also been influenced by
66 BCBS (2004), paragraph 14; see also Tarullo (2008: 160)
67 This was from confidential interviews with a private industry association undertaken in 2006.
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the subsequent disagreements between BCBS members over issues 
concerning capital levels and the impact that the new approaches would have 
on their domestic constituents. In the case of Basel II we can see two distinct 
stages of influence: firstly where private industry has had access to and has 
been able to influence the initial stages of shaping the language, discourse or 
the ‘norms’ of standards, and secondly where institutional constraints 
imposed during the policy process have been more influential in affecting the 
latter stages and hence outcomes of policy norms. What has therefore gone in 
to the ‘policy machinery’ has not necessarily come out the same way. Thus, 
despite the initial influence of these private norms and preferences, they have 
not been influential enough to survive the process of deliberation or bring 
about changes that promote their preferences.
As discussed earlier, we can see the use of institutional constraints 
through the reconstruction of norms occurring in the case of the operational 
risk charge. The decision to include operational risk in Pillar l capital 
requirements ironically stemmed from the fact that the Committee knew that 
the industry had commenced work on identifying and potentially measuring 
Operational Risk for internal risk management purposes68. The BCBS had 
decided that the industry could play an important role in initially shaping this 
new norm with their expertise and importantly -  their resources. This is 
evident when the BCBS in its first Basel II consultative paper in 1999 
explicitly invited banks to provide what they saw as approaches towards 
measuring operational risk for capital purposes. Specifically, it actively 
encouraged “submissions from banks that perceive their models to be 
functioning well” (BCBS 1999: 51).
68 Based on confidential interviews with BCBS conducted in 2006
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Industry also recognised this immediately, seeing the invitation at the 
very early stages of deliberation as a key opportunity to try and influence the 
norm by advocating their specific models in order to gain a competitive edge 
over others. Most influential in this area has been the collaboration between 
the Risk Management Association (RMA), ISDA and the BBA with their 
publication in December 1999 titled ‘Operational Risk Management—The 
New Frontier’. They acknowledged ‘increased regulatory interest’ and 
because of this interest recognised that the development and practice of 
operational risk management represented an opportunity for institutions to 
make their mark in this new field of risk (ISDA 1999). The industry 
associations jointly conclude that the ‘window of opportunity’ made it 
imperative for institutions to allocate resources to operational risk, in order 
to create competitive advantage (ISDA 1999).
This type of selective consultation with industry is often interpreted as 
being indicative of the close relationship the BCBS has with industry and as a 
result outcomes are then assumed to be captured. Indeed, selective 
consultation was a mechanism used by the BCBS to primarily obtain 
information from industry. This initial stage in the formation of policy norms 
is reflective of the ‘supply and demand’ of regulation, where private industry 
has the resources and expertise to provide regulators with information that 
regulators would not necessarily have. However, obtaining information from 
private industry is very different from what then happens to that information 
once it is obtained. This is the missing key variable to public-private 
interaction: a close relationship between public and private actors may mean 
increased interaction and dialogue but ‘closeness’ doesn’t mean ‘capture’.
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One major industry association confirmed that the BCBS is often very 
open in the initial stages of policy formation in order to obtain information 
from industry and as such, they will actively develop position papers and 
propose working solutions to make it easier for the BCBS to simply ‘adopt’ 
outright. Though when asked if the Committee did simply adopt their 
position, the response was that in some instances “they basically didn’t buy 
any of our points” and in others, “they have adopted what is basically a more 
conservative version of what we’ve proposed”69. Once papers are submitted to 
the BCBS, the industry representative admits that they have no control over 
what the BCBS then does with that information and “then there is a relatively 
long period where they go off and finalise the final version and [then], it kind 
of arrives in an email and that’s how we find out where they ended up...”7°
Even personal relationships with key members of the BCBS do not 
seem to help in influencing the process, the major industry association 
representative admitting that his contact was “not going to give me the final 
paper until it is signed off, he kind of just gave me a sense of where it may be 
and may not be”?1. Moreover, they also admitted that once a paper was 
finalised that there would be no way that the BCBS would then change their 
views, despite vocal and written objections?2. Policy deliberation and policy 
outcomes are therefore not only about the initial and somewhat preferential 
collection of information but they are also more importantly about the 
subsequent interpretation and use of that information. Put simply,
69 Based on confidential interviews with a large industry association
70 Ibid
71 Ibid
72 Ibid
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information can be significantly altered and to use Lindblom’s expression 
‘reconstructed’ as a result of it being fed into the policy machinery.
Why then, did the BCBS proceed with the inclusion of operational risk 
within Pillar l? The decision to include operational risk in Pillar l  was from 
the outset highly opposed by the US as a result of fierce domestic US bank 
lobbying and the issue of whether or not to include operational risk 
underwent intense debate within the BCBS?3. Nevertheless, the BCBS had 
reached the conclusion that because some large international banks were 
already looking at the quantification of operational risk in the late 1990s, that 
it would be imperative for the Committee to be forward thinking and utilise 
the bank’s evolving methodology early on in the process?*. Former Chair of 
the BCBS Tom de Swaan made it fairly clear in 1998 that “awareness of, for 
instance, operational, legal and reputational risks among banks seems to be 
increasing. Some banks are already putting substantial efforts into data 
collection and quantification of these risks. Not surprisingly then that the 
Basel Committee will also be considering the treatment of the risks that are 
implicitly covered by the Accord...” (1998:1).
Aside from the reasoning that the BCBS was in effect keeping up with 
industry developments, it appears to be no coincidence that the issue of 
including operational risk in Pillar 1 as a capital requirement coincided with 
the very vocal push from the US regulators and US banks for the BCBS to 
adopt the IRB methodologies^. The operational risk charge appears to be
73 Based on confidential interviews conducted in 2006.
74 Ibid.
75 Interview sources would not comment on which members of the BCBS were supportive of the 
operational risk charge; they only commented on the fact that the US were very much against the 
operational risk charge. As a result, this study deduces that the push to include operational risk may 
have come from the European Members.
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somewhat of an ‘offset’ to the incentives that the large banks would gain from 
using their own IRB estimates so that in line with the BCBS’s intention, 
overall capital would neither increase nor decrease from Basel I levels?6. In 
fact, as the QIS data revealed in the first major exercise (QIS 2 and 2.5) the 
capital incentives purportedly gained from the adoption of the IRB 
approaches were completely nullified by the addition of the operational risk 
charge. As a result, the BCBS attracted widespread criticisms from both 
regulators and industry alike, arguing that the 20% operational risk charge 
was arbitrarily high and lacked any sound methodological justification??.
Given the widespread criticism of the operational risk charge, the 
BCBS may have considered dropping the charge from Pillar 1 and instead 
place the more qualitative risk under Pillar 2 supervisory discretion?8. 
Instead, what we see subsequent to the QIS 2 exercises is 8 major 
consultative stages and papers since its inception in September 1998 through 
to the final version of the Accord, published in June 2006. Over this time, 
even though the BCBS has attempted to respond to industry criticisms by 
making modifications to the operational risk methodology, it has stuck to its 
conviction that the operational risk charge remain in Pillar 1 as a minimum 
capital requirement.
76 This intention is stated in most of the consultative papers as well as in the QIS impact studies. For 
instance the BCBS states in its Overview o f QIS 3 that “the Committee is not intending for the 
revisions to result in material increases or decreases in aggregate banking system minimum capital 
levels”. Refer BCBS (2003)
77 The American, Austrian, Belgium, British, Dutch, European, Finnish, French, Japanese, Latin 
American, Spanish, and Swedish Banking Associations, as well as the major international associations 
such as the IIF, ISDA and the Financial Roundtable -  to name a few -  were all unanimously opposed 
to the capital charge o f 20%, with some suggesting a significant reduction to others demanding it be 
abolished altogether; regulators from Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Argentina, Mexico, Thailand, the 
US, Europe, Iceland, Korea, Finland, Guernsey, Hong Kong, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, India, Saudi 
Arabia and Chile had all made specific objections to the proposed operational risk charge saying that 
the figure was not going to be workable within their respective jurisdictions. These were submissions 
made during the CP 2 deliberations. Refer BCBS (2001a)
78 Pillar 2 of Basel II incorporates the supervisory review o f capital requirements specific to banks 
within national jurisdictions. The effects of Pillar 2 are discussed later in this chapter.
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Thus, whilst the BCBS welcomed input from private industiy on ways 
to improve the capital framework, it was ultimately the impact of the 
proposals advocated by private industry that would eventually cause internal 
disagreements and divisions between the BCBS members, most notably 
between the EU and the US. As Tarullo argues, the underlying problem that 
has marred the Basel II process from the beginning is the lack of any strategic 
clarity by the BCBS members on the desired outcome for Basel II. Unlike the 
first Basel Accord, which was based on a pre-determined bilateral agreement 
between the US and UK, the Basel II process began without any clear 
proposals from any of the BCBS members (Tarullo 2008). As a result, the 
process has been significantly influenced by the domestic prerogatives of the 
BCBS members.
In the case of the EU, one major consideration for European 
regulators throughout the Basel II process has been the simultaneous process 
of negotiating the revised EU capital adequacy directive (CAD) (Tarullo 
2008). Furthermore, the Europeans are also said to rely less on ad hoc 
interactions with banks as is characterised in the UK and US regulatory 
systems and more on external audits of bank compliance with capital 
standards. As a result “regulators from the continental European countries 
had a dual incentive to seek more, rather than less, detail in the Basel 
arrangement (Tarullo 2008: 118). On the other hand, for the US rules-based 
system where international agreements adopted by the US are automatically 
incorporated into domestic legislation, the onerous details and increased 
requirements for capital was also a serious threat to US regulators. The 
capital requirements being proposed were not only increasingly incompatible
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with the risk practices and profiles of the US banks but the US regulators 
were also coming under increasing pressure from the US Congress on the 
impact that the new Basel II requirements would have on their domestic 
constituencies (read US banks) (Tarullo 2008).
Disagreements and domestic political differences are not unique in 
any international negotiation. The consensus decision rule in the BCBS 
committees was the key factor for what one BCBS official called the inevitable 
‘horse-trading’ among members for essentially what went in and what stayed 
out of Basel II79. It was in the author’s view, no coincidence that the inclusion 
of operational risk in Pillar 1 under the Dutch Chairmanship of Tom de 
Swaan occurred at the same time as the increasing pressure from the US 
regulators for the BCBS to adopt the IRB methodologies. When the IRB 
methodologies were adopted under Chairman McDonough, the adoption of 
the operational risk charge was, it appeared, a strategically targeted ‘offset’ to 
appease non-US members. There were further disagreements between 
members concerning the impact that the new proposals would have on 
capital levels, even after the final Basel II framework was released in 2004. 
This was evident when the BCBS reluctantly supported another round of QIS 
exercises, referred to as QIS 4, where only a number of countries namely the 
US, Germany and Japan undertook their own national field test exercises. As 
stated by the BCBS, “several member countries decided to conduct a further 
national impact study or field test during 2004 or 2005. These exercises did 
not represent a joint effort of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
and the details varied significantly across countries” (BCBS 2004b).
79 Based on confidential interviews conducted in 2006.
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However, despite the negotiations, what is evident in the case of Basel 
II is that it has, in effect, appeased the European regulators’ need for detail. 
Basel II has become a complex set of rules that is over 347 pages long, 
compared to the 30 pages of requirements under the original Basel I Accord. 
This over-complexity and the associated compliance costs for banks have in 
many ways offset the advantages gained from the capital incentives produced 
through the adoption of internal models80. The increased prescriptiveness 
and complexity led to the US’s decision to not only delay full implementation 
of Basel II for all its banks but also for its subsequent decision to adopt ‘Basel 
IA’. The US not only allowed many of its smaller banks to continue applying 
the Basel I rules, but also developed their own less complex version of Basel 
II that was considered more appropriate for their institutions. As the former 
Governor of the federal Reserve Susan Bies stated "Basel IA is intended as an 
option for the wide range of institutions that will not be adopting the 
advanced approaches of Basel II...The goal is to improve the Basel I 
standards by making them somewhat more risk sensitive while at the same 
time retaining a relatively simple and straightforward approach suitable for 
all but the largest and most complex institutions." (US Federal Reserve 2006)
80 One of main criticisms o f the international banks was that the new rules would impose a significant 
increase in compliance costs associated with implementing, monitoring and adhering to the new Basel 
II rules. For instance, the costs associated with implementing the advanced approaches have been 
argued by the banks to outweigh the supposed ‘reductions’ in capital that advanced banks are said to 
benefit from. For example, the HF argued that “the compliance costs associated with implementing the 
new capital framework are expected to be extremely large. Here banks refer specifically and only to 
the personnel and information technology costs associated with building global internal rating systems 
within a defined period o f time (two to three years).” The Financial Services Roundtable also 
reiterated in significant detail the costs of implementing Basel II for their members, arguing “the 
monetary cost of complying with the Basel II rules will be significant. One of our members has 
estimated that initial costs will be USD 70 million to 100 million just to implement the system, plus 
multi-million dollar ongoing costs. If one multiplies these costs by the thousands of banks around the 
World, this will amount to many billions of dollars of additional costs.” Credit Suisse also estimated 
that “the precise additional cost of Basel II will no doubt be in the hundreds of USD billions for the 
banking community. If the benefits / risk mitigation number do not reach these figures, Basel II will 
have failed”. Comments found at the BCBS CP2 and CP3 submissions.
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The question that remains is why have the European BCBS members 
been able to include more of these details, despite US opposition and 
eventual ‘defection’ from the agreement? The simple answer is that the EU 
has been able to exercise considerable power over the Basel II policy process, 
through the BCBS committee structure. Simultaneously, the EU members 
have been able to do this due largely to the way in which the interests of the 
five US regulatory agencies81 responsible for bank regulation have been 
fragmented throughout the Basel II process. This has weakened the ability of 
the US to present a ‘united’ front on proposals.
The EU’s power over the institutional structure and policy process of 
the BCBS stems largely from the way in which EU members have dominated 
the committee and sub-committee structure, where key positions are 
occupied by regulators from the EU. This study has proposed that another 
mechanism for regulators to successfully impose constraints is through the 
decision structure. For instance, the current Chairs of the four main BCBS 
committees are from the EU82. As discussed earlier in this chapter, Chairs 
and BCBS members also have an incentive to make sure that regulators from 
their domestic agencies are included in each of the sub-committees. The 
consequence of the sheer number of EU members means that each sub­
committee would also correspondingly consist largely of EU members. 
European regulators have therefore been able to include more detail in Basel 
II based on their domestic CAD prerogatives, primarily through the policy 
revision process.
81 The five agencies responsible for banking regulation in the U S are the Federal Reserve, the 
Treasury, the Office o f  the Comptroller o f  the Currency, the Office o f  Thrift Supervision and the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
82 Refer to current BCBS organisation chart found at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/organigrarn.pdf.
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As there were often no obvious solutions for many of the complex and 
technical issues that arose as a result of extensive deliberation with industry 
and other regulators, the various sub-committees responsible for different 
issue areas (largely populated by European regulatory staff83) would 
incorporate solutions that EU regulators had already discussed at the EU 
level of deliberation for the purposes of the CAD. These proposals were then 
fed through the sub-committee chain, also largely dominated by European 
regulators, who would already be familiar with the solutions put forward by 
their respective working group members. Consensus on this basis was 
therefore much easier to achieve, due largely to the fact that the EU 
regulators were for the most part familiar with solutions that had already 
been agreed to for the purposes of the CAD.
This however was markedly different in the case of the US regulators. 
As Tarullo argues, the disagreements and inconsistencies between the five 
major US regulators have been the major stumbling block for the ability of 
the US to influence the direction of Basel II. Despite the fact that the 
adoption of IRB methodologies was primarily championed by the US, Tarullo 
argues that there were considerable disagreements between the agencies on 
whether the US banks and banking supervisors were feasibly able and ready 
to adopt the new approach. The House Financial Services Committee also 
went so far as introducing a bill requiring the agencies to develop a unified 
position on Basel issues, giving the US Treasury the default position if they 
could not determine one (Tarullo 2008:120).
83 For example, refer to current BCBS organisation chart found at
http://www . bi s. org/bcbs/organi gram .pdf. The current Chairs o f the four major sub-committees are 
from the EU.
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As a result therefore of the EU’s power over the policy process and US 
disunity, there was in accordance with one BCBS official a ‘blocking minority’ 
where if a number of members -  which would include a combination of 
either the US, UK, France, Germany and Japan -  were unified in their 
opposition to a particular issue, that this would alone veto the issue outright 
or send it back to the sub-committee drawing board84. This process was 
continued, such that each Basel II output became a patchwork of ad hoc 
policy proposals incrementally built into the overall framework. This is by far 
the most overarching criticism made by the banks (particularly from the US) 
that have argued that Basel II has been marred by an enormous and complex 
set of rules and requirements, qualifications for the ability to use different 
methodologies and differing charges for different portfolios -  all in the name 
of making Basel II more ‘risk sensitive’ and better aligned to market practice. 
The US decision to develop Basel IA was testament to this criticism. The 
consensus decision rule and the associated policy processes caused extensive 
delays in producing revised consultative papers, which would build in 
cumulatively more and more detail in order to appease predominantly the 
European regulators of the BCBS. It took on average two years for the BCBS 
to revise each consultative paper and release it for further consultation.
The Basel II process of revision has therefore been highly influential in 
the way in which it has affected policy outcomes. Internal divisions within 
the Committee would trigger continual rounds of policy negotiations within 
the sub-committees that would take into account various and competing 
norms in order to produce outcomes that could be agreed to by the BCBS 
members, regardless of whether the end product was technically feasible or
84 Based on confidential interviews conducted with the BCBS in 2006
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not. The Basel II policy process became the causal mechanism between the 
initial acceptance of IRB models, to the eventual adoption of other norms 
that served to counter the capital incentives gained by the large international 
banks. Even though the BCBS had a strong demand for the private 
methodologies in order for the BCBS to produce a more risk-sensitive capital 
framework, the impact of these proposals on member jurisdictions ultimately 
gave rise to internal divisions, which would then be played out through 
various revisions and ad hoc policy proposals.
One problematic aspect of the Basel Framework is that it is very 
difficult to categorically call it an ‘outcome’ because even at the time of 
writing, Basel II is still being changed, amended, and moulded in response to 
various factors8s. It is a moving target and one in which has been susceptible 
to various influences, including pressure from private industry. In fact, critics 
have argued that the BCBS had no strategic direction in mind when 
undertaking the Basel II exercise and a lot of the cognitive frameworks 
produced resulted from the various different sub-committee working groups 
and their own internal consultation processes. As Tarullo argues, “the 
cumulative effect of so many alterations was helpful neither to the 
committee’s credibility nor to the coherence of its proposals...Committee 
members seemed aware of the effects of their activities but were apparently 
unable to change course” (2008:114).
85 The BCBS released their final ‘Basel II Enhancements’ in July 2009 in response to the weaknesses 
revealed by the global financial crisis. The capital requirements are also undergoing intense revision at 
the time o f  writing and is a key agenda item for the G20 and the Financial Stability Board. See BCBS  
website press release on 7 September 2009 http://www.bis.org/press/pQ90907.htm
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4 ’3 Conclusion
The BCBS and its important capital framework Basel II has involved a high 
degree of private influence, by way of the BCBS openly engaging with 
industry and its subsequent adoption of market generated methodologies as 
part of its revised capital paradigm. As an important stakeholder, input from 
the industry has been actively sought by the BCBS through its deliberation 
and QIS field exercises. This information has been extremely important for 
the numerous revisions to the capital requirements and to the internal model 
methodologies, which created capital incentives for the large international 
banks. However, at the same time as the BCBS’ intention of producing capital 
incentives, the BCBS has also built in elements into Basel II that reduce these 
incentives and in some instances increase the capital levels. The result of 
these competing influences is that the Basel II framework has not only veered 
somewhat indiscriminately towards the version that we see today, but these 
same competing pressures, in conjunction with extraordinary events such as 
the global financial crisis, continue to influence the evolution of Basel II. 
Private discursive influence therefore is important but, within the wider 
context of international banking regulation, is only a part of a more complex 
international policy framework.
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5
The International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
and the ‘included exclusion’ of Private Observers
The International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) has become an 
integral part of the global architecture for the regulation of insurance firms. 
Like the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the IAIS’s 
headquarters are based at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in 
Basel, Switzerland and is recognised by insurance regulators around the 
world to be a key international standard setter for its industry. Alongside the 
BCBS and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO), the IAIS is also the third peak body of the Joint Forum for the 
regulation of conglomerate firms86 and, like its two peers, the IAIS’s 
standards and principles are used as the blueprint for assessment under the 
joint International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank Financial Sector 
Assessment Programs (FSAP)8?.
However, unlike its two major peers, little is known about this 
organisation despite its mandate and standing in international standard- 
setting circles. This relative obscurity may be due to the fact that it is a 
comparatively new international standards organisation, established only in 
1994. What is more interesting about this organisation is how different it is 
compared to its nearest neighbour the BCBS. In fact, the IAIS is unlike the 
BCBS in many ways, including its size, its broader mandate and most
86 For information on the Joint Forum, refer to http://www.bis.org/bebs/iointforum.htm
87 For more information on the FSAP, refer to http://w w w .im f.or g/extemal/np/fsap/fsap.asp
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importantly, its membership profile. These differences have contributed 
significantly to the way in which the IAIS has interacted with private actors 
and consequently, the type of private influence evident in the case of the IAIS.
As a result of the unique circumstances that surrounded the 
establishment of the IAIS, this chapter argues that there has been a high 
demand by regulators for private material resources and technical expertise. 
The material resources of private actors were used by the regulators of the 
IAIS to secure its initial and continued viability as an international 
organisation. As a result, private actors gained important concessions in the 
form of membership, information and access to decision making forums. The 
IAIS also sought the technical expertise of private industry in order to 
develop international standards at a relatively rapid pace. As already 
outlined, the IAIS was a relatively new standard-setting organisation and in 
comparison to its nearest peer, the BCBS, it was also some way behind in 
producing comparable international standards.
Nevertheless, despite this supply and demand of private resources and 
capabilities, this chapter finds that demand for private material resources 
and technical capabilities dropped once the material viability and the 
international standing of the IAIS was secured. When this occurred, 
regulators of the IAIS (or IAIS ‘Members’) put in place institutional 
constraints that structured their interaction with private actors as well as 
restricted their access and input in to decision forums. This is because certain 
regulators of the IAIS (namely from the European Union (EU)) perceived 
that their authority was being undermined by the participation of private 
actors in ‘regulatory’ forums. Other considerations such as political pressures
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generated by the development of the Solvency II project in the EU (Solvency 
II) were also factors that led regulators to create the ‘included exclusion’ of 
private actors. As a result, this chapter shows that like the case of the BCBS, 
the IAIS has also been a case of both capture and constraint, resulting from 
high demand but a corresponding increase in perceived threat from private 
industry.
5.1 High dem and, low  th rea t: th e  in troduc tion  o f O bservers and  
cap tu re  in  the  IAIS
The establishment of the IAIS and the supply and demand for private 
resources
The relatively humble beginnings of the IAIS have played a significant role 
not only in the way in which the organisation has evolved but more 
importantly for the way in which its relationship with private actors 
developed. The circumstances of being a relatively new international 
institution charged with the task of developing standards in a comparatively 
new field of insurance regulation gave rise to the IAIS’s need for material 
support and technical resources, which ultimately paved the way for private 
actors to fulfil.
The IAIS was formally established as an international standard-setting 
body in 199488. It has regulatory representation from 180 jurisdictions and 
formal membership is granted only to insurance regulators and supervisors 
who become active participants in the organisation’s activities. This means 
that only regulators of the IAIS are granted decision making power through
88 For more information see website w w w . iasbweb.org
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the right to vote on outcomes. Members must pay an annual fee which forms 
the majority of the IAIS’s budget. However in addition to this membership 
base, information on their public website also states that “Since 1999, the 
IAIS has welcomed insurance professionals as Observers. Currently there are 
more than 100 Observers representing industry associations, professional 
associations, insurers and reinsurers, consultants and international financial 
institutions.”8? In fact, the vast majority of those industry Observers originate 
from the G10 and include the world’s largest insurance companies such as the 
American Insurance Group (AIG), Allianz AG, ING Group, Munich Re and 
Swiss Re?0.
The IAIS’s rationale for introducing the new membership category 
‘Observers’ was to promote “sound insurance markets and to contribute to 
financial stability around the world” by making sure that its standards had 
sufficient ‘buy-in’ by all relevant bodies -  relevant bodies being both 
regulators and firms which ultimately implement them. Thus, in the words of 
the IAIS, membership is “open to all those who are not regulators but who 
are interested in contributing to the work of the IAIS, for example insurance 
companies, insurance brokers or accounting firms.”?1
A brief examination of how the IAIS came about goes some way in 
explaining why Observer members were invited to participate in IAIS 
activities. Ten years prior to the formal establishment of the international 
body, a small number of insurance regulators from around the world started 
to attend the annual meetings of the National Association of Insurance
89 From the IAIS website ‘About the IAIS’ http.V/www.iaisweb.org/index.cfm?pagelD=28
90 For lull list o f  Observers refer IAIS website http://www. iaisweb.org/index.cfm?pageID=417
91 From the IAIS website ‘How to Join’ http://www.iaisweb.org/index.cfrn?pageID=29
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Commissioners (NAIC) in the United States (US) for the primary purpose of 
exchanging information with the US insurance commissioners on cross- 
border transactions and exchanges^. Aside from the NAIC meetings, there 
were no other forums in which insurance regulators around the world could 
interact and potentially cooperate. In the years leading up to the inception of 
the IAIS, international participation in the NAIC meetings continued to grow, 
and by 1989 regulators recognised the need for a more formal international 
association separate from that of the US and began pushing for an 
international forum of their own93. The most obvious and logical choice for 
locating such an organisation was alongside the long standing banking 
standard-setter and under the wings of the BIS.
However, unlike the resources available to the G10 central bankers 
which made up the BCBS at the time, the initial financial backing of the IAIS 
was much less stable. The BIS agreed for instance to provide space for the 
IAIS’s permanent Secretariat at its headquarters in Basel but since 1994, 
these offices have been located in the basement adjacent to the main tower 
where the BIS and BCBS staff are located. In fact the IAIS headquarters were 
often sarcastically referred to as ‘the car p ark ’94. In addition, the BIS also 
agreed to subsidise the IAIS with ‘support in kind’ by providing its conference 
facilities within the BIS, hardware such as computers and furniture and its 
internal systems (such as processing staff payroll). Aside from this support, 
there has been no other direct financial support given to the IAIS from the
92 From an internal IAIS newsletter in 2003; this newsletter is for Members only and is not available 
for public viewing.
93 Based on confidential interviews with a long standing member of the IAIS who had been involved 
with the IAIS since its inception in 1994; all references to confidential interviews with Members of 
the IAIS refer to one or more of the 16 Members interviewed for this study between 2006-2009
94 These comments were confidentially made by non-IAIS officials and also observed by the author 
directly; it should also be noted that renovations are currently underway so that the increasing number 
of staff can be housed at the BIS; however this does not guarantee that the IAIS staff will be moved.
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BIS95. As a consequence, the financial viability of the organisation rested 
entirely on membership contributions and donations of staff by member 
regulators to work for the Secretariat through external secondments, which 
meant that they were paying for these staff in addition to their membership 
fees96.
This was an uneasy financial foundation for IAIS for two main 
reasons. Firstly, insurance regulators at the time had much less budget to 
spend on activities outside their own jurisdictions compared to their 
wealthier banking and central bank colleagues (and arguably still do to date). 
Subsidising an international organisation meant less public funding to spend 
on domestic regulation. Secondly, because of the way in which the US 
insurance market and regulations are structured, the LAIS was predominantly 
funded by the US. To elaborate, the US is not one of the IAIS’s 180 
jurisdictions but over 50 of the member jurisdictions. This is because each 
state in the US is sovereign when it comes to insurance regulation. 
Consequently, because the US was treated as over 50 members, it was also 
paying for over 50 membership fees and hence largely supporting the 
organisation’s funding base.
However, paying 50 membership fees did not in return grant the US 
50 voting rights. Instead, the NAIC9? - an umbrella organisation for each of 
the US state insurance Commissioners - was given the right under the IAIS’s 
By-Laws to designate up to a maximum of 15 of its members “who may
95 Based on confidential interviews with a long standing member of the IAIS
96 Confirmed in interviews with Members of the IAIS.
97 The NAIC has itself had a large standardisation challenge of its own, trying to align the insurance 
regulations of all its states which have historically varied. Based on interviews with the NAIC.
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exercise their rights to vote”98. There was apparently no science to the exact 
figure of 15 votes but was considered a proportionately fair number relative to 
the overall number of members at the time99. However, the author presumes 
that it is not coincidental that the number of EU members in 1995 was exactly 
15100, hence the proportionately fair 15 votes granted to the NAIC.
The US jurisdictions as well as the other member jurisdictions were 
therefore always conscious of the funding structure versus the voting 
structure of the organisation. This created some tensions between the ways in 
which the United States of America and the ‘united states’ of Europe 
approached regulatory matters. The most immediate tension that arose from 
the conception of the IAIS came from the US’s vocal support for the LAIS to 
not only consult with private industry but to have private industry directly 
involved in the LAIS’s activities, the argument largely centring on the need for 
market practitioners to buy-in to the LAIS’s standards101. However, the reason 
for the US’s strong support for the idea of private market participation again 
goes back to the special nature of the US State Insurance Commissioners.
For a start, the Insurance Commissioners are quite different from the 
prudential regulatory authorities that are predominant in most of the other 
IAIS member jurisdictions. Unlike the statutorily independent regulatory 
authorities, the US Insurance Commissioners are elected by popular vote, or 
appointed by elected officials such as the Mayor’s or State Governor’s
98 IAIS By Laws Article 6 (4) found at http://www.iaisweb.org/index. cfm?pageID=45
99 Based on confidential interviews with a long standing member o f  the IAIS.
100 Member States at 1 January 2005: Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, Greece, Spain and Portugal. N ew  Member States: Austria, 
Finland and Sweden. See the EU Gateway website http://europa.eu/abc/historv/1990-
1999/index en.htm
101 Based on confidential interviews with a Member o f  the IAIS.
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office102. Hence, the Insurance Commissioners are much more aware of 
electoral outcomes and arguably their perspectives are much more highly 
politicised. They are also in effect politically accountable to their private 
industries and in some US states, the reason is evidently clear. These 
insurance markets are some of the largest not just in the US, but in the world. 
California for instance ranks as the sixth largest insurance market behind 
Japan, the UK, France, Germany and Italy103. California is then followed by 
New York, Florida and Texas in terms of the volume of total premiums 
written10*. As a result, the US Commissioners have a significant interest in 
making sure that their industries are heard.
Past allegations and incidences involving State Insurance 
Commissioners accepting large campaign contributions from regulated 
insurance firms have also further tarnished the perceived independence of 
these US Member jurisdictions. For example, according to a review by the 
non-profit, non-partisan Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights 
(FTCR), Louisiana Insurance Commissioner J. Robert Wooley received over 
$577,000 in campaign contributions from the insurance industry between 
2003 and 20041Q5. In 2003 the Oklahoma House by a vote of 95-0 voted to 
impeach Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner Carroll Fisher on the basis of 
corruption, neglect of duty and incompetence including “improperly solicited
102 This does not imply that statutorily independent authorities are not susceptible to political 
pressures. It is only to emphasise the fact that statutorily independent authorities are not elected by 
popular vote and hence are not susceptible to electoral pressures or electoral cycles.
103 Based on direct premiums written in US$ million. These figures were derived from confidential 
documents given to IAIS Members based on Swiss Re December 2006 figures, however similar 
reports and statistical information can be found at the Swiss Re website. For example, refer Swiss Re 
publication ‘World insurance in 2006: Premiums came back to "life"’ found at
http://www.swissre.coni/pws/research%20publications/sigma%20ins.%20research/world insurance i 
n 2006 premiums came back to life.html
104 Ibid
105 Article found at
http://wvvw.democraticunderground.eom/discuss/duboard.php?az=view all&address= 132x2096828
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monies for a charity he established from entities he regulates”106. In 2006 
Mississippi Insurance Commissioner George Dale raised approximately 40 
percent of his campaign funds from insurers and others with ties to the 
industry according to a report filed with the Secretary of State's office. 
Mississippi's campaign finance and ethics laws do not prohibit insurance 
commissioners from accepting contributions from insurers or trade 
groups10?. In 2007 Florida Insurance Commissioner stated “''I agree being 
involved in an effort to advance a personal or political cause may be 
misperceived and problematic regardless of its legality". The Commissioner 
drew scrutiny because he raised hundreds of thousands of dollars by 
soliciting donations from the insurance industry108. There were allegations 
made that California Insurance Commissioner John Oxendine received more 
than $1 million in campaign contributions from small-loan and insurance 
interests10?.
It was no surprise therefore that a number of IAIS Members 
interviewed110 admitted that US member jurisdictions are seen by other 
members of the IAIS to be much more “beholden” (read captured) by their 
private market constituents111. It was therefore largely at the behest of US 
pressure that the idea of private market participation came to fruition. 
However the fact that it took almost 5 years for private Observership to be
106 Senate Journal, First Extraordinary Session o f  the Forty-ninth Legislature o f  the State o f  Oklahoma 
Second Legislative Day, Tuesday, September 14,2004 found at 
http://www.oksenate.gov/publications/senate ioum als/si2004/si20040914x.pdf
107 At least $53,800 o f  the $133,350 that Dale raised in 2006 was donated by insurance companies, 
their political action committees or individuals who say they work in the industry, according to a 
report that Dale's campaign filed Tuesday with the Secretary o f  State's office. Found at, 
http://www.insuranceioumal.com/news/southeast/2007/02/02/76517.htm
108 Found at http://www.sptimes.com/2007/Q4/21 /State/Insurance commissione.shtml
109 Found at http://www.onlineathens.com/stories/121599/opi 1215990Q38.shtml
110 All references to interviewed Members o f  the IAIS refer to one or more o f  the 15 Members 
interviewed for this study; in this instance these Members were not from U S jurisdictions.
111 Based on confidential interview with a Member o f  the IAIS
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instated112 lends weight to the argument that the introduction of Observer 
members was not due so much to US pressure (because if this was the case 
they would have been instated from the beginning) but rather, the 
recognition by other IAIS members that they needed the resources that 
private actors could bring; that is, a private funding source could bolster the 
disproportionate and unstable funding base of the o rg an isa tio n 1^ .
It is known throughout the IAIS that the EU member jurisdictions 
vehemently objected to having private Observers take part in what was 
considered an exclusive public regulatory domain11^ . The ‘openness and 
transparency’ argument of what is largely a US approach to insurance 
regulation was not something that the EU member jurisdictions were used to 
or necessarily advocated. Their different approaches to market interaction 
were the key stumbling block for having the introduction of Observers 
approved earlier; the even-handed voting rights proved to be very effective in 
blocking the US’s push to include private actors. One Member of the IAIS 
argued that Observers would have actually been included right from the start 
had it not been for EU opposition1^ . However the EU jurisdictions, as well as 
most other active participants (such as Australia and Canada) knew all too 
well that the funding base of the organisation was not only disproportionate 
but also relatively weak116. Even though a large amount of funding was
112 IAIS was established in 1994 and states that “since 1999, the IAIS has welcomed insurance 
professionals as Observers.” Refer to IAIS website http://www.iaisweb.org/index.cfm?pageID=28
113 This was confirmed by a senior official at the IAIS during confidential interviews undertaken in the 
2006 who is familiar with the administrative history o f  the organisation. The comment made in 
interview was that Observers were also introduced because the IAIS was able to obtain observer fee 
and this was important because the financial backing and resources o f  the organisation were weak.
This comment was also substantiated by a number o f  other comments made by other members o f  the 
IAIS interviewed.
114 Confirmed in a series o f interviews conducted with Members o f  the IAIS
115 Based on confidential interviews with a Member o f  the IAIS
116 This was confirmed in interviews with different Members o f  the IAIS from different jurisdictions.
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coming from the US, it was still insufficient to fund the activities of the 
organisation. Thus, based on information and inferences made from a 
number of different Members of the IAIS, it became apparent to the author 
that it was ultimately the financial reality that Observers would bring a 
significant injection of funds through membership fees that finally brought 
the EU jurisdictions on board.
What they didn’t envisage however was the flood gate effect of opening 
up membership to private Observers. Initially, only a handful of large 
insurance associations and firms from the US and the EU had joined the 
organisation11?. However other market participants became aware of the 
comparative advantage these firms were receiving as a result of being part of 
the organisations and eventually joined as well. As a result there are currently 
135 Observers listed on the IAIS website118. The controversial nature of 
accepting funds from private actors was not however taken on lightly. Unlike 
the fee criteria for Members of the IAIS, which is now based on a matrix of 
factors that take in to account the size of the jurisdiction’s insurance market 
and the relative Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita wealth of that 
jurisdiction, Observer member fees are flat.
In addition, there were also conditions placed on the acceptance of 
Observer fees. Firstly, Observer fees were not to form the majority of the 
organisation’s funding base. It was confirmed in confidential interviews that 
indeed Observer fees were less than 50 percent of IAIS funding11?. Secondly, 
Observer fees were to be specifically earmarked towards education and
117 Based on the recollections o f  one long standing Member, these were mainly the industry 
associations from the US and the EU
118 At January 2009 http://www.iaisweb.org/index.cfm ?pauelD=417
119 Based on confidential interviews with Members o f  the IAIS; the author can confirm that they are 
less than 50% however the fees do still make up a sizeable portion o f  the total funds.
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training initiatives for the less developed members of the IAIS. The fees were 
not, in other words, to be used for standard-setting activities or initiatives in 
any regard120. Though as one Member noted, “money is fungible and I don’t 
know in reality if that has happened”121.
Material resources via Observer funding has therefore fulfilled a high 
demand from IAIS regulators. Even though Observer fees do not make up the 
majority of the LAIS’s funding base, they do constitute a significant portion of 
the IAIS’s overall funding122. It should however be emphasised that this is not 
the only form of private resource the IAIS has used. It has also extensively 
called for and used the technical resources of private Observers, where 
Observer members are asked to provide technical papers, analysis and 
presentations on given topics. Observer technical input was crucial to the 
IAIS at a time when it was not only lacking in resources to develop the 
quantity of standards needed but also at the pace in which the IAIS standards 
needed to be developed in order to justify the organisation’s viability.
This demand from regulators therefore paved the way for the IAIS 
Members to facilitate capture, through primarily procedural and 
participatory concessions. The following section uses the example of how as a 
result of these concessions private industry Observers have managed to use 
their foothold into the IAIS in order to influence the scope and content of the 
IAIS Common Structure for the Assessment of Insurer Solvency (also 
referred to more generally in this chapter as the IAIS Solvency fram ew ork) 123.
120 Based on confidential interviews with Members o f  the IAIS; these conditions are also listed in 
confidential Observer member terms and conditions.
121 Based on confidential interviews with a member o f  the IAIS
122 The exact figures can not be stated for confidentiality reasons.
123 IAIS (2007), Common structure paper for assessment o f  insurer solvency, February, found at
http://www. iai s w eb. org/index. c fm?pa geID=3 7
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Enhancing capture through procedural and participatory practices: private 
Observer access and influence over Insurer Solvency
Due to pressure from both the US and pressure arising from funding issues, 
the IAIS (or largely the EU as well as other non-US member jurisdictions) 
finally agreed to the introduction of private Observers to the IAIS. As a result, 
private Observers have been granted important privileges and concessions in 
return for their Observer fee contributions. Whilst Observers are said to have 
brought with them invaluable technical input as well as being an important 
sounding board for the standards that the IAIS were developing, the IAIS also 
recognised that Observers should also be given more direct concessions in 
return for their membership fees. Such concessions included the right to be 
involved in the official consultation process, receive IAIS papers and have 
access to the Observer area of the IAIS website. However, perhaps the 
greatest concession granted to private Observers was not simply an 
opportunity to provide comments during the consultation phases of 
standards initiatives but more importantly, their direct access to meetings, 
seminars and conferences; that is, decision forums and to decision makers.
The importance of this concession relative to the amount of funding 
provided can not be underestimated. To put such a concession in to 
perspective, one only needs to look at the current membership fee for 
Observers which in 2009 was only CHFi2,500 (Swiss francs) per year (or 
US$12,414 at the equivalent market rates12*). This fee for the likes of the 
largest Group of Ten (G-10) insurance and reinsurance firms and even some 
of the smaller non-G-10 insurance firms and associations is to put in simple
124 http: /7www. i ai s web. or ii/i nde x . c fm? page I D =303: USD1 = CHF 0.9931 at November 2009 from 
Bloomberg http;/7vvww.blooinberg.com.au/markets/currencies/fxc.html
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terms, miniscule. In fact in some cases, it is cheaper than what some senior 
executives would pay for one return airfare to Basel. Thus, most private lobby 
groups would agree that the opportunity to hear developments directly and 
have access to decision makers is significantly more valuable relative to the 
amount of material resources contributed. Furthermore, to have direct access 
to an international forum where numerous decision makers from around the 
world are all centrally located for the duration of the standard-setting 
proceedings would be considered by private lobbyists to be invaluable.
Indeed, it was not unusual to see private Observers already 
strategically located by the coffee tables during mid-session breaks12s. It was 
well-known by most IAIS Members that coffee breaks and lunch sessions 
were some of the most crucial opportunities for private Observers to access 
all decision makers in the one spot. Private Observers would without 
hesitation use these opportunities to air their views and or grievances in a 
more informal setting and conversations would generally focus on 
contentious issues. The Chairpersons of each of the sub-committees or 
Committees would also be strategically targeted, as influencing the decision 
sway of the Chair could play a crucial role in determining decision outcomes. 
Interestingly however, private Observers from specific ‘regions’ would more 
often than not try and target Chairs and Members of Committees who were 
also from their ‘region’. Euro-based private lobby groups for instance would 
be seen in conversation with Members from those same EU jurisdictions. 
Likewise, Anglo-American Observers would similarly target Chairs and
125 This is based on the author’s own observations when attending one of the IAIS’s annual meetings 
in Basel. The author attended meetings for several different sub-committees over a period of four 
consecutive days in 2006.
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Members who were from English-speaking Anglo-American regions126. When 
this observation was posed to one Member of the IAIS, the response was that 
this was not so much ‘domestic’ lobbying happening on the international 
doorstep but rather commonality of ‘language’12?.
Private Observers of course also have access to IAIS meetings and 
conferences which deal directly with standard-setting drafting issues. This is 
very different to the BCBS for instance, which closes the drafting stages of 
standard-setting to all parties, including other non-BCBS regulators and 
private actors. The procedural mechanisms of undertaking deliberation with 
private actors throughout policy development process and increasing the 
frequency of meetings with regulators were proposed in this study as key 
practices used by regulators to facilitate capture. Whilst it is important to 
note that Observers are not formal members and as such have no right to vote 
on issues, Observers have been granted important concessions in terms of the 
scope of their participation and the opportunities they have for technical 
input. According to the IAIS, they are given an opportunity to comment at 
each stage of any consultation process128 including drafting stages that are 
debated and discussed in meetings. Within these meetings, Observers are 
able to convey their views and even raise their objections to issues which are 
discussed by Members.
Their physical presence is also said to have influenced the behaviour of 
Members within meetings. For instance, one anecdotal example given by two 
non-US IAIS Members interviewed was that some of the US Commissioners
126 Including jurisdictions such as Australia and Canada
127 Based on confidential interviews with a Member of the IAIS
128 Based on interviews and confidential policy documents obtained from the IAIS. The author has had 
special privileges obtaining confidential internal documents from the IAIS and hence specific details 
of these documents can not be cited.
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would convey different opinions in meetings where US industry were present, 
as opposed to their views when they were not. Specifically, one interviewee 
argued that even though some of the US Commissioners agreed with the 
views of other Members outside the meeting room walls, they would return 
back to the meeting where their Observer constituents would be present and 
convey a view that was contrary to the one agreed upon with Members and 
favourable to the interests of those Observer constituents. That Member 
argued ‘I know that person well and I know that person doesn’t think like 
that; and it’s obvious that person is aware of which Observers are in there and 
therefore has to change their stance on issues’129. Again, this was seen to be 
the result primarily of their electoral pressures domestically as opposed to 
other regulatory Members who did not have the same political prerogatives.
However, it was also argued by a US Member that certain non-US 
Members were certainly no better when it came to the issue of domestic 
capture. Unlike the more ‘open’ displays of industry favouritism alleged to be 
the case for some US member jurisdictions, the Europeans were said to be 
more ‘covert’ in their domestic favouritism. A specific example given was 
when the US and European Members came to a head over an incident where 
the European Members had told the US Members not to share information 
on a particular issue being debated internally by Members. The US Members 
finally agreed after much debate. However, the US Member then received a 
leaked copy of the confidential document from a European industry Observer 
that one of the European Members had given to their industry covertly. The 
reaction from the Member was “so we waved this around saying ‘c’mon you
129 Based on confidential interviews with a Member of the IAIS
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are blaming us for wanting an open process and transparency but then you go 
ahead and share/leak this info in se c re t’!”^ 0
One of the most prominent examples of the IAIS regulators facilitating 
private capture over standards outcomes was the special treatment given to 
one private Observer, the International Actuarial Association (IAA). The IAA 
is a worldwide association of professional actuarial associations and 
individual actuaries, and was constituted as a formal organisation in 1998 
Actuaries are considered an important stakeholder in the IAIS process 
because in its words, “it uses mathematical and statistical techniques to solve 
problems relating to the evaluation and management of risk, especially in 
relation to financial instruments and the management of financial 
institutions such as insurance companies, pension and benefit plans, 
provident funds or social insurance programs. Actuarial roles may include 
the design and pricing of products; assessing the adequacy or the fairness of 
benefits; establishing provisions; assessing and managing risks; making 
recommendations on financing strategy, solvency and investments; providing 
dynamic financial analyses and financial reporting.”^ 2
For these reasons, the IAA was often asked to present on matters not 
only in open forums but more noticeably in partially open meetings where 
the IAA was the only private Observer in attendance. For instance, the IAIS 
would also often request the IAA to develop technical papers on various
130 ibid.
131 At 1 June 2003, the IAA had 50 Full Member and 24 Associate Member Associations in about 70 
countries, which cover some 35,000 individuals who are full members o f  their association and work in 
around 90 countries. Refer website
http://www.ae tuaries.org/index.cfm?LANG=EN&DSP=ABOUT&ACT=INDEX
132 Refer website http://www.actuaries.org/ABOUT/Brochures/IAA Brochure EN.pdf
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aspects of particular s ta n d a rd s ^ .  In ‘closed’ regulator meetings the IAIS 
would note that the IAA was in the process of developing their own positions 
for their own members on similar issues and that the IAIS should in effect 
‘piggyback’ on these p a p e r s ^ .  Indeed one Member of the IAIS did in fact 
confirm that the IAA had a somewhat ‘special’ status among private 
Observers primarily because of its superior technical proficiency and 
specialisation in actuarial m a tte r s ^ .
The IAA was in fact the only private Observer involved in the early 
stages of developing what is now known as the IAIS Common Structure for 
the Assessment of Insurer Solvency (also referred to in this chapter as the 
Solvency framework) (IAIS 2007). This Solvency framework was released in 
February 2007 and was the culmination of work undertaken formally by the 
IAIS since 1999. It is in effect the official blueprint for the overall IAIS risk 
based approach to the assessment of insurer solvency and informs all of the 
other standards and guidance that the IAIS produces. There was very close 
cooperation between the IAIS and IAA in the initial development of the issues 
contained in the Solvency framework, where the IAIS would present their 
initial ground work to the IAA and vice versa, the IAA would present their 
technical reports to the solvency subcommittee. This close cooperation 
culminated in the IAA forming its Insurer Solvency Assessment Working 
Party in 2002 with the express aim to act “in support of the IAIS” and “assist
133 For example, confidential minutes reveal the IAIS sub committee requested the IAA to develop 
issues such as internal modelling approaches.
134 Based on the author’s own observations in several closed meetings. These meetings took place in 
2006 .
135 Based on confidential interviews with a member of the IAIS
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in the development of a global framework for insurer solvency assessment 
and the determination of insurer capital requirements”186.
The IAA has had a very privileged relationship with the IAIS whereby 
the IAA would be invited by the IAIS solvency sub-committee to present its 
work on solvency issues. Specifically, the LAA’s report, ‘A Global Framework 
for Insurer Solvency Assessment, A Report by the Insurer Solvency 
Assessment Working Party’ which was finalised in 2004 was the result of the 
direct request of the IAIS solvency subcommittee for the IAA to undertake 
work on solvency issues (IAA 2004). The IAA also note that “As part of the 
response of the International Actuarial Association (IAA) to the International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) paper “On Solvency, Solvency 
Assessments and Actuarial Issues - An IAIS Issues Paper”, the IAA offered to 
support the IAIS in developing a solvency framework, consistent with the 
proposals for a new international accounting standard. In partial fulfilment 
of that offer, the IAA is pleased to contribute a report from an IAA Solvency 
Working Party for your consideration”^ .  in fact, work undertaken by the 
IAIS Solvency sub-committee was often put on hold in anticipation that the 
IAA Solvency Working Group would be producing work for the IAIS’ 
consideration. For instance when the Solvency sub-committee were planning 
to commence work on issues concerning internal models, the sub-committee 
agreed that it would ‘make sense’ to see what the IAA produced on this topic 
before commencing its own work188.
136 IAA, Report o f  the IAA's Working Party on Solvency, found at
http://w,ww.actuaries.org/index.cfrn?lanff=EN&DSP—PUBL1CATIONS&ACT-PAPERS
137 Ibid.
138 Based on confidential minutes from 2005 records
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Whilst the IAIS admit that the work undertaken by the IAA would be 
useful in the Solvency sub-committee’s task of setting a framework and would 
be used as background material in the development of capital adequacy 
requirements, key aspects of the IAA’s work has evidently been taken into 
account in the finalised Solvency framework. Elements incorporated into the 
framework include a number of the guiding principles advocated by the IAA 
for the IAIS to use in the overall design of the paper including a ‘three pillar 
approach’ to supervision, principles versus rules based approach, a ‘total 
balance sheet approach’, appropriate time horizons, types of risks to be 
included, the more importantly standardised and advanced approach 
methodologies and risk management and governance (IAIS 2007). The 
Solvency framework also refers to the three ‘levels’ within the overall 
framework, which take into account the three pillars approach of minimum 
capital requirements, supervisory assessment and market disclosures. The 
framework also outlines its principles based approach and incorporates the 
total balance sheet approach, types of risks, appropriate time horizons, and 
the standardised and advanced approaches including internal models. In 
fact, the Solvency framework gives explicit credit to the IAA in its 
introductory section, acknowledging the “ongoing support and input from the 
IAA” (IAIS 2007:11) (refer Table 5.1 for overview).
It is evident that the presence of the IAA as a private Observer at 
decision forums provides them with the opportunity to influence decisions 
(and arguably some like the IAA are even asked to provide their technical 
input into the standard setting process). However, this relationship as well as 
outcomes including the Solvency framework has also been highly influenced
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by institutionalised boundaries created by the IAIS organisation itself. This 
includes the way in which the organisational structure of the IAIS has 
intentionally ‘positioned’ private Observers (including the IAA) in the overall 
standard-setting process, as well as the way in which the organisation has 
generated its own internal norms about the identities of certain actors and 
their associated legitimacy. The remainder of this chapter argues that, in the 
case of the IAIS, we see a deliberate ‘included exclusion’ of private Observers 
such that their access to decision forums is conditional and more often than 
not restricted by these institutionalised constraints. As a result, this influence 
has to a large extent been fundamentally constrained by institutionalised 
barriers which led the Solvency framework to resemble other existing capital 
standards such as Solvency II in the EU, rather than reflect the interests of 
the Observer insurance community.
5.2 H igh dem and, high threat: constraining capture through the  
’included exclusion’ o f private O bservers
Constraining capture: the inner and outer circles o f the IAIS Committee 
structure and the case o f the Solvency framework
Participation in the IAIS standard-setting process has been an important 
concession granted to private industry in return for their monetary 
contributions and, in the case of the IAA, their technical resources as well. 
However, private participation in policy forums can be intentionally 
‘positioned’ so that whilst private actors feel as though they are getting some 
pay off for their resources, ultimately they are excluded from the decision 
making process. In the case of the IAIS, whilst pressure from the US led to 
the inclusion of private actors in decision making forums, counter pressure
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from the EU member countries ultimately led to the ‘included exclusion’ of 
those Observers such that their participation was ‘structured’ to ensure 
ultimate decision and influence over outcomes resided with Members. This 
means that private participation in standard-setting meetings has been 
conditional and in some instances, completely closed to private Observers.
Access to decision making forums and decision makers is an important 
condition for private actors to influence decisions and outcomes. As 
discussed, the IAA has had important influence over the work of the IAIS 
solvency subcommittee as one example, but what about other Observers? 
Access to and participation in decision forums is misleading to the extent that 
they infer both reciprocity between public and private actors and the ability 
for private actors to influence outcomes. Decision forums that allow private 
participation may not allow a free mutual exchange between public and 
private actors and in fact be structured so that private actors are only given 
limited scope and opportunity to influence decisions. Participation therefore 
may very well depend on how public actors permit private actors to 
participate.
This can be seen in the IAIS. It is no accident that Observers are not 
‘Members’ of the IAIS and as such they have a very different role and status 
within the organisation. More importantly, this difference between Members 
and Observers has been reinforced institutionally, which can be illustrated by 
four features of the IAIS Committee structure. Firstly, whilst members may 
join, vote and take part in all committees, Observers can be excluded from 
meetings if Members deem public discussion on an issue as ‘in a p p ro p ria te ’^ .
139 From confidential internal IAIS documents.
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Secondly, where meetings are open, formal protocols apply such as seating 
arrangements and rules concerning the active input of Observers. Thirdly, the 
Chairs of Committees are given significant powers to determine the scope of 
Observer participation and the amount of consultation that is deemed 
appropriate for that Committee. Access rules therefore may vary across the 
numerous committees and sub-levels of each committee. Finally, when 
Observers are given access to make their contributions by way of formal 
presentations and or through the consultation mechanism, Observers often 
do not know if or how their contributions have been taken into account. 
Taken together, the institutional boundaries created do not allow Observers 
to stand on equal footing with Members and act to constrain full participation 
and input from private industry.
Beginning with the first of these important institutional constraints, it 
is neither surprising nor controversial that only regulators are allowed to be 
Members of committees and therefore given free reign in terms of their 
participation and voting rights. Even private Observers would agree that this 
is inevitable. What Observers do fundamentally disagree with however is the 
ability of Members to restrict Observer access to crucial drafting sessions and 
standard-setting meetings where the initial formation of ideas is 
undertaken1*0. The IAIS has in fact developed an internal policy statement 
for Members and Observers which outlines the scope and conditions of 
Observer participation in IAIS activities1*1. Whilst in principle the IAIS 
maintains that its Members will seek to consult with and obtain the views of
140 This was confirmed in interviews with several Observers from both the US and the EU
141 This is a confidential IAIS document and cannot be cited for this reason.
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Observers at each stage of the standards development process, there are 
significant caveats which act to counter this principle.
One of the most important is the rule that allows Members to close 
access to meetings which are deemed ‘inappropriate’ for public discussion. 
Examples given are matters that fall under confidentiality and privacy laws or 
those dealings that are specific to the internal workings of the organisation 
However, the rule also states quite clearly that it is not intended to be limited 
to the circumstances listed and hence can simply be closed because Members 
decide that the matter should not be publicly discussed1^ 2. One Observer 
stated that a reason frequently given when an issue or meeting is closed is 
that “this doesn’t concern you, this only concerns regulators” which was 
argued by the Observer as being ‘demonstrably false’ and defeating the 
purpose of having Observer input in the first pi ace ^ 3. Even one Member 
confidentially admitted that “it is reasonable to say that it’s not clear why 
some of the sub-committees are closed, because what is discussed in that 
meeting is not that confidential...”J44
What is more interesting is the case of the ‘partially open’ meeting. At 
first glance, a partially open meeting to an Observer would be more 
preferable than no participation at all. However, ‘participation’ is again 
structurally conditioned to allow only Observers to join meetings before or 
after Members have conferred with each other in private. Far from allowing 
Observers to take part in mutual discussions with regulators, Observers are 
often invited to make their verbal contributions in the time slot allowed and
142 ibid
143 Based on confidential interview with an IAIS Observer
144 Based on confidential interview with a Member of the IAIS
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then asked to leavers. As one Member noted, “[in these cases] they just hope 
that their comments will be taken into account but they have no way of 
knowing if their comments have done anything or not...”1*6 Regulators will 
then close their doors and conduct private discussions based on what was 
presented and Observers will indeed have no way of knowing if their 
‘contribution’ actually mattered until drafts are released at the very later 
stages of formal consultation. As one Observer argued “we have run up 
against circumstances where our input has been systematically ignored, even 
though it has been solicited, and as a process theoretically supposed to 
provide”1*?.
The reason both Chairs and Committee Members might come to the 
conclusion that meetings should be closed or partially open is said to result 
from the concern that regulators may not be able to engage in frank 
discussions with the knowledge that industry Observers are also there taking 
note of every word said1*8. From the author’s observations, certain Observers 
attended meetings not to make their view known so much as to take down 
detailed notes of what was being discussed in order to disseminate these 
discussions to their industry participants1*^ . The other reason is said also to 
stem from the concern that regulators may not want Observers in meetings 
because in some cases regulators have been criticised by their respective 
industry Observer for not taking a particular line that would be favourable to 
their ‘national’ interests160. Therefore there is recognition by regulators that
145 This was both observed by the author and also confirmed by a number of interviewees
146 Based on confidential interview with a Member of the IAIS
147 Based on confidential interview with an IAIS Observer
148 Based on confidential interview with a Member of the IAIS
149 From meetings attended by the author in February 2006
150 Ibid
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sometimes Observers might not necessarily contribute to the ‘regulatory’ 
prerogative, but instead act to push their vested interests which is argued to 
be unwelcome in a regulator’s domain^1.
On the other hand, many meetings are also open to Observers and 
their input is actively sourced. Within these meetings Observers can take part 
in all parts of the discussion and actually ‘observe’ all the debates first hand. 
However, these meetings again are not ‘open’ in a sense of ‘unstructured’. Yet 
another crucial structuring of Observer participation is the formal rule that in 
order to further maintain the institutional distinction between Members and 
Observers, Observers must be seated separately in meetings^2. The internal 
policy statements even indicate the type of seating arrangements that are 
best, generally following the rule that Members are to sit within the inner or 
main table of the meeting and that Observers must sit behind the Members in 
the outside circle or chairs^s. it is evidently difficult to engage in discussions 
with Members if you are not included as part of those discussions and almost 
‘relegated’ to the back of the room. This seating arrangement rule however 
was not always in place and was only introduced recently because “[certain] 
members were squeamish about sitting with Observers...Members wanted 
more formal protocol for their authority”. Moreover, Members wanted the 
formal separation of seating in order to “always reinforce the notion that no 
matter what...the ultimate decision always resides with regulatory 
M em bers”^ .  It was soon evidently clear in discussions that “generally
151 Ibid
152 This was also directly observed by the author
153 Based on confidential internal policy documents of the IAIS
154 Based on confidential interview with a Member of the IAIS
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speaking, European Members were the ones most opposed to open 
seating”^ .
Furthermore, to make matters more difficult for Observers, Observers 
are not actually allowed to make any unsolicited contributions to any of the 
discussions generated by and among Members. Instead, Observers are only 
allowed to make comments when the Chair formally asks them to do so^6. 
Whilst in theory Chairs would try and do this at regular intervals of the 
meeting, Chairs are sometimes too preoccupied with balancing the dynamics 
of their Members and facilitating agreement between them to realise that 
Observers are also there waiting to make their views known. Based on the 
author’s own observations, Chairs would more often than not only solicit the 
views of Observers after Members have already engaged in lengthy and 
somewhat heated debates over issues and had come to some form of 
consensus. The Chair would then solicit comments from Observers who, by 
this stage, would have limited means of objecting or contributing given that 
Members have already come to some agreement on the m atter^ .
Observers therefore are given fairly uneven and sometimes restrictive 
access to drafting sessions and decision making meetings. Their input in to 
these meetings can as a result be minimal, which means that Observers often 
must then resort to making more formal written comments in the 
consultation periods offered for each draft standard. Even though IAIS 
protocols stipulate that Observers’ views should be gathered at each stage of 
the standards development process, Committees are only required to
155 Ibid
156 From confidential internal policy documents of IAIS
157 Based on observations made by the author who attended meetings in 2006
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undertake at least one round of formal consultation prior to the adoption of 
standards. This means that if meetings have been closed, partially open or 
‘open’ in a restricted sense, Observers are often left with access to only one 
window of opportunity to make their views known which is open for either 30 
or 60 days^8.
However, these formal consultations only occur at the very last stages 
of drafting which means that by that stage, Members have invested a 
significant amount of time deliberating over the fundamental structure and 
principles of the standard, leaving little room for Observers to change the Trig 
picture’. As one Member confidentially noted, “the amount of change that 
takes place in the papers in the very final round of consultation which is the 
one Observers then participate in is pretty s m a l l . . T h i s  was because the 
most important stages of deliberation usually occur in the drafting and 
decision meetings where “the committee considers every single aspect of each 
standard [and] things do get considered for a reasonable length of time”160. 
One Observer also agreed, arguing that even though they have been able to 
get changes through, they were the “less important changes” and that most 
importantly, “it shouldn’t be that [members] have already bought in to 
something before you have the opportunity to comment”161. The greatest 
concern for this Observer was that “if the comment process only starts at the 
11th hour after everyone has worked on these things then what does it really 
mean in practice? It’s great to have a comment period and all, but not so
158 Confirmed in interviews with several IAIS Members
159 Confidential interview with a Member of the IAIS
160 Ibid
161 Confidential interview with an IAIS Observer
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great if already psychologically people have bought into things. That’s why 
open meetings are so important”162.
Private Observer access to standard-setting meetings and to decision 
makers is certainly not as unfettered and lucrative as Observers would hope 
for. The result of closed, partially open and ‘structured’ open meetings as well 
as Chairmanship discretions is that access rules are very different from 
committee to committee. This is reflected for example in a scheduled list of 
meetings held by the IAISl63; out of 27 meetings that had been scheduled 
across numerous different committees, sub-committees and working parties, 
13 had been deemed ‘not open’ or ‘partially open’16*. The ramification for 
Observers if a meeting is deemed closed or even partially open, is the 
recognition by one Member that “it’s difficult then obviously for Observers to 
provide their contributions in these [formative discussions] because there is 
nothing for them to observe...”l65
Furthermore, the compositional membership structure of committees, 
the total number of committees across various standard-setting issues and 
their numerous sub-working group layers make it very difficult for Observers 
to exert their influence consistently. The IAIS has four overarching 
Committees and then another 15 sub-committees across a number of 
different issue areas. In addition to this it also has another two task force 
groups to review IAIS work (refer Figure 5.1). Some have even argued that it 
is because of the IAIS organisational structure where “no-one [can] exert
162 Ibid
163 The scheduled meetings were from 2006-2009
164 Based on confidential internal documents of the IAIS; there could potentially be more closed and 
partially open meetings than this figure because some o f these meetings are annual meetings where a 
number of meetings take place simultaneously.
165 Ibid
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over-proportionate influence...because so many people get a say” that 
standards can not be developed quickly enough let alone implemented166. 
Thus the committee structure prevents the domination of any one 
jurisdiction, which is argued to be necessary sometimes in order to “get 
things done”16?. The fact that the solvency work took over 7 years to complete 
is also testament to the structural impediments associated with committee 
processes and decision consensus.
166 These comments came from a Member and from other international organisations
167 Ibid
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This study proposed that by limiting or structuring private 
participation, or undertaking limited deliberation with private actors in the 
latter stages of the policy development process, regulators could significantly 
constrain capture. The effect of these institutionalised constraints can be 
clearly seen in the case of the work undertaken by the Solvency 
subcommittee. Specifically, these constraints had a significant affect on the
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way in which privileged Observers such as the IAA could influence outcomes. 
For example, whilst work on issues related to solvency began in 1999, the 
solvency subcommittee meetings were not opened to Observers until June 
2005. It was evident from confidential minutes that from 2002 Observers 
wanted more input into such an important issue area, with the Solvency 
subcommittee consequently acknowledging that it would need to give 
Observers more of an opportunity to provide comments on certain papers 
and to make the activity of the subcommittee more “transparent”168. As a 
result the subcommittee agreed to make past minutes of meetings available 
to Observers via their access to the website, but participation in meetings was 
still not opened. More importantly, access to past minutes was also 
significantly qualified by the Chair’s request for Members to review the past 
minutes to see if there was “anything sensitive they would wish to delete”16?.
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the IAA was one of the only 
Observers invited to attend these closed Solvency meetings. However these 
invitations were for the IAA to present its technical reports and material for 
specific agenda items only and were not general invitations to join the 
discussions that took place within the subcommittee1?0. Details of records 
show that the IAA would only be there for the time slot allocated for their 
presentation and the remainder of the meeting would then be for Members to 
discuss what had been presented to them. However the real impact that this 
structured interaction with the IAA and more generally Observer exclusion 
had was that from 1999 to 2005 the important groundwork for developing 
the Solvency framework was heavily influenced by its Members. Specifically,
168 Based on confidential IAIS Solvency sub-committee minutes of meetings from 2002
169 Ibid
170 Ibid
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an important process that was occurring simultaneously during this period 
was the EU’s reform of Solvency I which was the original set of solvency 
margin requirements that had been in place since the 1970s1?1. This 
coinciding process meant that Members from the EU had a vital interest in 
ensuring that the IAIS principles were consistent with the reform direction 
that the Solvency II project1?2 was taking. For instance, when the Solvency II 
project was officially launched in 2002, the draft report of the preliminary 
principles was sent to the IAIS and emphasis was placed on the need to have 
consistency with the IAIS work and more importantly “convergence of 
insurance solvency standards”^ .
Members from the EU were also reporting back to the subcommittee 
on the changes in their respective solvency regimes as a result of the Solvency 
II proposals. Whilst there was significant discussion around whether the IAIS 
framework should adopt the ‘three pillars’ approach being proposed by 
Solvency II, it is apparent from confidential records that because the 
Members from the EU were heading in that direction under the Solvency II 
banner that the IAIS had little choice but to follow. In July 2004, the 
European Commission (EC) had published the “Framework for Consultation” 
which set out the core policy guidelines and principles that the new Solvency 
II regime would incorporate. By this stage all of the main principles outlined 
in the EC’s Framework paper were being discussed for the IAIS Solvency 
framework, including the detailed guidelines around the very important issue
171 Refer to the EU website
http://ec.europa.eu/intemal market/insurance/solvency/background en.htm#iulv2007
172 It became clear during the Solvency I process that a more fundamental and wider ranging review o f  
the overall financial position o f  an insurance undertaking was required, looking at the overall financial 
position o f  an insurance undertaking and taking into account current developments in insurance, risk 
management, finance techniques, international financial reporting and prudential standards. This 
project became known as Solvency II.
73 Based on confidential IAIS Solvency sub-committee minutes o f  meetings from 2002
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of technical prov isions1^ .  After extensive deliberation, the EC had almost 
finalised its directive by 2005, and following completion of the consultation 
process, the Commission adopted the Solvency II Proposal in July 2007^ 5.
The timing of this process is significant because by the time the IAIS 
had essentially ‘bought-in’ to the same underlying principles as Solvency II in 
2005, the solvency subcommittee had at that point opened the meetings to 
Observers. However not only had a lot of the groundwork been undertaken 
by Members, this Observer participation was then only partially opened to 
parts of the meetings and furthermore was determined by the Chair when 
drafting the agenda. In the meetings opened since 2005, Observers have only 
been able to attend for one agenda item only, where Observers would be 
invited to present their views and comments, as opposed to engaging in 
active dialogue with Members. To reiterate the frustrations of one Observer 
from the US “it shouldn’t be that [members] have already bought in to 
something before you have the opportunity to comment”1?6.
Moreover, the timing of the final release of the IAIS solvency structure 
paper in February 2007 and the EC’s release of Solvency II in July 2007 is 
not coincidental. According to a long standing solvency subcommittee 
member, the subcommittee was adamant that it had to release its paper 
before the EC published Solvency II so that it didn’t look like the IAIS was 
‘piggybacking’ on the EC’s work1??. Regardless of the perceptions, the two 
frameworks contain fundamentally the same structure based on the ‘three
174 The guidelines and principles on technical provisions are for the most part also contained in the 
IAIS solvency structure framework
175 Refer to EU website
http://ec.europa.eu/intemal market/insurance/solvencv/background en.htm#iulv2007
176 Based on confidential interview with an IAIS Observer
177 Based on confidential interview with a Member o f  the IAIS
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pillars’ approach1?8 and the same underlying principles (refer Table 5.1 for 
comparisons). This was according to one long standing Solvency 
subcommittee Member “inevitable” given the emphasis on the need to have 
harmonised principles and standards across global reg im es1^ .  Thus, as the 
Solvency case shows, private participation in the IAIS is not free and 
unfettered but in fact structured so that private Observers are only given 
limited scope and opportunity to influence outcomes. Observers are therefore 
not given the consistent opportunity or means to exert their influence over 
outcomes in the various stages of the standards development process, 
exemplifying the procedural and structural constraints designed to capitalise 
on private capabilities as well as at the same time ensuring that regulators are 
able to exert their authority over outcomes.
178 Three pillars of supervisory assessment, minimum capital and public disclosure
179 Based on confidential interview with a Member of the IAIS
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Table 5.2 Comparison of Solvency regimes
IA IS  S o lv en c y  F r a m e w o r k E U  S olv en cy  I I IA A  G lo b a l  S o lv en c y
Fram ew o r k  Level 1 -  Su per v iso r
MUST HAVE ADEQUATE POWERS
Su per viso r y  po w ers -  A rticle 3 4
Fram ew o r k  Level 2  -  Regulatory  
Re q u ir e m e n t s
A robust and risk sensitive solvency 
regime
Financial requirements appropriate 
to the type of risk
Risk characteristics and 
components
Total balance sheet approach
Valuation and market consistency
Determination of current estimate
Role of technical provisions and 
capital
Underwriting risk in technical 
provisions and capital
Asset-liability mismatch risk in 
technical provisions and capital
Time horizon for calibration of 
technical provisions and capital
Capital requirements and 
diversification between risk factors
Cost-of capital approach and 
percentile approach for the 
determination of the technical 
provisions
Use of standardised and more 
advanced approaches, including 
internal models
Governance Requirements
Market Conduct Requirements
Q uantitative  Req u ir em en ts
General principles of supervision 
-  Article 2 8
Own Risk and Solvency 
Assessment -  Article 4 4
Valuation of assets and liabilities 
-  Article 73
Technical provisions - best 
estimate Articles 7 5 -7 8  and 
Articles 8 0 - 8 4
Technical provisions -  Articles 
74-84
Calibration for minimum capital
General provisions for Solvency 
Capital Requirement -  Articles 
1 0 0 -1 0 8
Value at Risk (VaR) measures
Standard formula and Internal 
Models -  Articlesi0 2 -1 2 4
System of Governance -  Articles
4 1 -4 9
Capital  Re q u ir em en ts  
/ S olvency  Asse ssm e n t
Key components of risk 
and types of risk
Total Balance sheet 
approach
Role of capital 
Underwriting risk
Market risk -  
asset/liability mismatch 
risk
Appropriate time horizon
Appropriate risk 
measures
Risk Measures
Standardised, Advanced 
and Internal Models 
methodologies
Corporate Governance
F ram ew ork  Level  3  - S u pervisory  
a sse ssm e n t  a n d  inter v en tio n
Public disclosure and transparency
Su per viso r y  Po w er s  a n d  
Su per v iso r y  Rev iew  P rocess -  
A rticles 3 4  a n d  3 6 ; Capital  A d d - 
On s - A rticled  3 7
Public Disclosure -  Articles 5 0 -5 5
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Why the regulatory threat? EU institutional norms, US fragmentation and 
the perceptions o f regulatory ‘credibility’
One question that arises in the case of the IAIS Solvency framework is why 
were EU regulators able to influence the framework based on Solvency II 
prerogatives? More generally, why has structured participation come about? 
Pressure from the US led to the inclusion of private actors in decision making 
forums, but why was counter pressure from the EU member countries 
successful given that the US was highly critical of closing access to 
meetings?180 There are two main reasons that led to the ‘included exclusion’ 
of Observers such that their participation was ‘structured’ and these reasons 
are closely tied to the nature of the European and US regulatory systems. 
Firstly, US Members neither agreed to the structuring of Observer 
participation, nor did they oppose the EU push to have more formal protocols 
in place. According to officials interviewed, the US Commissioners did not 
take an active interest in the activities of the IAIS in the early stages of the 
organisation’s work. Their reasons were that it had nothing to do with their 
domestic political considerations. Devoting time to an international 
organisation, which in the eyes of domestic electorates, had nothing to do 
with their own insurance activities, was a primary reason why the US 
Commissioners were said to be less than interested in participating in the 
IAIS’s work181.
Instead, this was left to the representative body, the NAIC, to form 
opinions on behalf of the US State Commissions. However, unifying the 
interests of vastly different US state insurance commissions (with limited
180 Based on confidential interviews conducted in March 2006.
181 Ibid
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interest in international developments in insurance regulation) was said to be 
logistically difficult. This logistical difficulty it seemed had more to do with 
the internal coordination processes between the NAIC and the US state 
Commissions, which weakened the US’s ability to present its interests in a 
unified manner. According to confidential sources, despite the concerted 
efforts of the NAIC to alert and advise the US Commissioners on the 
importance of the work being undertaken by the IAIS, they were according to 
the official simply “not on the same page” when it came to matters outside of 
the their state jurisdictions182. It was, according to officials, the outcome of 
the IAIS Solvency framework, which US Commissioners recognised was 
almost entirely based around the EU Solvency II project, which jolted the US 
Commissioners to take a much more serious interest in the work of the IAIS. 
They realised they had much more at stake and that the work of the IAIS 
would ultimately impact their domestic prerogatives1^ .
It was therefore fragmentation of US interests, as well as US domestic 
political apathy, which in effect allowed the EU Members to dominate not 
only the development of IAIS standards but also, the internal norms of the 
organisation that were largely influenced by EU protocols. What was 
explained as perhaps one of the more fundamental barriers to Observer 
influence was the acute awareness by regulators of what can be described as 
peer credibility and the institutionalised distinctions made between Members 
and Observers. This institutionalised distinction and emphasis on the 
identity of ‘regulators’ was largely influenced by the more formal distinctions 
and identities generated by the European regulators. Specifically, the EU
182 Based on confidential interviews with officials in March 2006.
183 Ibid
221
regulators have played a pivotal role in influencing the way the IAIS has not 
only developed as an organisation but also for the way the IAIS has created 
internal norms and identities, the most evident being the distinctions 
between ‘Member’ and ‘Observer’, largely as a result of the fact that EU 
regulators felt their authority to be compromised with private industry 
participation in what was considered a ‘regulatory’ policy domain.
There was for instance an evident distinction between the ‘European’ 
and ‘Anglo-American’ regulatory identities amongst the more dominant IAIS 
Members18*. The former was referred to as much more conservative and 
consequently had a much greater preference for hierarchical relations with 
industry than the more open and transparent styles of the Anglo-American 
regulators. The hybrid blend of open, closed and partially open meetings in 
the IAIS is testament to this regulatory ‘culture clash’ between the two 
dominant styles. However what in principle bound these two identities 
together was the internal identity generated by the IAIS itself, and that is the 
institutionalised distinction between ‘Regulatory Member’ and ‘Private 
Observer’. Based on the author’s observations of meetings and numerous 
interviews with various Members, the identification that a Member was a 
regulator created an expectation of behaviour or the way in which you were 
supposed to construct your views and apply your decisions because of who 
you were. This was often then further accentuated by the fact that as the 
national representative at an international forum, Members appeared to be 
even more acutely aware of their place as a regulator amongst other
184 According to the author’s own observations in meetings as well as confirmation from many IAIS 
members who were not from the EU or from the US.
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international regulators and as a result, perhaps more conservative in their 
views than they would otherwise be in their domestic jurisdiction.
The identities of private Observers were also largely understood by 
Members by virtue of their distinction as those obviously representing private 
industry interests. They too were expected to behave in a certain way and 
Members had predefined expectations of the types of comments they would 
receive from those Observers based on their affiliation and industry mandate. 
Comments were often made in this regard, where specifically Members 
‘already knew’ what Observers would say “because that’s what they’re paid to 
do”l8s. The expectation of Observer behaviour went so far as Members 
knowing which Observers were normally the more ‘verbal’ ones in meetings 
and which Observers provided written comment insteadl86.As a result, one 
Member explained for instance that in open meetings, Members are acutely 
aware and even reluctant to accept Observer contributions because they are 
also aware of the potential criticisms that await them from their fellow 
regulators18?.
Observers are said to be very frustrated about this at times because 
they are given no reason or explanation for why their contributions were not 
taken in to account. They are, if lucky, simply told that their contributions 
were “noted -  no change required”188. As one Member admitted, “perhaps 
the IAIS Observers have a legitimate concern that they are not listened to as 
much as they like...”l89 Another Member explained that whilst peer credibility 
is important, it also boiled down to the fact that Members simply did not
185 Based on confidential interviews with a number of IAIS Members
186 Ibid; also observed by the author in meetings
187 Based on confidential interviews with a non-EU IAIS Member.
188 Ibid;
189 Based on confidential interviews with a Member of the IAIS
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agree with the views of Observers. The message given to Observers is “we 
hear you, but we don’t agree with you”1®0.
This was said to be even more acute in the case of certain Observers 
who were recognised by all regulatory circles as ‘known lobbyists’. In these 
instances, regulators were even more reluctant to take the views of these 
lobby groups on board simply because they knew that these representatives 
were being paid to push a certain vested agenda. Being seen by fellow 
regulators to be supportive of these lobbyists’ views would in the opinion of 
one Member jeopardise your own credibility and professional integrity1®1. 
Thus, even though Observers are invited to these open meetings where 
technically they are supposed to provide their input in to discussions and 
debates, it is very difficult for them to do this freely and of their own accord. 
Instead, Observers are constrained by formal protocols, which served to 
generate perceptions of regulatory credibility which act to impede their 
influence over the formation and development of standards and principles.
It was interesting that this treatment was only directed towards those 
who were known or perceived lobbyists. As a general rule, Chairpersons who 
allowed meetings to be opened to Observers must allow all Observers to 
attend however this didn’t always have to be the case. Chairs instead have the 
option to invite individuals with specific expertise, giving those Observers a 
very lucrative captive audience. This was indeed the case for the IAA who 
held a privileged position in the eyes of many IAIS Members because the IAA 
was viewed as objective, non-partisan, technical specialists who could be
190
191IbidIbid
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entrusted to get on with the task of providing technical input without pushing 
a vested agenda1?2.
The distinctions between Member and Observer created by the 
organisation in other words created the expectation that Members would 
behave like regulators and apply a prudential decision framework for the 
interests of the public and Private Observers would behave either like 
lobbyists and exert their industry preferences through direct and indirect 
pressure or in the case of the IAA could be entrusted as ‘technicians’. If 
Members or Observers were to veer from their expected behaviour (for 
instance Members supported the positions of industry or private Observers 
opted for more stringent rules) this would be looked upon with cautious 
suspicion amongst others and judgements would be made about their 
respective ‘credibility’. In the case of Members, this would translate in to 
reputational and professional credibility and for private Observers, this 
would be interpreted as self-interest disguised as ‘public’ interest. The 
problem of course with this is that Members could legitimately be raising an 
industry issue which could impact the greater public interest and Observers 
could legitimately want more stringent standards for greater industry 
stability.
Internal identities created as a result of these institutionalised 
distinctions therefore generated what can only be described as an 
institutionally constructed constraint in the form of ‘peer pressure’ on 
behaviour, and this was in large, very influenced by the formal protocols 
developed by the European regulators. There would be an unspoken pressure
192 Ibid
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for regulators not to be seen to be too sympathetic to the views of industry. In 
the case of some Members who were viewed as being ‘too close’ to their 
respective industry Observers, those Members were in turn earmarked as 
being ‘too influenced’ and consequently regarded by other Members as being 
‘known as cap tu red ’^ .  Observers too had a good understanding of how they 
might come across to Members if they tried to push too hard for their vested 
interests. As one Observer stated “when commenting, I try to advocate other 
ways of doing things rather than just focus on the impact it would have on my 
industry ...”194 This is because this Observer knew too well that they wouldn’t 
have any chance of getting through to standards outcomes if they didn’t at 
least come across as contributing to the solution to a problem. However, this 
too could also backfire on Observers who would always propose the same 
types of solutions which to Members would translate in to solutions that 
would be beneficial for their industry. As one Member explained “[observer 
comments] are given full consideration but if they keep sending them 
through, it won’t do much because the Committee just decides and then 
moves on...”1^
The impact of the access rule on private instrumental influence is that 
it can play a significant role in structuring when and how Observers can 
provide their input on matters that have essentially already been decided by 
Member regulators. The benefit of this for regulators who have used private 
instrumental capabilities for their purposes is that they can simultaneously 
provide the concession of ‘participation’ to private actors without actually 
allowing them to gain any influence over ‘their domain’. The institutional
193 Ibid
194 Based on confidential interview with an IAIS Observer
195 Based on confidential interview with an IAIS Member
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distinction created between Members and Observers farther reinforced the 
separation in boundaries between what is expected of a Member (as a 
regulator) and what is expected from an Observer (as a ‘lobbyist’).
Expectation of behaviour which is created by internal norms and 
identities therefore plays a significant role in the ‘structuring’ of private 
participation. This type of role play contributes to not only the creation of 
cognitive boundaries but also in the action taken to reinforce this separation 
through institutional protocols and access rules. This is even clearly stated in 
the IAIS’s internal policy documents, where even the formal separation of 
seating arrangements is required to “facilitate the distinction between 
Members and Observers”^ 6. This sort of ‘constructed’ separation is not often 
factored into studies on influence, however these institutional boundaries do 
act to fundamentally counter the full impact of private influence on 
outcomes.
Thus, the question that then remains is why private Observers would 
continue to engage in such a structured interaction? In short, the answer was 
access was better than no access to decision forums and that on a ‘cost- 
benefit’ analysis, what private Observers contributed by way of resources was 
minimal compared to the opportunity for private actors to gain ‘face time’ 
with key decision makers. One Observer reiterated this, stating simply that 
“we appreciate the many opportunities we get to comment orally and to 
provide written comments and to participate” but there was no other
196 Based on confidential internal policy documents of the IAIS
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expectations of further concession other than these opportunities for ‘face
time’197.
5.3 Conclusion
The regulators of the IAIS used the material and technical resources of 
private actors to secure the viability of the organisation. In return for the 
resources, the IAIS granted private actors concessions by way of access to and 
participation in decision forums. What is important however is some 
Observers like the IAA had even more privileged access to influence 
standards outcomes such as the IAIS Solvency framework. However, 
regulatory Members, particularly from the EU, also used institutional 
constraints, such as access rules and formal protocols to ‘structure’ the 
participation of private actors so that they would have restricted 
opportunities to influence outcomes. This not only prevented Observers from 
directly influencing decisions, but more importantly, allowed European 
regulators to shape important decision agendas and cognitive frameworks, 
such as the IAIS Solvency framework. However, ultimately the outcome is 
that both public and private actors still benefit from this ‘supply and demand’ 
exchange because public actors can provide face-time opportunities for 
potential influence which is considered by private actors to outweigh the 
minimal cost involved, while private actors can provide their more abundant 
material resources which is considered by public actors to outweigh the 
structured ‘air’ time they need to give in return.
197 Based on confidential interview with an IAIS Observer
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6The International Accounting Standards Board and the 
prudential application of fair value
This study has so far canvassed the issue of private influence in financial 
standard-setting forums that consist primarily of regulators. However, 
financial standard-setting is no longer exclusively undertaken by regulators 
but can also be exercised by entirely private bodies. Perhaps the most well 
known example of this in current academic literature is the high-profile role 
played by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) in the setting 
of international accounting and financial reporting standards. In the case of 
the IASB, these private actors are setting international standards and hence 
influencing outcomes for both their public and private constituents. Instead 
of looking at the role private actors play in using their power to influence 
public actors in the setting of standards, the IASB requires us to look at how 
as a private body, it has influence in a way in which fundamentally impacts 
the regulatory roles undertaken by governments and supervisory authorities.
This case in other words requires us to look at this study’s theoretical 
framework in a slightly different way, by examining whether firstly, a supply 
and demand dynamic can be established between public agencies and private 
‘authorities’; and secondly, whether the same types of institutional practices 
are used by public agencies to enhance the authority of private bodies or, if 
they are perceived to threaten regulatory prerogatives, constrain their 
authority. This chapter argues that evidence can be found to support these
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propositions, namely that there has been a high demand from public 
regulators and agencies for international harmonised accounting standards, 
which the IASB was pivotal in supplying. However, when private authority 
was deemed to undermine the prerogatives of public agencies, institutional 
practices were used to fundamentally constrain the IASB’s standard-setting 
ability.
The empirical case used to support these propositions was the IASB’s 
paradigmatic shift from historic cost to fair value accounting by way of its 
introduction of the fair value option in accounting standard IAS39 (Perry and 
Nolke 2005, 2006). Whilst initially the IASB was seen to provide public 
agencies with an important technical capability that these public agencies 
could otherwise not generate themselves, this chapter also finds that this 
paradigmatic shift has not necessarily occurred without significant 
constraints imposed by public agencies. Specifically, when the development 
of IAS39 began to encroach on the authority of prudential regulators, these 
public actors imposed their own institutional constraints that have curbed 
the full application of the accounting standard. These constraints have meant 
that the application of fair value has not been applied for prudential reporting 
purposes. Consequently, this chapter finds that the IASB can also be shown 
to be a case of high demand from public agencies which has corresponded 
with a perceived threat to regulatory authority, thereby leading to the 
imposition of institutional constraints. It then proceeds to explain why these 
agencies have been able to impose these constraints on the IASB in a 
‘macroprudential’^ 8 world of rule making.
198 For a definition and overview of macroprudential regulation, see the BIS Working Paper
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6.1 High dem and, low th rea t: achieving in te rn a tio n a l
h a rm o n isa tio n  and  the ascendance  o f th e  IASB
The IASB and the demand fo r  international harmonisation of accounting 
standards
The high profile nature of the IASB in recent years as an international 
accounting standard setting body is not so much the result of the work they 
have undertaken per se but rather the private nature of who they are and the 
significant impact their work ultimately has on global financial market 
governance. Indeed, in a relatively short span of time, the IASB (and its 
predecessor the International Accounting Standards Committee -  the IASC) 
has been catapulted to the forefront of international financial governance due 
to the fact that its standards, unlike many other international financial 
standards, are now legally binding in many parts of the w orlds. The 
mandatory nature of the IASB’s international accounting standards therefore 
raises serious questions about the IASB’s legitimacy as an agency of 
governance and its ability to ultimately produce ‘public goods’ for global 
markets200.
The IASB as a ‘private authority’ has attracted widespread scholarly 
attention for varying reasons201, but perhaps the most common reason is 
because of its private nature in conjunction with the significant influence it 
has over determining the financial reports of public companies around the
N o 128 ‘Towards a macroprudential framework for financial supervision and regulation?’ by Claudio 
Borio, February 2003 found at http://www.bis.org/publ/work 128.ndf?noframes= 1
199 For example, the EU (from 2005), Australia (from 2005), Canada (from 2011), NZ (from 2007), 
Russia (from 2011) Turkey from 2006
200 For example, see Mattli, W and Buthe, T (2005a) for discussions on issues concerning the 
accountability o f the IASB.
201 For more general discussions on private authority, refer to Cutler et al (1999)
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world. The international accounting standards that the IASB produces (the 
International Financial Reporting Standards or TFRS’) are now used in 
almost too countries and in some parts of the world, are also legally binding 
through their domestic laws202. Whilst not entirely ‘global’ yet in scope, given 
that one of the most important jurisdictions -  the United States (US) -  still 
maintain their own Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
developed by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the ‘global’ 
structural reach of the IASB is not far off in light of the landmark 
Memorandum of Understanding (the ‘Norwalk Agreement’) reached between 
the FASB and the IASB in February 2006. This agreement is significant as it 
is the first time that the two ‘rival’ standard-setters agreed to “to co-ordinate 
their future work programmes to ensure that once achieved, compatibility is 
maintained.”2°3 It is also significant because it is a very public recognition 
that the work undertaken by the IASB directly impacts the work undertaken 
by the FASB and vice versa. Also, according to the IASB, it also recognised 
the fact that “many national GAAPs are based on IFRSs.”2°4
So how has the IASB been able to reach this position of authority? 
Although this question merits a much more detailed analysis of the various 
factors that have contributed to the rise of the IASB2°5, this chapter focuses 
on the argument that the rise of the IASB coincides with the inability of the
202 Specifically, 75 countries now require all or some publicly traded companies to use IFRSs, 25 
more countries permit public companies to use IFRSs and at least 50 countries require or permit 
IFRSs for non-public companies. IASB presentation: Progress on Adoption, Progress on Adoption, 
Convergence, and Convergence, and Implementation: Survey Results, found at
http://ww'w.iasb.org/NR/rdonlvres/86EBDC8A-5BAE-46EB-8540- 
08F4B65E0146/0/0609W S SConverge .pdf
203 Refer the IASB website, About Us found at
http://www.iasb.org/About+Us/Intemational+Accounting+Standards+Board+-+About+Us.htm
204 IASB presentation: Progress on Adoption, Progress on Adoption, Convergence, and Convergence, 
and Implementation: Survey Results, found at http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlvres/86EBDC8A-5BAE- 
46EB-8540-08F4B65E0146/0/0609W SSConverge.pdf
205 For historic overviews o f  the rise to the IASB, see for instance Katsikas (2006) and Dias (2005)
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US and the European Union (EU) to reach agreement over accounting 
standards harmonisation and what this study argues to be the resultant 
demand for an alternative forum206. The argument put forward by Katsikas 
(2006) for instance centres on the idea that regulators will resort to non-state 
or private transnational governance when they are unable to satisfy domestic 
constituencies through inter-state agreements. By adopting Katsikas’s 
argument, this study proposes that a demand for an alternative forum will 
give rise to a demand for private capabilities.
By way of brief historical background, it was largely the changes that 
resulted in the international financial system in the early 1990s, namely 
privatisation, which led to an increase in the desire for foreign companies to 
list in one of the largest capital markets in the world -  the US. Foreign 
companies recognised the need to tap into this market in order to pursue 
global strategies of expansion and growth (Martinez-Dias 2005, Katsikas 
2006). However, one of the biggest hurdles for foreign companies wishing to 
list in the US for instance was the stark differences in listing and disclosure 
requirements, imposed by the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC).
The US exchanges began to worry that the cost for foreign companies 
to maintain essentially two separate financial accounts -  for its home 
jurisdiction and for the US requirements would eventually be too prohibitive 
and the benefits of listing on the US exchanges would soon be lower than the 
costs. As a result, regulators within the US and the EU began to face 
increasing pressure to harmonise their accounting requirements to facilitate
206 See for instance Katsikas 2006 who refers to the notion of ‘forum shifting’ derived from 
Braithwaite and Drahos (2000).
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their cross-border activities (Martinez-Dias 2005, Katsikas 2006). In the US, 
pressure on the SEC came mainly from the American stock exchanges seeking 
to capitalise on the demand for foreign listings. The European Commission 
(EC) also felt pressure from primarily the major European firms, especially 
German and Swiss-based enterprises, who began to unilaterally adopt US 
GAAP and International Accounting Standard (IAS) standards in the mid- 
1990s (Martinez-Dias 2005). The EC adoption of US GAAP was considered 
politically unpalatable, where the “unilateral export of US GAAP would be 
labelled “accounting imperialism” and was unacceptable to the European 
Commission” (Martinez-Dias 2005: 15). The US was also opposed to 
harmonising their GAAP system based on the IAS, which they believed to be 
under-developed compared to their standards (Martinez-Dias 2005).
It was therefore essentially the relative ‘neutrality* of the then obscure 
London-based standard-setter which appeared to offer the contending 
regulatory agencies a solution to their deadlock over harmonisation. There 
was, in the words of this study’s framework, a very high demand for an 
international accounting standard-setter that was based neither on the US 
nor EU system of accounting. The LASC therefore provided a politically 
palatable and alternative source of technical expertise which both sides of the 
Atlantic would be willing to comply with.
The IASC also capitalised on this demand from regulatory agencies by 
building better networks with domestic accounting agencies and eventually 
by transforming itself “from a collegial, private interest association...to a 
hierarchical centralised international organisation” (Donnelly 2007: 118). 
The IASC was initially set up in 1973 as an overarching private international
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organisation representing professional accounting bodies from Australia, 
Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. This organisational base however was 
eventually considered by the IASC itself as too limited and in 1999 it set out 
to restructure and reposition itself as a much more global standard-setter, 
with the specified aim to gain “support for IASC as the most appropriate 
organisation to play the pivotal role in the development of a single set of 
global standards.”20? As a result, in March 2001 the IASC Foundation 
(IASCF) was established as the parent entity of the “independent, privately- 
funded accounting standard-setter”, the IASB.
Political pressures and the need to satisfy domestic constituencies lead 
to the high demand from both US and EU regulators for what essentially the 
IASB could offer -  a set of international standards that companies on both 
sides of the Atlantic could use as the basis for global reporting. This study 
also argues that regulators not only had a demand but utilised important 
institutional tools to secure the rise and prominence of the IASB and the 
ability of the IASB to develop internationally accepted standards.
Enhancing the IASB’s capture o f international accounting standards: 
institutionalised endorsement o f International Accounting Standards
One important factor which has led to the endorsement of IASB authority is 
the role public agencies and other international organisations have played in 
legitimising its governance role208. States and regulatory agencies for
207 Recommendations on Shaping IASC for the Future: A Report o f  the International Accounting 
Standards Committee’s Strategy Working Party Recommendations to the IASC Board, November 
1999, found at http://archive.iasb.org.uk/uploaded files/documents/8 210 swp rep.pdf
208 For a more detailed discussion on why public actors may delegate authority to private authorities 
see Mattli and Buthe (2005a)
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instance have played a crucial role in legitimising the authority of the IASB’s 
technical supremacy by institutionalising the standards in to domestic law. 
The most significant endorsement given to the IASB (and its predecessor the 
IASC) has no doubt come from the EU when EU members were required to 
adopt its accounting standards though namely the Fourth and Seventh 
Directives20^
However, more significantly is the recent and more explicit 
recognition given to the IASB by the EU in the form of Regulation (EC) No 
1606/2002 adopted in 2002 where from 2005, “all listed EU companies 
(including banks and insurance companies) must prepare their consolidated 
financial statements in strict accordance with LAS.”210 Many other states have 
also followed suit including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Russia, and 
Turkey to name a few211. Furthermore, and according to the IASB, several 
more large jurisdictions are on their way towards making IFRS legally 
binding as well212. Most notably, India announced that IFRS will be 
mandatory in India for financial statements for the periods beginning on or 
after 1 April, 20 ii213. As one IASB Board member acknowledged “one of the 
really interesting, unique features of this international organisation is it is a 
private organisation whose product is being embraced by governments all
209 Directives found at Europa portal http://europa.eii/scadplus/leg/en/s70001 .htm
210 Regulation found at Europa portal, http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/eiidvb/126040.htm
211 Australia (from 2005), Canada (from 2011), NZ (from 2007), Russia (from 2011) Turkey from 
2006
212 Confidential interview with a IASB Board Member conducted in 2006
213 Refer the Institute o f  Chartered Accountants o f  India (ICAI) announcement ‘Convergence with 
IFRS From 1st April 2011, Where We Stand as on 02-02-09 - (05-02-2009)’ at
httn://www.ieai.org/categorv.html?archive=&c id=219&page=l 5
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around the world...I mean, I think its amazing that so many governments are 
basically abdicating a sovereign responsibility to a private organisation...”21*
In addition to endorsement at the state level, the IASB has also been 
embraced by international organisations as a core part of the ‘global 
architecture’. For instance, the IASB standards are one of “the eleven key 
‘issue’ areas for governance” from which the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank base their Financial Sector Assessment Program 
(FSAP) and Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs) 
surveillance2^ . Recognition that the IASB is not simply a private interest 
body but is in fact undertaking a more ‘public’ role has also been widely 
acknowledged by the wider regulatory community. The General Manager of 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) for instance has argued that the 
global policy orientation towards fostering financial system stability 
encompasses not only the roles played by macro prudential regulators such 
as central banks and prudential supervisors but is also a framework which 
“naturally goes hand in hand with global financial reporting practices” 
(Knight 2004). As he further explains, “sound and internationally 
harmonised accounting standards are important for a well functioning and 
stable financial system” and that “it is important for overall financial stability 
that accounting and prudential standards are mutually consistent to the 
extent feasible.” (Knight 2004)
214 Confidential interview with one o f  the IASB Board Members, November 2006. References to the 
Board Member interviewed in this chapter refers to only one Member interviewed for this study.
215 Refer the IMF webite http://www.imf.org/extemal/NP/fsap/fsaD.asr); These are namely data 
dissemination, fiscal transparency practices, monetary and financial policy transparency, banking 
supervision, insurance supervision, securities market regulation, payments systems, corporate 
governance, accounting, auditing and insolvency regimes and creditors' rights.
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The “intense efforts” that are under way to establish a common set of 
internationally accepted financial reporting standards (IFRS) are also said to 
reflect “now a broad consensus over their importance for the proper 
functioning and stability of the financial system.”216 Furthermore, like the 
IMF and World Bank, the influential Financial Stability Forum represented 
by the three major financial standard setters the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS), International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) 
has also officially recognised that “alongside core principles for prudential 
frameworks in banking and insurance, accounting standards have been 
included among the 12 standards identified by the Financial Stability Forum 
as conducive to a robust financial infrastructure.”21?
This study proposed that the normative practices used by regulators 
when facilitating capture include instances when norms are not only sourced 
from private actors, but also shaped by private actors. These norms are then 
introduced and adopted by public agencies. Furthermore, it was also 
proposed that public agencies would grant private actors decision making 
authority in order to facilitate capture. As the legitimisation of the IASB 
through domestic legislation shows, public agencies and international 
organisations have indeed not only sourced accounting norms from the IASB 
but they have also allowed them the decision authority to shape these norms, 
which public agencies have then adopted through domestic institutional 
channels.
216
217IbidIbid
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So what are these norms? The official view given by the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines accounting 
standards as methodologies and disclosure requirements for the preparation 
and presentation of financial statements. They are usually developed within 
the institutional and professional framework of a country and promulgated 
by regulatory or professional accountancy bodies. Importantly accounting 
standards may also be developed in harmony with, or as an adaptation of, an 
internationally recognized set of benchmark standards such as the IASB or 
the US GAAP as promulgated by the FASB218.
According to Perry and Nolke (2006) however, accounting impacts the 
lives of everyone in society because accounting is a system for measuring 
economic activity; however the accounting numbers themselves are not 
simply factually objective numbers and recorded after the event, but rather, 
form the basis for such activities in the first place. In their words, “the way in 
which assets are valued and defined is thus a central parameter in socio­
economic relations” (Perry and Nolke 2006: 561). Therefore those in the 
position to shape and define this value and measurement system have 
significant impact over the actions and choices that the economic society can 
make. Mattli and Buthe also reiterate this view, arguing that what may 
seemingly appear “technical”, such standards to the contrary, act to create 
incentives and disincentives “through which they shape the behaviour of 
firms and consequently aspects of a country’s political economy” (2005a: 
400).
218 Refer to OECD site http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=4463
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A further indication proposed in this study that normative practices 
have been used to facilitate capture is when those norms adopted by public 
agencies allow private actors to self-regulate. This has also been seen in the 
IASB’s somewhat controversial shift from its former historic cost accounting 
methodology to one that is based on ‘fair value’. The IASB’s ability to offer “a 
single set of high quality, understandable and enforceable global accounting 
standards that require transparent and comparable information in general 
purpose financial statements”21? is a key point of contention for Perry and 
Nolke because of the underlying basis on which it has formed its new system 
of economic measurement and hence governance. They argue that the “newly 
instituted accounting techniques for defining and valuing business assets, 
chief among them fair value accounting, are integral to the ongoing 
reorientation of the international political economy...the new standards 
represent a shift in power from production to finance.” (2006: 560)
Indeed, the IASB has increasingly based its new global system of 
accounting on the principle of ‘fair value’ -  that is, “the amount for which an 
asset could be exchanged or a liability settled, between knowledgeable, 
willing parties in an arm’s length transaction.”220 What underlies this 
definition is the disputed methodological practice underpinning this ‘fair’ 
amount, which is either a market value of a transaction at today’s prices (as 
opposed to what a buyer and a seller paid at the time of the transaction or 
‘historic cost’ accounting) or, where an asset is not actively traded, a 
simulated model of a market and its value (Perry and Nolke 2006). By relying
219 Refer IASB website
http://www.iasb.org/ Aboiit+Us/Intemational+Aceounting+Standards+Board+-+About+Us.htni
220 IAS39 Technical summary found at http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlvres/339C384D-045B-47D7- 
AA8E-8P26PFA 726FB/0/I AS39.pdf
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on what the ‘market’ sees as the inherent value of an asset, “fair value 
accounting shifts power from managers to markets, which benefits 
shareholders...market-based asset prices do not represent some sort of 
abstract social equilibrium, but rather they represent the actions of marginal 
buyers and sellers, driven by the views of dominant market analysts and 
pundits who do not necessarily make the long-term calculations which reflect 
broader societal interests.” (Perry and Nolke 2006: 566) It allows, in other 
words, those in the market to determine the value of their own assets and 
transactions.
Why has this ‘shift’ occurred? Mattli and Buthe argue that this has 
largely occurred because of the dominance and attraction of the American 
and British capital markets for global business and hence in their words, “it is 
not surprising that Anglo-Saxon experts are central in shaping international 
accounting rules” (2005b: 256). In their view, the Americans and the British 
have arguably had the most extensive experience writing rules for their 
respective national capital markets because these are the largest capital 
markets in the world. Furthermore, they also argue that because stock 
markets have historically been the main source of capital for firms, the needs 
of investors have been the main consideration in the development of 
accounting standards. This is in stark contrast they argue, with the most 
continental European countries where the main purpose of financial 
statements has been for tax assessment purposes and for the protection of 
creditors. Therefore unlike the continental European tradition which is 
“enshrined in tax laws that are the products of democratic political process”,
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the Anglo-Saxon model is one in which “accounting rules result from private- 
sector processes funded by industry” (Mattli and Buthe 2005b: 255-256).
The governance and funding structure of the IASB illustrates how the 
IASB has been able to shift to this paradigmatic shift towards ‘fair value’ 
accounting. The compositional make up of the IASB structure, as well as the 
revenue arrangements which have funded the IASB to date are pinpointed as 
key reasons for the IASB’s push towards the ‘financialisation’ of accounting 
standards (Perry and Nolke 2006). As discussed earlier, in March 2001 the 
IASC Foundation (IASCF) was established as the parent entity of the IASB. 
The IASC Foundation oversees two main bodies, the Trustees and the 
IASB221. The IASB is ultimately overseen by the Trustees of the IASCF and it 
is the Trustees who are responsible for appointing the members of the IASB 
as well as determine its overall strategy and standards agenda. Even though 
the Trustees do not have a direct role in the setting of the accounting 
standards, they appoint those whom they consider the most appropriate 
candidates to undertake the standard-setting role and establish their work 
agenda.
So who are these Trustees? The majority of the IASCF Trustees come 
from the financial/accountancy sectors, which include investment banks (for 
example Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Capital International, Nomura), 
investment firms (for example Omega Capital, CA IB Corporate Finance, 
Uranus Investment Holdings) and accounting/consultancy firms (for
221 The IASC Foundation also oversees the newly Standards Advisory Council (SAC), a forum 
providing the IASB with the opportunity to consult individuals and representatives o f  organisations 
affected by its work and the International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC), a 
derivative o f  the former IASC’s Standing Interpretations Committee (SIC). Refer IASB website for 
more details http://www.iasb.org/About+Us/About+the+Trustees/About+the+Trustees.htm
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example Ernst and Young and Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PWC))222. The IASB 
in comparison is much more evenly distributed in terms of the technical 
background of the Members represented. Their backgrounds as long standing 
accounting standard setters, academics or accountants by trade223 fulfil the 
IASCF Constitutional requirement that “the main qualifications for 
membership of the IASB shall be professional competence and practical 
experience...[and] will comprise a group of people representing, within that 
group, the best available combination of technical expertise and diversity of 
international business and market experience in order to contribute to the 
development of high quality, global accounting standards.”224
However Mattli and Buthe argue that such ‘technical’ expertise also 
reflects again on the measure of Anglo-Saxon influence over accounting rules 
(2005b: 256). When the IASB was formed in 2001, the US, UK, Canada, 
South Africa and Australia together accounted for no fewer tan 10 of the 14 
Board Members and as currently stands, the Board is still heavily represented 
by the Anglo-Saxon world with only 5 of the 14 Members now from non- 
English speaking jurisdictions2^ .
Even though the IASB is recognised for its technical prowess, the IASB 
Board also establishes key working groups that give the IASB “access to 
additional practical experience and expertise”226. According to the IASB, the 
composition of the working group “reflects the diversity and breadth of
222 As at 2007-2008.
223 For the IASB Board Member backgrounds, refer to IASB Members section at
http://www.iasb.org/About+Us/About+the+IASB/IASB+members.htm
224 IASCF Constitution, paragraph 19, found at http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlwes/A3010B6C-3F80- 
401F-BE81 -3 59E1EO15E22/0/Constitutionfinal.pdf
225 As at January 2009 -  the five Board Members from non-English speaking jurisdictions are from 
France (two Members), Sweden, Japan and China.
226 From the IASB Working Groups site at
http://www.iasb.org/Abo ut+Us/About+WTorking+Groups/Working+groups.htm
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interest involved in a particular area. The Trustees’ Procedures Committee 
reviews the proposed composition of each group to ensure that there is a 
satisfactory balance of perspectives.”22? Even though the IASB states clearly 
that it is solely responsible for setting the working group’s mandate and 
objective, and that groups are not asked to develop formal recommendations, 
the IASB can rely significantly on the specific expertise provided by these 
groups. This is because despite their high level of proficiency in accounting 
expertise, they as a group may not be able to know the intricacies of the way 
certain products or transactions are conducted in ‘real life’. For instance, one 
end-user group commented that because products and markets are changing 
dramatically from one year to the next, the IASB Board ‘can not possibly 
know or keep up’ with the technicalities of these products without the direct 
input from those market participants. This was because “there are 14 Board 
members that have been out of the markets for a very long time now -  they 
don’t know how to account for a credit derivative [for example] -  they just 
don’t know because they’ve never seen these products in real life...”228
As such, the Working groups may not make formal recommendations 
per se but the Board can rely extensively on the knowledge inputs that these 
groups provide. One key example of this is the Financial Instruments 
Working Group, which was established to “help the IASB take a fresh look at 
the accounting standard IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement by examining and questioning the fundamentals of the 
standard ...[and] will therefore focus on improving, simplifying and 
ultimately replacing IAS 39 and will examine broader questions of the
227 ibid.
228 Confidential interview with international industry association that represents financial institutions
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application and extent of fair value accounting...”229 It is no surprise that out 
of the 17 members of this Working group, 9 members are from the world’s 
largest investment banking conglomerates and banking associations 
including Credit Suisse First Boston, BNP (now Banque BNP Paribas), 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA), Morgan Stanley, UBS, Hong Kong 
Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), ING, Goldman Sachs and the 
Japanese Banking Association. A further 3 are from the Corporate Treasury 
functions of large international companies23°. In the words of one large 
financial association who regularly provide input into the Working group 
process, “we’re not going to talk about accounting standards...because the 
IASB Board, they know that stuff, backwards and better than anybody else; 
what we’ll go in and talk about is the derivatives business, how its run, how 
portfolios are managed, how risks are offset, how you trade derivatives, and 
that’s the stuff the IASB appreciate the most and it’s the stuff that works in 
terms of getting a decent standard...”^ 1
To the casual observer, this composition of members would be 
expected given the nature of the expertise required to look at the recognition 
and measurement of a financial instrument. In other words, one would 
expect practitioners to be able to provide information about what they 
practice. However, to others such as Perry and Nolke, this composition of 
‘expertise’ only serves to reinforce the ‘selection bias’ of solutions that the 
IASB would ultimately take in to account; that is, the recognition and
229 From the IASB website
http://www. iasb.org/ About+Us/Aboiit+Working+Groiips/Financial+Instruments+Working+Group.ht 
m
230 As at 2007-2008
231 Confidential interview with international industry association that represents financial institutions
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measurement of a financial instrument in accordance with what the large 
investment banks do. In their words,
"we view experts as political actors whose preferences set the ‘technical’ agenda and 
define the range of possible outcomes in a decision process. Expert knowledge is 
always political because it is always acquired in a particular social context, and 
reflects the political-economic structures and social relations which generated and 
which reproduce that context...Therefore, while the experts on the IASB committees 
may be independent in as much as they do not consciously make decisions to serve 
their material interests, the social context in which such expert knowledge has been 
acquired and practised is critical in determining which technical solution of the 
many possible ones is produced.” (2006: 578)
The sources of expertise and the IASB governance structure is also 
compounded by the IASB’s funding structure to date. Based on the statistics 
produced by the IASB in 2006, fewer than 200 companies and organisations 
worldwide provide the IASB with its funds, with approximately 72 per cent of 
the IASB’s funds sourced from corporations (including banks), accounting 
firms and business associations. In fact, corporations and banks currently 
account for 41.5 per cent of funding, compared to just 19.5 per cent provided 
by accounting firms. The IASB have recognised that their current funding 
structure "relying on a small number of voluntary contributions, would not 
be sustainable on a global basis”. In fact, as a consequence of this very narrow 
source of funding, the IASCF announced that it would establish plans for a 
sustainable, broad-based funding system when financing commitments for 
the IASC Foundation expired at the end of 2007. It has subsequently 
announced that it had secured funding from national sources and as at 25 
February 2008, the IASC Foundation had secured £13 million in multi-year,
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annual commitments from country-specific regimes towards a target of £16 
million.
Thus, the fundamental change that has resulted from the IASB’s 
governance over global accounting rules is the shift to fair value accounting. 
The legislative adoption and endorsement of these standards by public 
agencies lead some academics to ask “given the controversial character of fair 
value accounting, and its orientation towards a financial perspective, [...] Are 
the public institutions that are supposed to protect the broader social groups 
impacted, albeit indirectly, by accounting regulation represented anywhere in 
the standard setting process?” (Perry and Nolke 2005: 4)
The following section does indeed locate the role of public agencies in 
constraining the application of fair value when it was perceived to threaten 
their regulatory authority. This chapter finds that as a result of a high 
demand, but corresponding high threat from the IASB’s shift to fair value, 
regulatory agencies (primarily those based in the EU) resorted to imposing 
institutional constraints in the form of norms and decision structures, which 
eventually forced the IASB to concede on aspects of the fair value 
methodology. These practices were used to reign in the IASB’s standard- 
setting agenda, as well as impose new forms of decision authority over the 
IASB and its Trustees.
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6.2 High dem and, high threat: the politics o f  governing carve outs 
and prudential filters
Constraining Fair value: IAS 39, regulatory ‘carve-outs' and prudential 
filters
The interests of the finance industry are closely tied to the fair value option in 
IAS 39 because it effectively promotes and compliments the transaction 
accounting undertaken by the large global banks. In its full application, the 
fair value option has the potential to increase the recognised profits of banks 
thereby boosting its shareholder value. However, the fair value option 
favoured by the finance industry has been significantly amended as a result of 
actions taken by public agencies, predominantly from the EU. This chapter 
has found that macro-prudential regulators - namely central banks and 
prudential regulators - have been pivotal in the IASB’s decision to 
substantially modify the fair value option so that it could fulfil prudential 
purposes -  or, the purpose of protecting the principal beneficiaries such as 
deposit holders, investors, pensioners and the like -  despite the fact that this 
modification was objected to by the vast majority of IAS 39 stakeholders 
(namely banks). They have been able to do this through what this chapter has 
argued to be the imposition of primarily normative practices, where 
regulators have imposed legislative ‘carve-outs’ and ‘prudential filters’ where 
IAS 39 accounting principles are not recognised for prudential measurement 
purposes. This means that regulated financial entities must report regulatoiy 
amounts that are potentially much higher than would be required under IAS 
39 -
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The introduction of the fair value accounting framework began back in 
1998 when the IASB’s predecessor the IASC issued the draft IAS 39 titled 
‘Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement’. The draft IAS 39 
included for the first time the proposal to require fair value accounting for all 
financial instruments. The revised IAS 39 released in 2003 formalised the 
‘Fair Value Option’ for the first time, which permitted “entities to designate, 
at the time of acquisition or issuance, any financial asset or financial liability 
to be measured at fair value, with value changes recognised in profit and loss. 
This option is available even if the financial asset or financial liability would 
ordinarily, by its nature, be measured at amortised cost -  but only if fair 
value can be reliably m ea su red .”232 Furthermore, “once an instrument is put 
in the fair-value-through-profit-and-loss category, it can not be reclassified
OUt”233.
This was indeed a significant move away from existing accounting 
practices, which applied a ‘mixed model’ approach of both historic (or 
amortised) cost and fair value measurement to financial instruments. 
Banking regulators in particular were from the outset fundamentally opposed 
to the standard and the fair value option because in their view “among the 
constituents of IASB, banking institutions can be regarded as the entities 
most affected by IAS 39” (Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
(CEBS) 2004a: 1). This is because the sale of or trading in financial 
instruments were not only the core business of banks, but also because banks 
were applying both historic as well as fair value accounting to their financial
232 Refer Deloitte IAS Plus, IAS Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement” found at
www'. i asplus. com/standard/i as3 9. htm
233 Ibid
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assets and liabilities. Consequently, the most vocal opponents to the fair 
value option were the BCBS and the European Central Bank (ECB).
The BCBS for instance reported its assessment of IAS 39 to the former 
Group of Seven (G-7) Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in 
2000234 and argued that “IAS 39...significantly increases the use of fair values 
in accounting for financial instruments, compared to both the existing 
international accounting standards and most countries’ national standards” 
and more importantly “the provisions of IAS 39 may have a major impact on 
how banks account for financial risks that are hedged” (BCBS 2000b: 2). The 
significant increase in the use of fair values and particularly its impact on 
how banks account for financial risks was considered a serious problem for 
banking regulators because it fundamentally differed in the way in which 
banks were accounting for financial instruments for regulatory purposes. As 
the BCBS set out in their report to the G-7 Ministers, “the approach to 
measuring risk positions in each main area of a bank’s activities -  often 
described as the ‘trading’ and ‘banking’ books -  is a matter of vital interest to 
supervisors” (BCBS 2000b: 7-8). This is because in most countries, banks 
were accounting for their ‘banking books’ and ‘trading books’ in two distinct 
ways -  the banking book at amortised (historical) cost and the trading book 
at fair value. Thus, only items in the trading book were allowed to be fair 
valued through profit and loss (P&L) because as the BCBS categorically states 
“it is well established that for capital adequacy purposes fair value is the 
appropriate measurement basis for the trading book” (BCBS 2000b: 8).
234 The BCBS also made similar submissions to the IASB in 2000 and 2002. See BCBS comment 
letters at http:/7www.bis.org/bcbs/commentletters/commentletters.htm
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However, the revised IAS 39 and the fair value option meant that in 
contrast to this treatment, items which were previously accounted for in the 
banking book at amortised cost could be fair valued through profit and 
loss235. This was considered fundamentally problematic for regulators 
because “under IAS 39, most financial liabilities will be reported at cost [and] 
reporting most liabilities at cost, while introducing more fair value 
accounting on the asset side of the balance sheet is likely to increase the risk 
of volatility in reported earnings and equity that may not reflect bank’s 
underlying risk management practices...” (BCBS 2000b: 4) Even more 
serious for regulators was the potential for IAS 39 to “lead some banks to 
make some changes in how they manage their risks” (BCBS 2000b: 15) or put 
simply, provide incentives for banks to use financial instruments for fair 
value gains reflected in earnings as opposed to managing and hedging their 
risks.
Similarly, the ECB stressed in its submission to the IASB that the 
application of a “full fair value accounting regime (applying to all assets and 
liabilities) to the banking sector gives rise to some serious problems and 
concerns” (ECB 2001: 2). Likewise, the ECB also reiterated that the 
application of fair value accounting “may be suitable for the trading book of 
banks, which refers to transactions (buying and selling) of marketable 
securities and related instruments with the objective of making profit from 
short term price variations. The use of fair value for these transactions is 
consistent with the availability of market prices and the short-term horizon” 
(ECB 2001: 2). However, the ECB also argued that the application of fair
235 Under the new classification o f  ‘available for sale’ -  see IAS39 Technical summary found at
http://www.iasb.Org/NR/rdonlvres/339C384D-045B-47D7-AA8E-8P26DFA726FB/0/lAS39.pdf
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value to the banking book of banks (to non-negotiable instruments such as 
loans) was “inappropriate” because the banking book was inherently 
concerned with longer-term decisions about credit quality and therefore less 
concerned about short-term market variations. Thus according to the ECB, 
“the introduction of fair value accounting for the banking book might in 
principle create incentives for banks to alter their core business” and above 
all “might induce banks to adopt an imprudent behaviour” (ECB 2001: 2). 
The ECB is categorical in its submission that “the ECB has a negative stance 
towards the possibility of applying a fair value accounting regime to the 
banking book of banks” (ECB 2001: 3).
These concerns conveyed to the IASB were reportedly raised by the 
IASB at their February and March 2004 Board Meetings where it had noted 
that it had received “comments from regulators about the permission of IAS 
39 to designate any financial asset or financial liability as one to be measured 
at fair value with changes in fair value reported in profit and loss (the fair 
value option)”236 The fair value option had attracted so much negative 
attention from banking regulators from the outset that one IASB Board 
member confirmed in an interview that “issues” with banking regulators in 
relation to the fair value option made it very difficult for the IASB to proceed 
as intended with the full application of the new regime2^?. Another industry 
constituent also explained quite bluntly in an interview that it was 
fundamentally the BCBS’s (and ECB’s) threat that it would not recognise the 
option at all for regulatory purposes if the IASB did not amend certain things
236 Deloitte, IAS Plus, Discussion at the February 2004 IASB Meeting -  Fair Value Option, notes 
found at http://www.iasplus.com/standard/ias39.htm
237 Confidential interview with international industry association
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that halted the progress towards a final full fair value option in IAS 39 238. For 
the IASB, the regulators threat would have created a very awkward outcome 
for a large section of the IASB’s end-user constituency.
Consequently in April 2004, the IASB issued another revised Exposure 
Draft (ED) of IAS 39 which this time proposed to limit the application of the 
new fair value option to only specified circumstances and to require that the 
option only be applied to financial assets and liabilities whose fair value is 
v e r i f ia b le 239. The amendments, in the words of IASB Chair Sir David 
Tweedie, resulted from “a constructive dialogue with banking supervisory 
authorities...[with] the dual aim of meeting concerns that the fair value 
option might be used inappropriately while continuing to allow companies to 
use the option in appropriate cases to simplify the application of IAS 39” 
(IASB 2004). In the eyes of private industry however, the IASB had 
fundamentally capitulated in the hands of regulators. Given the fact that the 
amendments were made to primarily appease regulators, the ED caused 
widespread disagreement amongst private industry constituents that had 
already conveyed their full support for the unrestricted fair value option in 
the 2003 release of the draft IAS 3924°. Of the 115 comment letters received, 
76 per cent of respondents - all of whom were from the banking and preparer
239 Specifically, the option could only be applied to a) Financial assets and financial liabilities that 
contained embedded derivatives; b) Financial liabilities whose cash flows were contractually linked to 
the performance o f  assets that are measured at fair value; c) Cases when the exposure to changes in 
the fair value o f  the financial asset or financial liability is substantially offset by the exposure to the 
changes in the fair value o f  another financial asset or financial liability, including a derivative; d) 
Financial assets other than loans and receivables; and e) Items that other Standards allow or require to 
be designated as at fair value through profit or loss; from Deloitte IAS Plus summary at 
http://www.iasplus.com/standard/ias39.htm
240 As outlined in the 2004 comment letters found at
http://www.iasb.org/Archive/Archive+IASB+Proiect+-+Comment+Letters.htm. See also Deloitte IAS 
Plus Summary.
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communities - rejected the proposals, disagreeing with the IASB’s move to 
limit the fair value option because of regulatory concerns2^ .
Excerpts from the major international banks illustrate this. For 
instance, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) argued 
that it “does not support the proposals in the ED to restrict the fair value 
option... [and] we do not believe the proposals to limit the use of the fair 
value option address adequately the concerns set out by regulators...”^ 2 
Likewise JP Morgan argue that “In our comment letter dated 30 October 
2003, on the proposed improvements to IAS 39, we agreed with the then 
proposal that an entity should be permitted to designate, irrevocably at initial 
recognition, any financial instrument at fair value through profit or loss (“the 
Fair Value Option” or “the Option”)...although we understand the issues 
raised by prudential supervisors, we believe that explicitly limiting the 
situations in which the Fair Value Option can be used is not the most effective 
means of addressing those issues and may result in restricting its legitimate 
use”243. Merrill Lynch also argued that it “believes that the restrictions... on 
the use of the Fair Value Option will not alleviate the regulator’s concerns 
over volatility in profit and loss. Therefore, Merrill Lynch does not support 
this ED as we believe the Fair Value Option should remain unrestricted”2^ .
Deutsche Bank also points out that “the requirement to disclose ... 
under the fair value option provides adequate information to address this 
concern of the regulators, who under their own mandate establish regulatory
241 See Deloitte IAS Plus (statistics); also the authors own analysis o f  comment letters in the IASB 
archives found at http://www.iasb.org/Archive/Archive-fIASB+Project+-+Comment+Letters.htm.
242 Letter from ISDA, as outlined in the 2004 comment letters found at 
http://www.iasb.org/Archive/Archive+IASB+Proiect+-+Coniment+Letters.htm
243 Letter from JP Morgan; ibid
244 Merrill Lynch Letter; ibid
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reporting requirem ents.”2^  [emphasis added] UBS also protested, arguing 
that “the initial proposal to include the fair value option (without restrictions) 
went through the IASB’s due process. The concerns that the exposure draft 
intends to address were debated in the original amendments to IAS 39, and 
the Board concluded not to restrict the use of the fair value option. We 
question, why the Board has decided to re-open this issu ed 6
Even more controversial was the IASB’s inclusion of the specific 
reference to the oversight of regulators, where it was stated in the ED that 
“For entities subject to prudential supervision such as banks and insurance 
companies, the powers of the relevant prudential supervisor may include 
oversight of the application of these requirements and of relevant risk 
management systems and policies”^ .  Again, not surprisingly, respondents 
opposed such an inclusion in an accounting standard, with the London 
Investment Banking Association (LIBA) for instance arguing that, “references 
to the requirements of prudential supervisors have no place in an accounting 
standard...We would also be extremely concerned if any prudential 
supervisors believed this reference gave them the ability to overrule 
accounting requirements for the purposes of financial reporting; we believe 
the oversight of application of these requirements is a matter for entities and 
their auditors, rather than for their prudential supervisor.”2^  ISDA too 
objected outright to this reference, arguing that “these concerns are outside 
the scope of standard setting and could potentially take the process of 
determining appropriate accounting policy away from accounting standards
245 Deutsche Bank Letter, ibid.
246 UBS Letter, ibid.
247 Deutsche Bank Letter, ibid.
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setters and reporting entities.”2^  Merrill Lynch also agreed, farther 
reasoning that “as regulators have the power to request reports and 
submissions in their own specific format and in accordance with their rules, 
Merrill Lynch feels it is unnecessary for accounting standard setters to 
provide provisions for regulatory oversight within the standards 
themselves. ”2s°
However, if that wasn’t enough, the BCBS -  one of the key 
stakeholders taken in to account in the IASB’s decision to restrict the fair 
value option -  argued in their submission that even though “the IASB has 
attempted to address some of the Committee’s concerns in its current 
proposal on the fair value option”, it did not, in the BCBS’s view go far 
enough. Instead, the BCBS argued that “the fair value option still raises a 
number of significant issues, particularly since the proposal does not appear 
to reduce the possible use of the fair value option” (BCBS 2004d: 4). For 
instance, the BCBS argued that the proposals did not “limit the problem 
associated with the ‘own credit risk issue’, or address ‘reliability’ concerns of 
whether fair values can be obtained directly from observable market prices 
and whether valuation models were robust enough (BCBS 2004d).
Furthermore, the BCBS argued that banks and other companies 
should be required to disclose their accounting and risk management policies 
that underpin the application of the fair value option because the proposal 
“does not require identification of the fair value option, nor the related gains 
or losses for each category reflected in the profit and loss account and in 
equity” (BCBS 2004d: 7). The BCBS did note however that one positive
249 ISDA comment letter, ibid.
250 Merrill Lynch comment letter, ibid.
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aspect of the fair value proposal was for fair value to be applied to both asset 
and liability positions in financial instruments that were managed together 
which would reduce an accounting ‘mismatch’ (BCBS 2004d).
The IASB was, at the end of the 2004 consultation period, facing a 
serious dilemma. At the September 2004 Board meeting, the Board 
considered how it was going to proceed with the project, given that out of 116 
comment letters received, most disagreed with the proposals contained in the 
April 2004 -  including the regulators^1. Even though the overwhelming 
majority of respondents had expressed a preference for retaining the full fair 
value option, it was reported that the Board agreed that it could not revert 
back to the full fair value option because of regulatory resistance^2. Despite 
the IASB’s intention to be ‘independent’ and for all proposals to go through 
appropriate due process, “a general concern was raised regarding the reason 
why a particular constituency's concerns, which appeared contrary to the 
majority's view, were being considered so extensively by the Board. It was 
also pointed out that an overwhelming majority of respondents disagreed 
with the 'possible new approach' and fully supported IAS 39 with the 
unrestricted fair value option.”253 A large industry constituent also conveyed 
their frustrations in interviews, arguing that it was primarily power politics 
and “lobbying from the Basel Committee” that forced the IASB to act on their 
specific concerns. The problem with this was that “the Basel Committee...are 
users of accounts like anybody else...so the IASB [should] have treated them 
like users [but] they didn’t ...”254
251 Refer Deloitte IAS Plus Summaries
252 Ibid.
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254 Confidential interview with large international industry association
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More significantly for the IASB however was the ramification of the 
BCBS’s (and ECB’s) concerns by way of the mounting political pressure that 
was yet to come. In November 2004, when the IASB was still ‘undecided’ on 
how it should proceed with the fair value option, the European Commission 
(EC) announced that it had adopted a Regulation endorsing International 
Accounting Standard (IAS) N° 39 with the exception o f certain provisions on 
the use o f the fu ll fa ir  value option (EU 2004). Specifically, “use of IAS 39, 
apart from the ‘carved-out’ sections, will be legally binding for all listed 
companies in the EU from 1st January 2005.” (EU 2004) The EC’s decision to 
apply the ‘prudential carve-out’ was explained as “based on observations 
from the European Central Bank and prudential supervisors represented in 
the Basel Committee of banking supervisors [which] the IASB took...into 
account when issuing an Exposure Draft in April 2004 limiting the scope of 
the full fair value option. However, the IASB has not yet taken a final 
position on this important issue.” (EU 2004) [emphasis added]
Not only was the IASB therefore facing potential regulatory 
restrictions on the full use of IAS 39, but more significantly, its underlying 
authority to determine the content of their own accounting standards was 
also being undermined. The IAS 39 was the only standard that the EC had 
not fully endorsed, which was a serious enough precedent for the IASB to 
take notice. As the EC explain in their press release “as a general rule, the 
Commission will always prefer full endorsement of international accounting 
standards. However, IAS 39 currently represents an exceptional situation 
caused by particular prudential and technical complexities which have not 
been resolved.” (EU 2004) The EC goes further, adopting a political
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declaration stating “it expects the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) to bring forward the necessary amendments to the current full fair 
value option by December 2004” (EU 2004).
As a result of the EC’s ‘carve-out’ based on the BCBS and ECB’s 
concerns, it did not take the IASB very long to agree to the amendments 
proposed by the BCBS. By February 2005, the revised new approach was 
presented to the Board for approval “in the light of constituents’ 
com m ents”^ .  The urgency to have the amendments go through the due 
process was evident in the IASB’s decision to hold a limited public roundtable 
on the new approach. It was reported that due to “time constraints, only 
certain constituents (approximately 30) would be invited to participate at 
those round-table discussions.” Furthermore, as Deloitte reported “it was 
indicated that some discussions had taken place with representatives of the 
Basel Committee and the ECB during which useful clarifications had been 
made of the concerns expressed previously with regards to the fair value 
option in IAS 39. Those clarifications had been incorporated into the 
redrafted document. The purpose of the round-table discussions was to 
solicit input from other constituents to ensure that the proposal was 
appropriate for all”.256 The IASB therefore was only simply going through the 
motions to get the amendment passed as quickly as possible. As a symbolic 
gesture, it was also reported that three of the IASB Board members had voted 
against the restricted fair value option in protest, but despite this, the new 
amended fair value option would proceed based on a 11-3 voting m ajority^ .
255 Based on the Deloitte IAS Plus Summaries
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In June 2005, the IASB issued its final IAS 39 Fair Value Option 
Amendment. Without exception, all the proposed amendments were based 
on the BCBS’s 2004 recommendations^8. In July 2005, the EC promptly 
“agreed unanimously to recommend endorsement of an amended version of 
IAS 39 relating to the Fair Value Option (FVO) previously carved out.” (EU 
2005) As further stated by the Commission, “after extensive consultation 
with third parties, the IASB published an amended version of IAS 39: 
Recognition and Measurement -  the Fair Value Option (FVO) which 
improves the existing standard. The amended standard benefits from wide 
support, both from the financial services industry as well as from the 
European Central Bank and the Basle Committee of banking supervisors.” 
(EU 2005) The fair value option therefore, did not seem very ‘fair’ at all to 
industry and to their astonishment, this ‘very small constituency’ had got not 
only some of their requested amendments, but almost all.
Regulators in the EU have been the major hurdle for the IASB’s 
preference for the full application of the fair value option in IAS 39. The IASB 
has had to significantly scale back the fair value option in IAS 39 as “a direct 
response to concerns expressed by prudential supervisors of banks, securities 
companies and insurers that the fair value option might be used 
inappropriately” (IASB 2004). However, this was not the only normative 
constraint imposed. The final fair value option amendment attained by the 
BCBS should have appeased the concerns of the banking regulators, given
258 Specifically, the option had been further restricted to only allow fair value through profit and loss 
to a) those instruments classified as held for trading b) where designation eliminates or significantly 
reduces a measurement or recognition inconsistency (“accounting mismatch”) c) those financial 
assets, financial liabilities or both that are managed on a fair value basis in accordance with a 
documented risk management or investment strategy; and d) those that contain one or more embedded 
derivatives. IASB, ‘Amendments to IAS 39’ 2005; IAS Plus Amendment to IAS 39 -  The Fair Value 
Option July 2005 Special Edition; see also IASB IAS 39 Technical Summary
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that the amended IAS 39 restricts the application of the fair value option to 
specified circumstances endorsed by the BCBS. However, for regulatory 
purposes this was not considered strict enough. The fair value option still 
contained outstanding issues that the banking supervisors wanted the IASB 
to include in IAS 39, which the IASB did not implement in its final 
amendment. As a result, regulators in response, led again by the BCBS, 
implemented their own ‘prudential filters’ where the application of certain 
aspects of the amended fair value option would still not be recognised for 
regulatory purposes. More specifically, regulated financial entities -  that is, 
all banks - would not be allowed to recognise certain fair value gains and 
losses in the calculation of their regulatory capital.
One of these outstanding issues for example was in relation to the 
BCBC’s concern that the fair value option, including the amended version of 
2004, did not limit the problem associated with ‘own credit risk’ (BCBS 
2004d). Specifically, the BCBS argued that the fair value option could result 
in gains and losses from changes in an entity’s own credit risk (BCBS 2006) 
and hence strongly urged the IASB to “exclude the mark to market of own 
credit risk from the fair value option by limiting the mark to market of 
liabilities solely to valuation changes due to general market movements...” 
(BCBS 2006: 12) The IASB is reported to have discussed this issue at its 
December 2004 meeting, noting that “significant concerns had been 
expressed about ‘own credit risk’”. The Board also reportedly noted that 
although it “acknowledged that this is of concern...no recognition criteria will 
be introduced. The Board agreed a robust discussion of this issue and the
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reasons recognition requirements in respect of this are not addresses would 
be needed in the basis for conclusions.”5^
However, this decision by the IASB to go ahead and include changes in 
the credit risk of financial liabilities in the final fair value amendment did not 
mean that the BCBS would accept the status quo. In fact, before the IASB had 
even made their views on the issue public, the BCBS had already pre-empted 
the IASB’s decision when in June 2004 it went ahead and issued its own 
supervisory action. Titled ‘Regulatory capital in light o f forthcoming changes 
in accounting standards’ [emphasis added], the BCBS argued that it had 
“examined the appropriate regulatory treatment of any gains and losses 
arising from changes in an institution’s own credit risk as a result of applying 
the fair value option to its liabilities...[and] believes that the potential 
inclusion of these gains and losses in Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital raises significant 
supervisory concerns and is of the view that they should be excluded. 
Accordingly, the Committee believes it would be appropriate fo r  national 
supervisors to not recognise these gains and losses in regulatory capital ” 
(BCBS 2004c) [emphasis added]
Other regulators, particularly in the EU, followed. In October 2004, 
CEBS announced that it has proposed to the EU that it would use prudential 
filters in the context of the new IFRS and the proposed Capital Requirements 
Directive. It recommended member states “apply the guidelines applying 
IFRS for prudential purposes in order to avoid any unwanted change likely to 
be introduced by the new accounting rules” (CEBS 2004b). They further 
specify that “in accordance with the proposal of the Basel Committee...CEBS
259 Deloitte IAS Plus, op cit.
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proposes exclusion from own funds of any cumulative unrealised gains and 
losses arising from changes in an institution’s own credit standing as a result 
of the potential future application of liabilities of the fair value option” (CEBS 
2004d: 4). Furthermore, CEBS stress that in line with the Basel Committee’s 
work on the same subject “the objective of the guidelines [on prudential 
filters for regulatory capital] is to maintain the current definition -  and 
quality -  of regulatory capital” (CEBS 2004c: 1).
The prudential filters however did not stop there. A suite of others 
were to follow, including a further announcement by the BCBS in December 
2004 that it had “considered additional issues related to the potential impact 
on regulatory capital of the implementation of certain International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS)” including its recommendation for IAS 39’s new 
recognition category of ‘available for sale instruments’, that “national 
supervisors to consider excluding unrealised gains and losses on loans 
designated as available-for-sale from the regulatory definition of Tier 1 and 
Tier 2 capital.” (BCBS 2004e) Other filters also included the BCBS’s 
recommendation for supervisors to exclude cumulative gains and losses on 
cash flow hedges that are recognised directly in equity from the definition of 
Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital (BCBS 2004c). Again, CEBS also followed the BCBS’s 
direction and issued its own prudential filters for ‘available for sale’ financial 
instruments and cash flow hedges.
The BCBS’s use of prudential ‘filters’ was unequivocally an attempt by 
the BCBS to pressure the IASB to succumb and amend IAS 39 to the full 
extent that the BCBS had requested. This is because so long as the prudential 
regulators maintained a separate interpretation of the fair value option and
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IAS 39, the standard could not in the full sense of the word be ‘harmonised’ 
for all constituent entities -  something that the IASB was determined to 
achieve260. In fact, not only would regulated institutions face the daunting 
administrative and compliance task of maintaining at least two separate 
definitions of equity -  one measured for regulatory capital and the other for 
general purpose reporting - the IASB would also be constantly wary of how 
prudential regulators would be ‘filtering’ the use of their standard.
The shift towards fair-value accounting has therefore been highly 
influenced by regulators who have significantly restricted the fair value 
option for those constituents (that is, banks) who would stand to gain the 
most from a full and unrestricted application of the standard. They resorted 
to using their own institutional constraints in order to pressure the IASB to 
align with their regulations governing prudential capital. The framework 
proposed in this study predicted that regulators would, when faced with a 
perceived threat to their authority, resort to rejecting or removing existing 
private norms from regulatory standards. The EC ‘carve-outs’ were certainly 
exemplary of this form of institutional control, whilst the filters were aimed 
at ensuring that regulatory prerogatives would have to be taken into account 
by regulated end-users. This case therefore shows that institutional practises 
can be used to affect the choice sets of stakeholders and constituents, in this 
case the IASB and prudentially regulated entities, thereby constraining the 
IASB’s ability to exercise its authority.
260 As stated in their website. Also confirmed in a confidential interview with an IASB Board 
Member.
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Why the regulatory threat? The battle fo r  methodological authority and the 
imposition o f new governance structures fo r the IASB
In a crowded standards-setting world where private standard setters do have 
the authority and ability to determine outcomes independently and 
autonomously regardless of the various preferences of constituents, why did 
the IASB favour the ‘marginal’ interest group of regulators? Furthermore, 
why were regulators threatened by the application of the fair value option in 
IAS 39? The case of the fair value option in IAS 39 highlights that a key issue 
in the decision making capacity of private actors is not only the inter-linkage 
between ‘private’ and ‘public’ governance outcomes but more importantly 
their interests. The BCBS did not simply oppose the fair value option because 
it was a ‘public’ institution wanting to stand its ground against a private 
organisation and nor did it simply do this solely on the abstract grounds of 
protecting the wider ‘public interest’. Whilst the public interest and in 
particular the interests of beneficiaries such as deposit and policy holders are 
a key part of the regulatory mandate, it would be more accurate to argue that 
the fair value option impinged on the interests of regulators who have 
already established a preferred means of fulfilling and carrying out that 
public interest mandate. The fair value option was touching the core central 
nerve of the BCBS’s regulatory framework -  the Basel II Capital Framework 
(Basel II).
In fact it was reported at the January 2005 IASB meeting that some 
Board members remarked “there was a possibility that there might in fact, be 
nothing wrong with the fair value option...” and “concerns raised by the bank 
regulators were in fact issues that they themselves could manage given their
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mandate and that the debate around the fair value option was not really an 
accounting debate, but possibly something else”261 [emphasis added] 
Indeed, it was in fact that ‘something else’ that was driving the main thrust of 
the BCBS’s stance on the issue, which they themselves outline in their 
submission to the G-7. For the BCBS, the fair value option had a direct impact 
on the reporting of equity, and equity in the language of regulators is capital. 
As far as the BCBS was concerned, banks and regulators around the world 
had already institutionalised a capital and regulatory framework which they 
had developed long before the IAS 39 fair value option. If the accounting 
standard setter wished to amend their methodology for valuing instruments 
that counted towards equity, their standard would have to work around the 
BCBS’s framework of banking and trading books. Above all, the BCBS is 
unequivocal when they declare that “accounting standards should facilitate 
and not constrain the effective supervision of banks.” (BCBS 2000b) 
[emphasis added]
In the case of the IASB, its decision to facilitate the supervision of 
banks in the case of the fair value option is the outcome of the IASB’s 
institutional enmeshment with the wider ‘macro-prudential’ governance 
world. The IASB is not an isolated private body with only formal contact with 
public actors; it is an institution that is now fundamentally embedded in the 
‘new global architecture’ that governs for the global mandate of financial 
stability. The outcome of this enmeshment is that it has created mutually 
constitutive constraints on the decision capacities of both the private 
standard setter as well as the macro prudential regulators. Structural power
261 Refer Deloitte IAS Plus Summaries.
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therefore at the global standards level is more a case of structural constraint 
through enmeshment.
The IASB is ‘enmeshed’ with the macro-prudential world in two main 
ways. Firstly, as discussed earlier in the chapter, the IASB is regarded by 
states and international organisations as playing a fundamental governance 
role for the broader mandate of global financial stability. Secondly, public 
actors such as regulators are also ‘embedded’ within the governance structure 
of the IASB itself so that the IASB is reminded that its core constituents are 
not just private entities but also the broader economic society. This means 
that whilst the IASB’s technical capacity is essentially derived from the 
private sector, this technical capacity is regarded by the wider macro 
prudential standards world to be used first and foremost for the greater 
public interest mandate of ‘financial stability5.
This structural duality between the IASB as a private organisation with 
an embedded ‘public’ responsibility is also well recognised by the IASB itself. 
One Board Member explained “we take the view that whilst they [prudential 
supervisors] have different policy objectives than we have -  it makes so much 
sense to try and work cooperatively so we don’t have duplication...so that if 
banking regulators think that a type of disclosure is really important for 
understanding the way in which the banks are operating and to impose some 
market discipline on banks, we would also think that is also pretty relevant 
for financial reporting purposes and so discuss how we can agree on what 
disclosures can meet both objectives”262.
262 Confidential interview with an IASB Board Member
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This element of structural duality is most clearly shown in the IASB’s 
final IAS 39 Basis for Conclusions. Even though the IASB could simply have 
made the fair value option amendments within IAS 39 without any further 
acknowledgment of the role played by regulators, it defied widespread private 
comments made by industry263 by taking one step further and including an 
explicit recognition of prudential regulatory governance in the application of 
the fair value option. Specifically, the IASB states that even though the 
objectives of prudential supervisors and the objectives of general purpose 
financial reporting fundamentally differed, the Board “acknowledged that for 
the purposes of determining what level of capital an institution should 
maintain, prudential supervisors may wish to understand the circumstances 
in which a regulated financial institution has chosen to apply the fa ir  value 
option and evaluate the rigour o f the institution's fa ir  value measurement 
practices and the robustness of its underlying risk management strategies, 
policies and practices”26* [emphasis added]. By doing this, the IASB was not 
only defying its financial sector constituency’s arguments that “references to 
the requirements of prudential supervisors have no place in an accounting 
standard” but it was also in effect, affirming the financial sector’s “extreme” 
concern that “this reference gave [prudential supervisors] the ability to 
overrule accounting requirements for the purposes of financial reporting”2^ .
The question is, why would the IASB go to such lengths in recognising 
the governance role played by regulators and thereby potentially reducing its 
own authority? In other words, what ‘pay-off is the IASB getting by such
263 As exemplified by comments already cited in this chapter.
264 A copy of the Final Amendment Amendments to* International Accounting Standard 39 Financial 
Instruments: Recognition and Measurement: The Faiir Value Option, can be obtained from the IASB.
265 Comments made by LIBA, also outlined by others such as ISDA, Merrill Lynch and JP Morgan
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enmeshment? As mentioned earlier, the IASB has enjoyed widespread 
recognition of its technical supremacy as global standard setter in 
accounting, not least because of the legitimacy that states and the wider 
‘global architecture’ have given to the IASB in this role. Institutional 
enmeshment therefore has served the IASB well, by raising its profile and 
ensuring that its standards overcome the greatest hurdle of all -  achieving 
‘buy-in’ from states and public authorities. Without this legitimacy, arguably 
the IASB may have encountered many more public constraints like the ones 
constructed by the BCBS in the case of the fair value option.
However, a more practical implication of this ‘enmeshment’ is that by 
endorsing the authority of the IASB, public agencies have also pressured the 
IASB to structure its governance hierarchy to include regulators within its 
decision structure. For instance, the newly created Monitoring Board was 
established in 2009 (replacing the former Trustee Appointment Advisory 
Group) to “enhance the organisation’s public accountability by establishing a 
link to a Monitoring Board of public authorities”266. The Board is responsible 
under the IASC Constitution for the approval of all Trustee appointments and 
reappointments and importantly consists of two of the IASB’s vital 
stakeholders -  the EC and the SEC26?.
Furthermore, the newly instituted Standards Advisory Council (SAC) 
is also one of the four main IASB groups in which regulators occupy key 
positions, including the BCBS, the LAIS, IOSCO, and the European Central
266 The Monitoring Board consists o f  relevant leaders from the Emerging Markets and Technical 
Committees o f the International Organization o f  Securities Commission (IOSCO), the European 
Commission, the Japan Financial Services Agency (FSA), and the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision will sit as a formal observer at 
Monitoring Board meetings.. Refer the IASB website
http://www.iasb.org/About+Us/About-j-the-t-Trustees/Monitoring+Board.htm
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Bank (ECB)268. The SAC also plays an important governance role in the IASB, 
as the forum where the IASB consults individuals, and representatives of 
organisations affected by its work. Crucially, the SAC gives advice to the IASB 
on a range of issues including input on the IASB’s agenda, project timetables 
including project priorities, and consultation on any changes in agenda and 
priorities. According to the IASB, “in view of the importance of the IASB’s 
agenda and priorities, once these have been determined by the IASB, changes 
thereto are expected to be the subject of consultation with the SAC.”269 
Furthermore, the SAC also “provides input to the Trustees on matters 
relating to the activities of the SAC or the IASB and any other relevant 
issues.”2?0
It is proposed in this study’s analytical framework that using the 
decision structure or specifically the governance hierarchy is a practice 
adopted by regulators to constrain the ability of private actors to capture 
outcomes. Consequently, regulators sitting in key governance positions 
within the IASB is not only indicative of the IASB’s increasing institutional 
‘enmeshment’ with regulatory authorities but it also crucially serves as a 
‘check and balance’ to enable regulators to influence the decision outcomes of 
the IASB. The newly established Monitoring Board and SAC was a direct 
response to what one interviewee confirmed as significant “angst” among 
certain regulators, “particularly in Europe, concerned about the nature of 
[the IASB] and what they perceived to be a lack of accountability”2?1. 
Furthermore, there was explicit recognition that public agencies and
268 Refer to the IASB website, About the SAC, 
http://www.iasb.org/ Ahout+Us/About+the+SAC/About+the+SAC.htm
269 Ibid
270 Ibid
271 Confidential interview conducted with IASB in 2006.
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governments would “never give [the IASB] power... what they’ve done is 
they’ve said ‘we’ll keep the power, but we’re going to use your product’ -  
that’s the way it is”272.
6.3 Conclusion
The IASB has able to exert significant influence over the measurement of 
international economic activity through the formation of international 
accounting standards, but these standards have also been influenced by the 
interests of regulatory agencies. This chapter has found that the IASB’s 
paradigmatic shift to fair value accounting has been significantly constrained 
by regulators who have been able to impose their own institutional 
constraints on the application of the fair value option for prudential 
purposes. However, the IASB has not simply been forced to make the 
amendments to the fair value option due to regulatory pressure. The IASB 
has also made conscious decisions to incorporate and acknowledge the dual 
role played by regulators in the governance of the finance sector indicating 
elements of mutual cooperation due to macro-institutionalised enmeshment 
between global standard-setting institutions and their common mandate of 
financial stability. It has and is, in other words, also in the interests of the 
IASB to maintain their special supply and demand relationship with public 
regulatory agencies as it is this dynamic which contributes to the viability and 
legitimacy of their mandated governance role.
272 ibid
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7Conclusion 
Private Influence in International Financial 
Standardisation: explanations and implications
It was the objective of this study to examine how private influence in 
international financial standard-setting forums operates in order to affect 
outcomes. The framework advanced in this study predicted that influence is 
based on the logic of supply and demand where regulators demand specific 
private power capabilities and private industry are able to provide these 
sources of power. Furthermore, capture is likely when demand from 
regulators is high, and regulators are unable to carry out their regulatory or 
policy making requirements without private power capabilities. The 
framework however also predicted that demand from regulators can also fall 
when the utility of the power capability wanes, or when they perceive their 
authority to be threatened as a result of utilising private power. When this 
occurs, captured outcomes would be limited.
The findings in this comparative study of international banking, 
insurance and accounting standardisation show that private actors play a 
pivotal role in the contribution of policy development and of financial 
governance more generally. The study reveals that whilst private influence 
can lead to outcomes that become captured by private interests, the findings 
also show that private actors are still fundamentally constrained and 
tempered by institutional mechanisms that determine the way in which they
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can participate and exercise their power. One of the core propositions 
advanced by the study is that because regulators lack formal authority in 
transnational governance arenas, they adopt institutional practices as a 
substitute for legislative authority in order to either enhance or constrain 
private influence. The need for and the perceived lack of regulatory authority 
was crucial as to how regulators carried out the demand-side of their 
relationship with private actors and how they subsequently utilised 
institutional practices to enforce their authority.
This chapter focuses on the key comparative findings of the case 
studies and discusses how they support the propositions advanced in this 
study. The chapter then discusses the implication of these findings on the 
broader issue of private influence in global financial governance and 
highlights the problems associated with the dynamics inherent in the supply 
and demand relationship between regulators and private industry, 
particularly in financial governance. It also draws important lessons from 
these findings; in particular, the role that institutions can play in financial 
governance and how these relationships can be mitigated through 
institutional checks and balances.
7.1 Private Influence in International Financial Standardisation: 
comparative findings and explanations
High demand, low threat and evidence o f capture: institutional practices 
used to facilitate private influence
In order to establish the empirical bases for capture, this study advanced the 
proposition that capture is based on a supply and demand relationship
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between regulators and private industry, and when regulatory demand for a 
specific private capability is high; that is, when regulators are unable to fulfil 
their regulatory roles and policy requirements without the input of private 
power capabilities and these capabilities in turn enhance the authority of 
regulators.
Regulators and policymakers can actively seek the input of private 
industiy to show at the very simplest level that they are performing their 
deliberative responsibility towards the constituency most affected by the 
proposed regulation. However as the findings in this study show, regulators 
capitalise on private capabilities because they may fundamentally depend on 
these sources of power in order for them to carry out their specialised roles 
and policy objectives. The case studies revealed that regulators did not 
simply deliberate with private actors on policy proposals but instead derived 
their capabilities from private industry sources at times when they could not 
generate policy outputs on their own accord because they lacked the 
resources, technical knowledge or expertise.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) was the most 
explicit case of this, where regulators explicitly acknowledged that they would 
be guided by industry about how best to revise the Basel II Framework (Basel 
II). Even though the BCBS is comprised of the world’s most powerful 
economies and as a result would not appear to be lacking in any power 
capability, the BCBS was nonetheless restricted in its ability to undertake its 
role without information from its member jurisdictions as well as other non 
BCBS member countries. Moreover, it was also difficult to develop standards 
without an intimate knowledge of the way in which various financial
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transactions worked and how financial institutions around the world 
operated, both of which needed to be provided by the banks themselves. 
Furthermore, relying on the banks to not only generate that information but 
to also package it in a way which would make the task of the BCBS easier was 
also the important pre-condition for promoting a ‘win-win’ outcome for both 
parties.
Due to the empirical circumstances surrounding the original inception 
of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (LAIS), regulators 
had a more rudimentary demand for material resources in order to establish 
the organisation’s ongoing viability as an international standard-setter. 
Public resources for various reasons were not only limited but also heavily 
dependent on one main ‘jurisdiction’, the United States (US). Private industry 
was not only capable of providing these resources but were also more than 
willing to supply this resource for the much more valuable benefit of gaining 
access to decision makers. In this case there was a mutual pay-off and 
reward. Regulators were happy to provide access to the forums in return for 
the resources because this was seen as less costly than having to ask for 
additional resources from their domestic constituencies.
At the global level of standard-setting, private authority in numerous 
industry issue areas abound. In the case of accounting, the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is arguably the only international 
authority in accounting standards, even though the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) is to a large extent its most evident ‘rival’. Public 
agencies have strategically selected the IASB to undertake a function that 
rival states, namely the US and from the EU, would not be able to conduct on
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a domestic basis and the IASB has also been more than willing to provide this 
capability, particularly as it would serve to bolster their technical superiority 
in the face of a competitor, the FASB. The political sponsorship provided to 
the IASB and likewise, the resources the IASB was willing to expend 
providing this function, was also therefore an important relationship in 
which both parties would benefit from such an exchange. As a result, the 
IASB not only produces accounting standards for over 100 countries around 
the world, they are also now enforceable through domestic legislation in a 
number of countries, led most notably by the European Union (EU).
Importantly, in all three cases, this study found that regulators 
adopted institutional practices to facilitate and support this demand for 
private capabilities. A table of empirical examples exemplifying these various 
practices are outlined in Table 7.1 below, showing that regulators will attempt 
to use the institutional infrastructure to enhance the influence of private 
industry, predominantly through normative means.
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Table 7.1 Institutional practices used to facilitate capture in the cases of the 
BCBS, IAIS and IASB
BCBS IAIS IASB
N orm s Data collection on 
internal ratings 
systems from top 30 
banks
Information sourced 
from IAA, drafted by 
IAA for solvency 
standard
Information sourced 
and private standards 
adopted through 
domestic legislation
QIS data collection 
exercises
Internal models 
incorporated into 
Solvency standard
IAS used as part of the 
IMF and World Bank’s 
FSAP and ROSCs 
surveillance
Recalibration to 
produce capital 
incentives based on 
QIS data
Fair value paradigm a 
form of self or market- 
based regulation
Basel II amended to 
incorporate revised 
incentives
Internal models 
approach a form of 
‘self-regulation’
Process QIS, QIS 2, QIS 2.5, 
QIS 3, QIS 4 
undertaken with 
private industry input
Observers given access 
to meetings, 
documents from 
meetings and other 
opportunities to 
comment
Continual dialogue 
with industry for 
feedback on revisions
Observers able to give 
presentations directly 
to regulators
Presentations from 
banks provided to 
BCBS
D ecision
Structure
Introduction of private 
Observer participation
Delegating decision 
authority to IASB 
through domestic 
legislative 
implementation
The finding that normative practices are used to facilitate capture in 
the development of international standards is not surprising, given that 
international financial standardisation is an exercise in norm creation based 
on what regulation should constitute based on what actors consider ‘best’ 
practice. These, as well as the complementary procedural and decision based 
mechanisms are argued to be the ‘means’ through which the supply and
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demand of capabilities is transposed into outcomes, which in these cases are 
international financial standards.
However, what was accentuated in all three case studies was not only a 
high demand for private power when regulatory capacity was lacking, but 
also the facilitation of a demand from a limited supply of capabilities. An 
interesting finding that emerged from the case studies was that even though 
private actors were in the position of providing the sought after power 
capability, many found their capability rejected in favour of others that came 
across as being a more ‘legitimate’ source of that power. An economic 
approach to capture and interest group politics would reason that the size of 
the private coalition or homogeneity of interests would matter when it came 
to successfully providing a power capability. Though in the cases of the BCBS 
and IAIS, these factors had little to do with such ‘selective capture’; instead, 
two observations made were the distinctions made between those who had 
‘technical expertise’ and those who were labelled as ‘lobbyists’.
For example, in the case of the BCBS, even though the large 
international banks most active in global financial markets would provide 
regulators with the required information, this information was categorised by 
the BCBS as being from either of these two ‘technical’ or ‘lobbyist’ sources. 
‘Technicians’ were thought to be more legitimate than lobbyists as they were 
seen to be more ‘objectively’ proficient in the issue areas being debated2^ . By 
way of example, despite similar membership profiles and membership size, 
distinctions were made between information provided by the International 
Institute of Finance (IIF) and information provided by the International
273 Confidential interview with source from the BCBS
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Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). On the one hand, the IIF was 
regarded to be more useful as a ‘one-stop-shop’ for gauging the type of 
reaction the BCBS was likely to get from the big banks on new proposals or 
am endm ents2?  ^ Information from ISDA on the other hand was noticeably 
taken more seriously due largely to the explanation that they were technical 
specialists and therefore ‘objectively’ proficient in the issue areas being 
debated. Their information was therefore taken on board and their feedback 
on issues sought, evident in the contribution made to the definition of 
operational risk2?6.
Interviews with ISDA also confirmed this view of their organisation, 
explaining that it was “less political maybe than some other associations” and 
“that is how we have made our mark in that particular field”2?6. Moreover, 
ISDA also explained that it is not organised in the same way as those ‘other 
associations’ such that the Board was represented by the Chief Executive 
Officers (CEOs) of the major banking organisations (read like that of the IIF). 
Instead, the ISDA Board consisted of the Heads of the various technical areas 
of its member banking institutions such as those heading up the Derivatives, 
Legal, Trading desks and Risk Management areas that were “relatively senior 
within their areas but not as senior as the Chairman or CEO...”2?? Thus, even 
though there is already a selection Tuas’ that creates the conditions for 
capture, this capture is based upon a limited source of information, which is 
considered more technically ‘objective’ in the eyes of regulators.
274 Confidential interview with a source from the BCBS
275 Confirmed by sources from both the BCBS and ISDA
276 Based on confidential interviews with ISDA
277 Ibid
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This was also found to be the case with the IAIS. Even though the IAIS 
has over 180 Observers officially included in the deliberation and 
development of standards, instrumental power capabilities provided by all 
Observer parties were not all treated equally. Special invitations extended to 
specific private industry representatives who were seen to be able to provide 
a specific technical capability on a particular topic or issue area, most notably 
the International Actuarial Association (IAA) was the starkest example of the 
differentiation between technicians and lobbyists. This was a source of great 
frustration for one Observer interviewed, claiming this to be highly biased 
and ‘unfair’2?8. Nevertheless, regulators of the IAIS selected notably the IAA 
for its expertise, allowing it opportunities to influence the underlying norms 
of standards. The IAA as a result had significant input into the finalised 
Insurer solvency framework issued in 2007, their contribution explicitly 
acknowledged in the standard.
What is observed in these case studies is that more often than not, 
regulators wanted to be affiliated and associated with ‘technical specialists’ 
who were in the game of providing objective and rational analysis of the 
subject matter at hand. This did not mean that the information was in fact 
objective or rational, but it was above all the perception of objectivity that 
mattered most. Obtaining their capability from what was considered by 
regulators as more legitimate or ‘objective’ sources enhanced their own 
credibility, as opposed to risking their professional reputation by being 
associated with vested domestic interests.
278 Confidential interview with large industry association
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In the cases of ISDA and the IAA we can see that these organisations 
are in fact private standard-setters within their own industries, perhaps 
contributing further to their perceived legitimacy. Obtaining what was 
perceived to be technically objective financial norms was far more 
advantageous for regulators in consensus decision environments because 
these norms were much easier to adopt through the policy process. This is 
because these organisations had already undertaken the difficult task of 
harmonising domestically based interests, thereby producing private norms 
that had already been agreed to by a number of global financial firm s2??.
It also appeared more efficient and easier to manage fewer suppliers 
than it was to utilise a number of suppliers with potentially competing 
interests. In all three case studies, when demand for these capabilities was 
high, managing fewer suppliers allowed the regulators to utilise institutional 
mechanisms that would enhance their ability to produce the required 
standards. What we find in the standard-setting cases examined therefore is 
that demand from regulators from a select few private actors is the primary 
reason why a limited group of private actors had such a pervasive presence 
and role in each of the banking, insurance and accounting standards regimes. 
Strategically selected private actors formed part of the policy machinery 
because in all three case studies, they were specifically called upon to do so. 
These sources of power were called on primarily to help regulators (or the 
standard-setter in the case of the IASB) to fulfil their roles and mandates to 
establish global standards.
279 The ISDA Master Agreement is a standardised contractual arrangement that governs the terms and 
conditions o f  over-the-counter (OTC) derivative transactions and is used by banks and corporations 
globally. Refer ISDA website http ://www. i sda.org/
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These findings therefore support the link between private influence 
and regulatory demand, but also importantly highlight a high demand for 
private capabilities from a select and limited group of actors. These actors 
were predominantly chosen because of their perceived technical expertise, as 
opposed to domestically vested interests, which in turn enhanced the 
credibility of regulators. At the global level of policy making and deliberation, 
it can be argued that this selectivity is the cornerstone of the supply and 
demand relationship that is generated to produce outcomes which benefit 
both regulators and a limited number of private actors.
However, an important consequence of this strategic selectivity was 
that regulators were not only able to choose their suppliers but it also then 
allowed them to control what they did with the supply. Controlling fewer 
suppliers can be potentially more efficient than exerting control over many 
diffuse and potentially competing interests. By using institutional practices to 
control supply, regulators in the case studies were able to obtain their power 
capability, use it to fulfil their policy requirements and facilitate 
predominantly the prerogatives of regulators, which were to either 
incorporate domestic regulatory considerations or to maintain or enhance 
their positions of authority over private actors. The findings in this study 
therefore also support the proposition that regulators use institutional 
practices to enforce their interests, exert their authority and as a result curb 
the extent to which private power capabilities determine standards outcomes.
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High demand, high threat and the imposition o f institutional constraints: 
US fragmentation and the EU’s power over the ‘policy machine*
Capture in this study is certainly evident in all three case studies, where 
reliance on a select few private ‘technicians’ formed the basis of the supply 
and demand relationship with regulatory policymakers. Capture was argued 
in this study to be likely when demand for these capabilities were high, and 
regulators facilitated the adoption of private norms using institutional 
mechanisms. However, this study further proposed that capture would be 
limited (if not completely obstructed) if demand for private capabilities 
dropped and regulators have resorted to using institutional mechanisms to 
curb the extent of private influence over outcomes. The reasons proposed 
were that the utility of the power source has waned, or that regulators 
perceive their authority to be threatened by the use of private power.
For instance, when private capabilities were seen to be detrimental, 
regulators in all three cases have resorted to using the ‘policy machine’ to 
limit the adoption of private norms. Again, empirical examples of these 
institutional practices can be illustrated in Table 7.2, showing that the same 
practices used to facilitate capture can also be used to constrain private 
influence.
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Table 7.2 Institutional practices used to constrain capture in the cases of the 
BCBS, IAIS and IASB
BCBS IAIS IASB
N orm s Operational risk 
information sourced 
from industry, re­
drafted by regulators 
to impose capital 
charge
EU Solvency II 
prerogatives included 
in standard
EC carve outs imposed 
on fair value option
Capital Floors and 
calibration factors 
imposed to maintain 
aggregate levels of 
capital
Institutionalised 
distinctions between 
‘Regulators’ and 
‘Observers’
IASB incorporation of 
prudential regulatory 
prerogatives in IAS 39
Pillar 2 supervisory 
powers and discretion 
added
Prudential filters 
applied for
prudentially regulated 
entities
Process Consultation with 
industry stopped after 
CP3 in 2003 -  final 
version released in 
mid 2004
Observers invited to 
participate in 
allocated time slots 
during meetings
Observers not 
permitted to engage in 
discussion unless 
called upon for views
Deliberation 
undertaken in last 
stages of standards 
development and 
limited time frame 
within which to 
provide comments
D ecision
Structure
EU members 
represented on all 
three ‘levels’ of the 
committee structure
EU members forming 
the majority of the 
solvency sub­
committee
New governance 
Monitoring Board 
imposed over Trustees 
and IASB, consisting 
of EU regulatory 
agencies
Observers given 
structured access to 
meetings (partial 
opening, structured 
seating)
No decision making 
authority
SAC also established 
to ensure regulatory 
prerogatives included 
in agenda and 
standards
Meetings closed when 
deemed for regulators 
only
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But which regulators? What was evident in all three cases was the 
domination of EU regulators over the standard-setting structures and policy 
processes. Simultaneously, US fragmentation also to some extent enabled the 
European regulators to take a lead on policy issues, made possible by the fact 
that the EU regulators had already undertaken EU-level deliberation on 
many of the issues, thereby producing common or united policy proposals 
based on EU legislative considerations.
We find for instance that private capture has been limited in the cases 
of Basel II, the Insurer Solvency Framework and IAS 39. Capture has been 
limited through the introduction of norms that ran counter to privately 
vested interests, through incremental policy changes to private norms that 
altered the incentive or benefits that accrued to private interests and also 
through limiting participation, excluding private actors at crucial stages of 
drafting and utilising only parts of information that private actors have 
provided. All of these institutional mechanisms fundamentally altered the 
way in which these standards benefit those actors who had the most to gain 
from the initial supply and demand relationship.
In the case of the BCBS, we see the introduction of new norms to 
counter the incentives provided by the Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) 
approaches, by way of the operational risk charge and other areas for capital 
increases included in Pillar 2 supervisory discretion. Despite the BCBS’s 
intention to be guided by private industry in the design of Basel II, which in 
the words of one banking association representative “was supposed to be a 
bank-centred” initiative, we find after both the Second and Third 
Consultative Papers (CP2 and CP3) stages the BCBS introducing elements to
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Basel II that ran counter to the interests conveyed by private industry during 
deliberations. The Quantitative Impact Studies (QIS) exercises for instance 
would confirm that amendments to Basel II would actually increase capital, 
as opposed to providing net incentives for the large IRB banks. Whilst the 
BCBS did amend the Framework to provide these incentives, overall they 
were considered to be very small, especially in light of the concern expressed 
by largely the IRB banks that the compliance costs associated with 
implementing the IRB approaches would offset any tangible benefits 
provided by the Framework.
There is therefore a parallel dynamic running through Basel II that is 
evident throughout the process. This is summed up by the BCBS and that is 
to provide incentives for the IRB banks as well as maintain aggregate levels of 
capital to Basel I levels (i.e. eight per cent minimum capital). As the case of 
Basel II shows however, these changes and ‘offsets’ were not necessarily the 
result of a strategic decision exercised by its members but rather the use of 
policy processes where changes were made ad hoc during the stages of sub­
committee deliberations. These incremental changes made are evident in the 
form of these competing norms, where Basel II contains elements which both 
enhance and penalise large banks.
This supports the proposition that if demand for private capabilities 
was high, but correspondingly the threat to regulatory policy authority was 
also high as a result of using private capabilities, regulators would resort to 
using institutional ‘checks and balances’. This means that regulators would 
still consider the use of private capabilities as beneficial, if additional 
constraints were also put in place ensuring the policy authority of regulators.
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This was seen in the case of the BCBS. Whilst US regulators championed the 
adoption of the IRB methodologies, which would provide tangible capital 
reductions to the more advanced banks, this private autonomy was in large 
part offset by other requirements introduced through the Basel II process 
that provided largely European regulators (and auditors) with the means to 
determine whether these IRB models were deemed appropriate or not 
through Pillar 2 supervisory discretion.
On the other hand, the study also proposed that when regulatory 
demand was low and correspondingly private capabilities were a threat to 
regulatory authority, regulators would put in place explicit constraints to 
control the ability of private actors to influence policy. This was certainly 
evident in the case of the IAIS. When the resources of private Observers had 
enabled the organisation to boost its funding, some regulators (again largely 
from the EU) began to feel uneasy about having private Observers involved in 
their activities. Unlike the BCBS deliberation process, which is largely 
undertaken ‘behind closed doors’ and undertaken as ad hoc amendments, 
what is interesting in the case of the IAIS is the use of transparent 
participation rules and protocols that are applied across the organisation. The 
IAIS was unique in the sense that it was both open and closed to having 
private industry Observers participate directly in their standard-setting 
activities. The IAIS also established very explicit rules about what Observers 
could and could not do. This was not only applied to the process of 
deliberation but even to small details such as seating rules and protocols 
concerning when Observers were permitted to participate and take part in 
discussions.
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The effect of this institutionalised constraint is seen in the case of the 
Insurer Solvency Framework. The use of closed and ‘partially open’ meetings, 
which included the IAA only at specific points in the Insurer Solvency 
drafting process, meant that sections of the IAIS Solvency framework were 
derived both from the IAA’s contribution and the EU Solvency II directive. 
The IAA’s expertise was included only for sections of the sub-committee 
meetings, allowing the regulators to conduct their meetings at their own 
discretion, and inviting the IAA when they were most required. The fact that 
the regulators decided to open the insurer solvency meetings in 2005 to all 
Observers, when the framework was nearly finalised was no coincidence. 
Opening the meetings to all Observers was, it appeared, simply a formality 
but as the final phase of the project showed, Members had already ‘bought-in’ 
to the largely European dominated standard that was made to largely parallel 
developments that were occurring with the Solvency II project.
The effect of carve outs and prudential filters from European states 
and other regulatory agencies was also a more explicit use of institutional 
practices to constrain the IASB from implementing the full application of the 
fair value option in IAS39. These were direct actions designed to strong-arm 
the IASB into amending the standard to take into account the preferences of 
what many considered a small minority of ‘end-users’. The result of the 
carve-outs and prudential filters was that IAS39 was explicitly amended to 
recognise the prerogatives of prudential regulators, despite the fact that the 
accounting standards were for broader constituencies. For prudentially 
regulated financial institutions, the result is that they must still report
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amounts much higher for capital purposes, than would be required for simply 
financial reporting purposes under IAS 39.
These practices were used because in all three cases, regulators from 
predominantly the European jurisdictions had their own domestic 
considerations to take into account, which were the Capital Adequacy (CAD) 
and the Solvency II Directives. Private norms and capabilities were 
undermining the prerogatives of the European regulators, which in the cases 
of the CAD and Solvency II, were to incorporate the necessary details needed 
to align with their domestic supervisory approaches. As a result, European 
regulators utilised the institutional infrastructure at the global standard- 
setting level to amend, constrain and even block initiatives that ran counter 
to their interests. This is not to say that the US regulators had no domestic 
interests that were at stake. On the contrary, as was explicitly seen in the case 
of Basel II, unable to exert common preferences through institutional 
mechanisms to enforce their interests, the US chose to opt out of the 
agreement altogether by developing their own domestic version of Basel II 
(or ‘Basel IA’) to suit its own political and regulatory prerogatives.
This ability by the Europeans to adopt institutional practices to control 
private participation was also evident in the IAIS. The US regulators were 
very critical of the fact that all meetings were not open and ‘transparent’ to 
all. The US Commissioners championed the need to have Observers involved 
in the standards-setting process and also be present at deliberations, which is 
similar to the arrangements in place in the US states. However it was again 
ultimately US fragmentation that allowed the European regulators to 
pressure Members to adopt explicit rules governing private participation and
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deliberation. The ultimate reasons given as to why the US in essence 
acquiesced to the arrangements was because the US Commissioners did not 
take serious interest in the work of the IAIS and coordinating the views of the 
fifty different jurisdictions was logistically difficult to do280.
Why then, were the Europeans able to utilise the institutional 
infrastructure and the Americans resigned to exerting preferences through 
domestic channels? As Posner asks, “why did US officials become more 
accommodating and European officials, more influential; and why did the 
shift occur in 2002 and 2003?” (2006: 4) Mattli and Buthe (2003) provide 
insights into why the Europeans were better able to utilise institutional 
mechanisms at the global standards level than for instance, the US. Their 
‘institutional complementarities’ approach posits that domestic 
standardisation systems involving high levels of hierarchy and 
consultation/coordination facilitate the accommodation of new layers of 
standardisation activity above the national level.
These features according to Mattli and Buthe (2003) are argued to 
offer greater complementarities with international standards institutions 
because of their ability to represent a broad-based domestic consensus with a 
single voice at the regional and international level. This is opposed to systems 
based on decentralization or institutional "anarchy" and market competition, 
where interests are fragmented, market driven and characterized by a high 
degree of internal competition. The European institutions based around the 
centralised EU regime is therefore far more advantageous in negotiations at 
the international level, than the US, which is characterised as institutionally
280 Based on confidential interviews conducted in March 2006.
290
more fragmented and hence more difficult to aggregate interests above the 
national level of deliberations.
The construction above all of a European-level regulatory regime 
enabled EU policymakers to not only consolidate their efforts to develop, 
implement and enforce financial services legislation but as Posner (2006) 
argues, these efforts have had a largely accidental consequence on 
transatlantic financial relations. One particularly important development in 
the EU what is important for this study was the introduction of the 
Lamfulussy process281, which in essence formalised the rule-making 
procedures for insurance, banking and investment services legislation and 
above all establishes important mechanisms for coordination between 
European regulators to implement and enforce legislation (Posner 2006). In 
many ways, the influence of the Lamfulussy process, based around 
committees and formal processes for establishing both broad framework 
legislation and more detailed rules, can be seen in the international standard- 
setting regimes, due largely to the way in which European regulators have 
transferred their domestic institutional arrangements with their international 
deliberation.
Thus, the European prerogatives based around the centralised EU 
CAD and Solvency II, in conjunction with the hierarchical policy process 
characterised by the Lafulussy process and more formalised interaction with 
private industry suggest that the Europeans were more familiar with the ways 
in which institutional mechanisms can be used to enhance regulatory
281 The Lamfulussy process is an institutionalised approach to the development o f  financial services 
regulations in the EU. Refer to:
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/02/195&format=HTML&aged=l&1angu
age=EN&guiLanguage=en
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prerogatives for constraining private power. These domestic institutional 
characteristics in other words were highly complementary with the 
international standard-setting arrangements, and where they were not -  in 
the case of the IAIS -  were deliberately constructed to exhibit similar 
constraints. The US on the other hand, with its fragmented regulatory 
systems, was much less able to exert unified preferences, let alone enforce 
these through institutional mechanisms such as norm creation, policy 
deliberation and consensus decisions. This was not only evident in the lack of 
unity between US Insurance Commissioners in the case of the IAIS but also 
between the various US banking regulators that are part of the BCBS.
These findings highlight the important linkages between domestic 
institutional arrangements and those which are then transferred into the 
international arena. However, at the same time, these findings also raise 
important questions about how international financial standards regimes 
have come to be structured in the ways they have and whether domestic 
institutional complementarities are simply a coincidence or part of more 
intentional institutional designs, aimed to further the interests of certain 
jurisdictions. It also brings us to the wider question addressed at the 
beginning of this study and that is why these international standards regimes 
are structured to be exclusive, narrow and closed off to broader public 
constituencies. The following section argues that whilst European domestic 
institutional arrangements have influenced the structure in which the 
standards regimes have evolved, regulatory actors have also constructed new 
roles for themselves, as a result of their increasing engagement in cross- 
border financial ‘diplomacy’ (Slaughter 2004).
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International financial standardisation and the question o f influence: 
embedded outcomes and institutional enmeshment
This study has found that capture and captured outcomes are a much more 
complex phenomenon than simply ‘private actors getting their way\ As the 
case studies showed, there are instances of both capture and constraint, 
where aspects of international financial standards reflect private normative 
preferences as well as the vested interests of regulators seeking to enhance 
their authority. This is interesting considering that from the outset of the 
study, we wanted to examine how closeness and private participation led to 
capture at this transnational level of governance. It is therefore evident that 
‘participation’ is a function of the institutionalised practices that were evident 
in all three case studies.
One of the comparative methods used in this study was to apply the 
Most Different Systems Approach to the three cases examined. Namely, 
despite the variations in the membership composition of each case study and 
differences in issue area, this study wanted to ascertain whether in fact they 
maintained similar supply and demand relationships and whether similar 
institutional practices were utilised to support the supply and demand 
dynamics. What this study found was that despite these initial institutional 
variations being treated as a constant, there were in fact markedly similar 
institutional characteristics across the three standard-setting organisations. 
Not only were their decision structures the same, revolving around a 
triangular committee structure with one peak committee forming at the 
vertex (sometimes referred to as the ‘Board’), followed by layers of sub­
committees and working groups but their deliberations with industry were
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also conducted in a similar manner involving informal ‘fact finding’ to more 
formal consultation. There was therefore little difference in the ways in which 
the standard-setters conducted their supply and demand relationships and 
more importantly, the exclusive interaction they all had with their respective 
industries.
This study proposed that both agency and the overall structure of 
dominant financial powers engaging in cross-border cooperation produces 
the exclusivity of the transnational standards-setting environment. Agents 
within these settings become so engrained in the environment that having 
specialised relationships with stakeholders is part of the dominant culture 
established within these forums. These environments also reinforce the ways 
in which relationships between public and private actors are undertaken and 
as a result, both regulators and private industry actors come to be aware of 
their roles and expectations of behaviour. This study has found that whilst 
the EU regulators have influenced the way in which certain norms have 
formed within the standard-setting regimes, such as formalised protocols, it 
also finds that regulators engaging in international financial standardisation 
are developing their own distinct identity above and beyond that of the 
domestic agencies from which they originate.
Global financial standard-setting is a relatively new phenomenon in 
international relations, giving rise to what Slaughter (2004) has referred to as 
the new ‘diplomacy5. The functionality of the task of producing standards has 
created new identities, norms, roles and behaviour in these transnational 
forums and these functionalities are geared towards the very exclusive 
interactions between regulators and industry. However, as the findings of this
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study show, this interaction is not without its boundaries, which are imposed 
and constructed through institutional means. The institutionalised or social 
construction of identities, norms, roles and behaviour is difficult to support 
empirically but there was a very strong undercurrent evident in all three 
cases about identities and as a result the perception about how those 
identities should think and behave. This study argues that this perception 
was influenced largely by the European domestic institutional systems, which 
placed importance on hierarchical relationships and the enforcement of 
authority through roles and established practice. The most prevalent identity 
mentioned in all three cases was without a doubt the identity and role of the 
‘regulator’, which despite having different domestic preferences, essentially 
meant the same thing to all regulators engaging at the international financial 
standardisation level.
In the case of the BCBS, one interviewee commented in no uncertain 
terms that “first and foremost we are regulators”282. Interviews with various 
Members of the IAIS also reiterated that standard-setting is primarily the 
“business of regulators”2^ . Despite the fact that it was a private organisation, 
the IASB also believed itself to be an ‘industry regulator’ which for the IASB 
meant that it was performing a public function. One Board Member stressed 
that as a result of this institutional identity, “there is a real pressure on this 
organisation to maintain its credibility -  to be seen to be acting 
independently, to be structured as an independent organisation -  and then to
282 From confidential interviews with the BCBS conducted in 2006
283 From confidential interviews with Members of the IAIS
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be seen to be acting independently...and not be the hand-maiden of vested 
interests...”2^
Perceptions of regulators and regulatory authority were also largely 
understood by private industry. There was a pre-defined expectation of the 
way in which regulators were going to behave and that is, conservatively. 
Private industry representatives were not surprised when regulators for 
instance disagreed with their views or disregarded them altogether. They 
were instead surprised when regulators behaved in the opposite fashion, 
when they were very accommodating or open to the idea of industry input. 
More telling was the comment made by a private industry representative 
involved with the work of the BCBS that they would have ‘little respect’ for a 
regulator who “tried to give their industry what they wanted”. The more 
important quality perceived in a regulator was “somebody who was 
recognised as a rigorous thinker in these issues from a regulatory point of 
view”285.
The underlying theme of these findings therefore is that the cognitive 
persuasion of actors is not only influenced by common and shared 
background beliefs and social conditioning but also more fundamentally by 
the norms created within institutions. Professional ‘peer pressure’ was a 
prevalent theme across all three cases and the desire to conform to pre­
conceived notions about what certain roles should fulfil were paramount to 
how decision outcomes would come about. To outsiders, technical 
discussions may indeed be impenetrable to wider societal constituencies; but 
when looking from ‘within’ the organisation, there are clear demarcations
284 From confidential interviews with an IASB Board Member in 2006
285 From confidential interview with a large industry association
296
between technical content which can favour private interests, and technical 
deliberation which imposes very firm constraints.
The institutionalised construction of norms within organisations is 
therefore a very powerful means for actors to not only shape their interaction 
with other actors but to also enhance their own positions of authority and 
cognitive preferences. This was most clearly seen in the case of the IAIS. The 
very deliberate imposition of formal and informal boundaries between public 
regulators and private Observers played a critical role in ensuring regulators 
always had the final say on standards outcomes. However more inherently 
was its effect on the way in which, crudely speaking, private Observers were 
‘put in their place’. These impositions of structure were without a doubt 
motivated by the desire of certain regulators to uphold and maintain their 
status as regulators who govern, rather than regulators who negotiate and 
deliberate with their constituents.
These visible boundaries and constraints were also imposed and 
constructed in the case of the IASB. Unlike the interpersonal divisions 
created between identities in the IAIS, regulators and central banks 
constructed their own institutional barriers designed to affirm their positions 
of authority relative to the IASB. This was because the IASB’s fair value 
paradigm was fundamentally diverging from the preferences of regulators. As 
the former General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
noted “the development of international financial reporting standards has 
brought to the fore important differences in perspective between accounting 
standard setters on the one hand and prudential authorities on the other that 
will need to be reconciled. The stakes are high.” (Knight 2004) As a result
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filters and carve outs were first and foremost designed to show the 
accounting standard setter that the prerogatives of regulators outweighed the 
purpose and function of accounting standards.
In addition to these institutional barriers to pressure the IASB to 
change their standards in accordance with the interests of regulators, the 
regulators also emphasised the role of the IASB as a ‘macro prudential’ 
regulator whose interests should necessarily align with the wider imperatives 
of the global financial system. Malcolm Knight, former General Manager of 
the BIS made several public speeches to this effect, explaining that prudential 
and accounting standards should be “mutually consistent” to promote “a well 
functioning and stable financial system” (Knight 2004). This was in effect the 
construction of the LASB’s public role to provide not just accounting 
standards for its end users, but standards that ultimately served a prudential 
purpose. This has led to the IASB to transform its role considerably, evident 
in its new governance arrangements that are highly interlinked with 
prudential and public authorities286. Its mission statement is also testament 
to this new found role, stating that “Our mission is to develop, in the public 
interest, a single set of high quality, understandable and international 
financial reporting standards (IFRSs) for general purpose financial 
statements.”28?
These findings reveal that the nature of private influence and its 
impact on outcomes can be fundamentally constructed (in the case of the
286 The IASB has recently announced new governance arrangements to ensure transparency and 
accountability. Refer the IASB website
http://www.iasb.org/Thc-t organisation/Govemance+and+accountabilitv/govemance+and+accountabili
tv.htm
non
From IASB website http://www.iasb.org/About+Us/Intemationa]+Accounting+Standards+Board+- 
+About+Us.htm
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IAIS) and reconstructed (in the case of the IASB) through institutional 
means. Institutional practices, such as governance structures, decision rules, 
and processes can be consciously and strategically imposed by actors in order 
to enhance their own positions of power and authority and to constrain the 
participation and input of other parties. What does this therefore mean for 
the nature of private influence and the operation of private influence in global 
governance more generally? This study argues that we must rethink the way 
in which private influence is conceptualised within governance and discover 
the ways in which private influence interacts with institutional dynamics to 
create embedded and constitutive outcomes.
It has been the contention of this study to show that private influence 
is not something that is simply imposed on public policymakers or that 
private influence necessarily leads to outcomes which favour private 
interests. Instead, a conceptualisation of influence encapsulates the premise 
that private influence is evident in policy settings because it ultimately serves 
or fulfils a function or purpose. Private influence forms part of a mutually 
constitutive relationship among actors, which are above all, bound by the 
institutional setting that constitutes their interaction.
Interaction between public and private actors in the three cases of 
international standardisation therefore led to that of an ‘embedded outcome’ 
where governance results from the integration of public and private 
preferences and norms. This study has referred to this situation as either the 
public integration of private power or the market integration of public 
authority, where as a result, the nature of private influence can differ in 
accordance with these policy settings. Specifically, the public integration of
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private power, evident in the case studies in the BCBS and the IAIS, has 
shown that whilst public regulators remain the policy and decision makers 
within a standards organisation, private actors play a key role in shaping the 
normative content of those standards through deliberation. On the other 
hand, the market integration of public authority, typified by the IASB, shows 
that whilst private actors act in policy and decision making capacities, public 
actors also then play a critical role in shaping the underlying normative 
frameworks of market standards to include public priorities and normative 
considerations.
These dual conceptualisations do not mean however that such 
embedded outcomes are not without disagreement and conflict. Embedded 
outcomes do not entail mutual agreement and narrow and exclusive 
deliberation does not necessarily entail capture. As all three cases have 
shown, there were continual struggles and conflicts between policymakers 
and private actors over the content and direction of standards. The major 
banking institutions were at odds with the BCBS over many issues, including 
the inclusion of the operational risk charge and specific issues covered under 
Pillar 2 for supervisors to have national discretion. This is in spite of the fact 
that the banks largely got their way with the inclusion of the internal models 
methodology in Basel II. There was certainly no agreement between the IASB 
and other regulators -  namely the BCBS and the European Central Bank 
(ECB) over the fair value option in IAS39, prompting the regulators to 
impose their own prudential filters. In the case of the IAIS, meetings were 
entirely closed off to private Observers, or only partially opened, allowing
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regulators to determine the core Solvency framework by the time Observers 
were allowed any input and deliberation.
This means that a dual functionality in the understanding of private 
influence in governance does not necessarily entail the preponderance of 
private market interests. It is the relationship between public and private 
actors which is, in other words, a constitutive one; that is, neither public nor 
private actors were able to undertake governance without the other and their 
actions were reinforced and constituted by the actions of the other. This was 
primarily due to the way in which institutions provided both the limits of 
their roles and what they were able to achieve as well as the normative 
‘roadmap’ for what they could undertake in such settings.
The implication of these findings therefore is that private influence 
cannot be delineated from policy settings; it is not mutually exclusive and 
cannot simply be treated as such within an analysis of financial policymaking. 
The dual public integration of private power and the market integration of 
public authority contribute therefore to the conceptualisation of ‘balance’ 
between these two dominant forces in global governance. It does this by 
illustrating that it is not necessarily a numerically even paradigm (that is, one 
public authority balances one private authority); instead, it illustrates that 
‘balance’ is an institutionally enmeshed ‘fabric’ that encapsulates both the 
vertical and horizontal interweaving of decision making, policy formation, 
deliberation and ultimately norm creation by both public and private actors 
within international governance.
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This finding therefore helps us to place issues like ‘private authority’288 
into some context by understanding that private authority does not occur in a 
vacuum but instead is closely interwoven into the wider fabric of public 
governance as was seen in the case of the IASB. It likewise helps us to place 
the activity and ‘closeness’ of private actors within the policy formation 
process as not necessarily detrimental lobbying but instead as a vital part of 
the information gathering task that public actors are called upon to conduct. 
It also shows us that public policymakers are not necessarily passive agents in 
this process but active participants who can be equally influenced by the 
social norms which accompany their roles within organisations.
7.2 Rethinking Influence: im plications and policy considerations
Implications fo r  understanding the global financial crisis and the flaw s in 
the system’
One of the main implications from the findings of this study is how we can 
now understand and place into some context the role private actors have 
played in producing the global financial architecture that is being blamed for 
contributing to the global financial crisis. We can now understand that 
‘capture’ is based on a fundamental ‘supply and demand’ cycle of power 
capabilities, inherent in the technical complexities of finance, where 
regulators require specialised knowledge from the private sector. This finding 
helps us to understand that capture or the supply and demand of private 
sector capabilities in finance is based on fundamental information 
requirements, without which regulators would not be able to undertake their 
mandated policy and supervisory roles. However, most important for this
288 See for instance Cutler et al (1999)
302
study is also the finding that the supply and demand relationship between 
regulators and the finance industry does not always produce outcomes that 
benefit private interests. Interests, regardless of whether they are public or 
private, are still fundamentally constrained by institutional dynamics.
Another interesting implication from the study is on the respective 
roles of the US and the EU in producing global financial norms. ‘Cognitive 
capture’ is an issue that was raised during the global financial crisis, with 
critics highlighting that the cultural sway of Wall Street was not only to blame 
for the crisis in the US but also more generally across global financial 
policy289. However the findings reveal that US regulatory fragmentation 
marred its ability to consistently influence and dominate norms, allowing 
more united and organised EU policy prescriptions to influence the eventual 
outcome of standards. International financial standards were therefore 
largely influenced by the cultural and cognitive persuasions of the EU 
regulators, which were based on more formal and hierarchical relations with 
the private sector and where authority is considered to be the legislated realm 
of political actors.
One of the main policy implications arising from the findings of this 
study is the dilemma associated with the evidently limited supply of private 
power capabilities. A limited supply acts to bias and limit ‘choice sets’ so that 
policy options are inherently captured as a result. The obvious solution to this 
issue would be to expand supply, to broader ‘epistemic communities’, 
including academic ones who are interested in not only the applicability of 
methodologies but also their impact on broader social welfare. The problem
289 For instance, Underhill and Zhang (2003) and Buiter (2009)
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with this is that the deliberation undertaken by these standards regimes is 
technically open and all who wish to provide their comments to these 
standards regimes are able to do so. The dilemma is that these comments are 
considered ‘outside’ the supply and demand relationship that has come to be 
institutionally engrained in these regimes.
The broader issues that arise from this study therefore concern 
accountability, legitimacy and the question of participation. As Held and 
Koenig-Archibugi argue, “global governance is a highly complex phenomenon 
in terms of participating actors, modes of operation and institutional forms” 
(2004:130). To mandate specific recommendations for all forms of standard- 
setting regimes would be simplistic and ultimately futile given the long 
established patterns of exclusive interaction already considered the ‘norm’ by 
many in the financial regulatory domain. As Slaughter (2004) too argues, 
ultimately, it is policymakers who wish to respond seriously to criticisms who 
will need to formulate a solution, after verifying for themselves the scope of 
what is considered to be a problem in the first instance.
The global financial crisis has acted as an important impetus for 
leaders of the G-20 to address issues of financial governance, however they 
have responded with a policy action plan empowering the standards regimes 
to impose more stringent rules, as opposed to fundamentally reconsidering 
the accountability of the global standard-setting organisations2?0. This means 
that political leaders have deemed that these informal networks of regulators 
are fundamentally part of the global governance architecture, mandating 
them politically to deliver on producing more global regulations. The G-20
290 See for instance the G-20 Washington Action Plan and subsequent progress reports at
http://www.e20.org/pub communiques.aspx
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leaders have therefore considered the ‘flaws’ of the system to be related to the 
content of standards, rather than the more fundamental issue that underlies 
the delivery of these standards and that is the regulatory relationships that 
form part of a supply and demand chain of power.
This prompts us therefore to consider how best to enhance 
accountability and transparency so that their activities are “as visible as 
possible to legislators, interest groups and ordinary citizens by ensuring that 
they operate in a real or virtual public space” (Slaughter 2004: 172). 
Importantly, Slaughter has argued that the principle of inclusion should be 
brought to the fore, meaning that governance networks adopt clear criteria 
for participation that will be fairly applied. Based on the findings of this 
study, important lessons on inclusion and participation can be drawn from 
the case of the IAIS. The IAIS was exemplary in the way in which 
participation rules were clear to all who were involved in its activities. 
Members knew that as regulators they had clear priority over the agenda and 
policy development of proposals and that they had the prerogative of 
including private industry Observers when they saw fit, as well as the 
prerogative of excluding them if they deemed it inappropriate. Moreover, 
there were also clear rules about when and what situations were to be 
deemed inappropriate, so that Observers knew that decisions to exclude them 
were not simply at the whim of Chairpersons.
Transparent rules and guidelines were also apparent in the formal 
arrangements that structured Observer participation. This included seating, 
when Observers should be included in deliberation and how comments have 
then been taken on board is then distributed to Observers so they are aware
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of the reasons why their comments were, or were not, noted or taken on 
board. This study argues too that these participation rules played a very 
important role in constructing social boundaries and identities that served to 
differentiate the prerogatives of regulators and private industry. Unlike the 
BCBS, these interests were considered to be separate, evident in rules 
mandating closed regulatory meetings. There are therefore very clear and 
transparent rules setting out and structuring participation, so that all who are 
involved are aware of their roles and responsibilities.
This very basic principle of establishing clear participation rules is 
proposed as an important but equally practical step that could be applied to 
enhance the transparency of the supply and demand relationship in place. 
This principle does not advocate the actors that should necessarily be 
involved and included, but simply emphasises the need for these regimes to 
clearly outline the criteria for participation. Deliberative equality is the goal, 
but transparency by way of formal protocols is considered the necessary step 
towards enlarging the limited supply of participants.
Imposing institutional checks and balances in transnational governance: 
insights into institutional design
An important implication of the study is the possibility that institutions can 
be used to socially construct or reconstruct what constitutes the ‘public 
interest’. Whilst the findings of the study support the proposition that 
institutional mechanisms can be used to both enhance and constrain private 
power, this does not mean that institutional mechanisms for control will 
always ensure ‘good policy’, and do not guarantee that the ‘right’ interests are 
included in outcomes. However, what it does highlight is the very feasible
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policy option to impose institutional checks and balances to filter, reconstruct 
and ultimately produce hybrid policy outcomes, or put simply, to reconstruct 
private influence for public purposes.
Reconstructing private influence to serve the ‘public interest’ is an 
issue that is not only interesting from an academic standpoint but seems a 
much more relevant issue to consider for the practical application in global 
governance today. The very essence of private vested influence is certainly at 
odds with the outcome that public goods can be produced for all relevant 
stakeholders, by primarily using private power to help achieve this goal. 
Nonetheless utilising the essence of private influence to contribute to the 
production of global public goods is an important policy issue to consider. 
Rather than looking at ways to prevent private actors from actively engaging 
in international governance circles, it seems a much more constructive 
endeavour instead to find ways in which the realities of public and private 
relationships can produce policy outcomes that can be favourable to all.
So what socially constructed elements are necessary to deliver such 
public goods? If we look at the empirical examples in this study, these are 
certainly almost all institutional elements. Interaction between public and 
private actors which are structured through both formal channels as well as 
by the creation of institutional norms which generate the ‘public’ cause are 
important areas of further policy as well as academic consideration. Formal 
institutional elements such as the ‘Committee’ structure and the 
corresponding decision rules such as consensus and the policy deliberation 
processes that follow this structure are powerful constraints when used to 
filter vested preferences but also to reshape them into institutionalised
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preferences. Locating policy formation in various areas and involving a 
variety of different policy makers seems the first step in dispersing 
preferences and generating the initial ‘institutional’ preference.
Having an even spread of decision makers from different jurisdictions 
who are then required to come to a consensus decision is considered another 
crucial factor in generating an institutional preference. Consensus is certainly 
not a perfect science and outcomes can be generated because more powerful 
‘personalities’ and jurisdictions can make their mark and dictate the direction 
of a consensus decision. It is nonetheless considered a much more reasonable 
solution than majority vote because in the former scenario, there is less 
certainty for lobbyists to target specific votes and ‘personalities’ are not 
contingent upon their respective jurisdiction. A powerful personality might 
not necessarily come from a powerful jurisdiction. Hence, consensus relies 
much more on the power of persuasion and argumentation and not simply on 
which vote is ‘worth’ more.
Furthermore, institutional preferences are also crucially guided by the 
norms which can be created within those institutions. One of the most 
powerful norms evident in all three case studies was the desire to uphold and 
maintain ‘credibility’ both at an individual level as well as at the overall 
institutional level. Hence, the norms that are created by institutions are thus 
crucial in this analysis. An institution that is guided and pressured to 
maintain a public and professional ‘credibility’ is certainly going to generate 
identities within those institutions who act on these designated ‘roles’. 
Institutions can certainly undertake purposive actions to generate an 
institutional identity (for example, regulators who are seconded to the BCBS
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know that for a designated number of years they are members of the BCBS 
and not simply regulators from their respective jurisdictions). Global or 
‘macro-enmeshment’ between the vast numbers of international governance 
organisations has also become a crucial instigator of institutional ‘peer 
pressure’. It becomes increasingly difficult to act upon self-interested 
institutional goals in a globally governed world where competing institutional 
preferences must also come to some sort of ‘consensus’.
Overall, the findings help us to locate key institutional mechanisms 
that have the potential to govern and rein in private influence in global policy 
forums. These mechanisms are considered to be crucial substitutes for formal 
authority in informal transnational governance networks, which can be 
further enhanced and expanded through clearly demarcated protocols that 
set out what the broader social goal of the regimes should be, how the actors 
involved can contribute to this goal and as a result how organisational roles 
and identities can be constructed to produce standards to serve wider public 
prerogatives. There are therefore important examples arising from these case 
studies that could benefit from further scholarship into the issue of 
institutional design for the purpose of generating socially constructed goals.
7.3 Conclusion
This study has sought to uncover what constitutes influence in the global 
financial standards regimes and how it operates to affect outcomes. The 
findings and conclusions that support capture through the supply and 
demand relationship may certainly not be the normatively acceptable 
position, particularly in light of the detrimental role private influence has 
played in the global financial crisis. However, the findings also provide some
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light about how private influence is able to be constrained through 
institutional means. What is crucial for an analysis of private influence in the 
future, not just in international financial standardisation but also for other 
issue areas involving private actors, is to incorporate the role that private 
actors do play into an analysis of governance. This means that private 
influence is not an external force or factor which is assumed to have negative 
normative implications for the production of policy; instead, it is to decipher 
the role private influence does indeed play and what goods it contributes to 
governance. It is also to decipher how the wider policy infrastructure is then 
equipped to ensure that vested interests -  regardless of whether they are 
private or public -  are constructed in line with the broader socially 
constructed ‘good’.
Private influence therefore should not be looked upon with analytical 
suspicion and conclusions should not be reached based solely on the mere 
presence and closeness of private actors to public actors. Rather it should be 
recognised as a part of the governance machinery that is well and truly reined 
in by a well established institutional infrastructure that acts to constrain and 
shape relationships in the first place. Furthermore these findings also prompt 
us to consider further the role that institutions themselves play in creating 
governance identities and as a result, the way in which governance in the 
‘public’ interest can be constructed.
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Appendix l
List o f  interview  questions for field  research undertaken
A. Q uestions for standard setting officials
Standard-setting
1. Could you tell me the reason for why particular standards come about? (Eg 
do they arise because of industry and or regulators concerns?)
2. Could you please explain what the policy development process is for 
drafting a standard?
3. Who is responsible for drafting a standard? Where does this person/area 
derive their knowledge from?
4. Are there disagreements between members about the content of standards 
(ie the nature of the problem as well as the appropriate solution?) If so, what 
are these disagreements generally about?
5. How do disagreements get resolved?
6. Someone once said to me that a lot of negotiating on standards takes place 
in ‘back room deals’ -  is this true and if so, to what extent?
External Consultation
1. Do you engage public consultation for the draft standards?
2. Which bodies or entities do you consult?
3. As part of this consultation, to what extent do you take into account their 
concerns about the possible impact of standards?
4. Have you had an issue which was very seriously contested? If so, which 
issue was this?
5. To what extent do the standards take into account the work of other 
standard-setting bodies or other international organisations?
6. Could you tell me which ones have the most impact and why?
Consultation with Private Actors
1. What are the key issues that you take into account from private actors?
2. Are some private actors more vocal than others?
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3- Do you think they have a significant influence over the content of 
standards?
4. Some critics argue that standards reflect the interests of private actors: do 
you agree with this? If not, why?
Organisational dynamics
1. Does the organisation report to other bodies or organisations? If yes, to 
which body and what is the purpose of the reporting mechanism?
2. How and why did this reporting mechanism come about?
3. If there is no reporting mechanism, who or what has recognised the 
organisation to be the appropriate authority for standard-setting?
4. Could you tell me the reasons why the organisation is made up of the 
members that it has? Is this historical? Or has it evolved?
B. Q uestions to private entities
1. Can you please explain your organisation’s role in international standard- 
setting initiatives?
2. What is your organisation’s primary objective?
3. Which international standard-setters do you have a particular interest in 
consulting with?
4. What sort of consultations arrangements do you have with international 
bodies?
5. Is your correspondence both formal and informal? (for example, written 
correspondence as well as face to face meetings?)
6. Do standard-setting bodies consult you prior to issuing a finalised 
standard?
7. Do you attend drafting meetings of the standard-setters?
8. Could you tell me the reason for why particular standards come about? (Eg 
do they arise because of industry and or regulators concerns?
9. To what extent do you think standard-setting bodies take your represented 
concerns into account?
10. If the standard is considered to negatively affect your represented 
interests, is there anything that you can do in order to have these amended?
11. Do you think standards achieve their intended aim? (eg financial stability)
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12. Do you think standards overall negatively impact your industry? If yes, 
why?
13. Could you tell me the reasons why your organisation is made up of the 
members that it has? Is this historical? Or has it evolved?
14. Do those members generally have the same sorts of concerns or do they 
vary significantly?
15. If they vary, how are you able to obtain consensus on the policy positions?
16. When you personally participate in standard-setting forums (eg with 
other industry as well as regulatory participants) can you describe what the 
level of inter-personal rapport is like between participants? (eg friendly, 
formal, etc)
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Appendix 2
C onfiden tial L ist o f In terv iew s
Case S tudy O rgan isa tion D ate
(D ay/M onth /Y ear)
BCBS
Interview 1 BCBS 29/11/2006
Interview 2 BCBS 29/11/2006
Interview 3 BCBS 29/11/2006
Interview 4 ISDA 24/1/2007
Interview 5 ISDA 24/1/2007
Interview 6 Banking Association2^ 8/9/2006
Interview 7 Banking Association1^ 2 8/3/2007
IAIS
Interview 1 IAIS 29/11/2006
Interview 2 IAIS 29/11/2006
Interview 3 IAIS 29/11/2006
Interview 4 IAIS 29/11/2006
Interview 5 IAIS 29/11/2006
Interview 6 IAIS 29/11/2006
Interview 7 IAIS 30/11/2006
Interview 8 IAIS 13/2/2006
Interview 9 IAIS 13/2/2006
Interview 10 IAIS 25/6/2009
Interview 11 NAIC 6/3/2007
Interview 12 NAIC 6/3/2007
Interview 13 IMF 6/3/2007
Interview 14 IMF 6/3/2007
Interview 15 World Bank 7/3/2007
Interview 16 American Insurance 
Association
7/3/2007
IASB
Interview 1 IASB 17/11/2006
Interview 2 ISDA 30/1/2007
Interview 3 BCBS 29/11/2006
Interview 4 IAIS 30/11/2006
29! This international banking association did not wish to be named in any printed context. 
292 ibid.
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